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ABSTRACT
Trust and Communication in Cross-Border Counterterrorism Networks
by
Cali Mortenson Ellis
Professor Allan C. Stam, Co-Chair
Assistant Professor John D. Ciorciari, Co-Chair
The effective implementation of national homeland security strategies is particularly
challenging at the international border, where local actors are the front line of defense,
and where security professionals face complex obstacles to cooperation for shared
security goals. Despite their importance, these local actors are often overlooked in
policy planning and scholarly analyses. As a result, political scientists and public
policy scholars are at a loss to explain why some security communities are more
effective than others when critical emergencies test the limits of carefully laid plans.
I argue that the development of interpersonal trust in a networked setting can
explain this variation in observed outcomes. Dyadic-level trust is a form of social
capital that allows actors from diverse bureaucracies to overcome substantial legal and
organizational barriers in the face of limited resources and potentially large threats.
In the homeland security context, individuals often function under tremendous
pressure and in high-stress situations. Under such conditions, the setting for the
development of trust begins as a result of interactions that give professionals the
opportunity to get to know other in formal and informal non-emergency settings.
xvi
However, while formal institutions such as mandated exercises and meetings provide
an important opportunity to meet, they are not sufficient for trust development.
Instead, repeated interactions set the stage for the formation of trust relationships as
individuals have the opportunity to demonstrate their competence under pressure and
share important and relevant information. Depending on the situation, interpersonal
trust can act as a complement or a substitute for institutional requirements, laws and
procedures.
My dissertation seeks to explain how interpersonal trust develops at the individual
and community levels in the high-stakes environment of domestic counterterrorism.
My research utilizes social network surveys complemented by qualitative interviews
with a difficult-to-reach population to map networks of homeland security profession-
als and explain how trust develops in one international border security community. A
more complete understanding of how interpersonal trust relationships interact with
institutional mandates is important for policymakers seeking the most effective use
of homeland security resources, and I conclude practical policy recommendations for




Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a
better balance between security and shared knowledge.
9/11 Commission Report, p. 417.
The really big puzzle in the social sciences is why cooperation levels vary
so much and why specific configurations of situational conditions increase
or decrease cooperation. This question is important not only for our scien-
tific understanding but also for the design of institutions to facilitate indi-
viduals’ achieving higher levels of productive outcomes in social-dilemma
situations.
Ostrom 2003, p. 39.
1.1 Motivation
On September 11, 2001 (9/11), the border between the United States and Canada
almost completely shut down.
The immediate economic toll was tremendous (Makinen, 2002). While the major-
ity of domestic economic impacts were clustered in New York City, the international
U.S.–Canada border was strongly affected as well. In an environment of extreme fear
1
and uncertainty, travelers, vehicles, and workers were all halted for inspections and
questioning which could take up to nine hours (Edmonson, 2001). Assembly plants
of major auto manufacturers located near the border, such as DaimlerChrysler, hav-
ing spent years perfecting profitable just-in-time inventory processes to exploit the
unique advantages of each nation, ground to a halt as critical parts failed to arrive
and workers from both the U.S. and Canada were sent home (The Canadian Press,
2001). The day after the attacks, Ford closed every single one of its plants in the U.S.
and Canada (Associated Press, 2001).
Figure 1.1: Annual Freight Tonnage through the U.S.-Canada Border in 2002.
Beyond just the auto industry, the economic effects of this closure were felt
throughout the U.S. and Canada, across multiple manufacturing sectors. As Fig-
ure 1.1 graphically displays, Michigan has long been the nation’s primary gateway
for international trade with Canada, carrying 27 percent of all land-based interna-
tional trade in North America. In 2001, the Ambassador Bridge connecting Detroit
to Windsor, Ontario, was the busiest commercial crossing in the U.S., with traffic
of approximately 12,000 trucks per day. The Blue Water Bridge, connecting Port
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Huron, Michigan and Sarnia, Ontario, was the busiest entry point for hazardous, ra-
dioactive, and flammable materials between the two nations (McDaniel, Groden and
Friedland, 2005). This border continues to be the location of one of the most impor-
tant and largest bilateral trading partnerships in the world, with $1.5 billion of trade
every single day (DHS, 2012b) and a major security breach would have tremendous
economic impacts in North America and worldwide.
U.S.–Canada border security is a major source of concern for counter-terrorism
analysts. Due to a long history of being, or being perceived as “the longest undefended
border in the world,” (Andreas, 2003) the events of 9/11 brought the vulnerabilities
of this border into focus. Both governments are acutely concerned about human
smuggling, illegal immigration, and the movement of drugs and weapons across the
border, in addition to the potential of a direct terrorist attack (Whitaker, 2004). In
2012, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the first comprehensive
approach to this border in the Northern Border Strategy (NBS) (DHS, 2012b). In
this document, DHS identified their key goals as:
• Deterring and preventing terrorism and smuggling, trafficking, and illegal im-
migration
• Safeguarding and encouraging the efficient flow of lawful trade, travel, and im-
migration
• Ensuring community resiliency before, during, and after terrorist attacks and
other disasters. (DHS, 2012b, p. 1)
Although there are many global and domestic threats that are key components of
the U.S. homeland security mission, due to its geographic proximity and direct trade
dependence, the U.S.–Canada border is one of the most critical.
While the challenges of this border – in terms of first response, communications,
and planning – are fundamentally local, the effects of border threats are enormous,
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potentially impacting the large economies of the U.S. and Canada, with ripple effects
around the world. As important as the actions and mandates of the principals at the
top of any national hierarchy are, they must rely on their agents at the state and local
level for day-to-day terrorism prevention and response. As Clarke and Chenoweth
(2006, p. 95) note, “Regardless of the national character of homeland security policy,
the reality is that all terrorism is local. Ultimately so are all security initiatives.
Paradoxically, the greater the national security threats, the more important the local
role in the United States.” These local actors and their actions are understudied in
the political science literature, and research on them can provide microfoundational
insights into the mechanisms underlying assumptions of models used to study the
policy responses to terrorism.
The United States federal government has invested considerable resources, both
domestically and abroad, to ensure greater levels of internal security. One of the
most prominent flaws highlighted by the 9/11 Commission Report (2004) was the
failure of communication between officials of different counterterrorism agencies. U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
analysts, local police officers and others all had pieces of the puzzle that could have
potentially prevented these devastating attacks, but none had the full information
necessary to act. 9/11 therefore precipitated the development of hundreds of new
laws, ushering in a new era of primarily top-down federal bureaucracy which sought
to formalize the process of networking and information sharing, particularly within
the law enforcement and intelligence communities.
New bureaucratic agencies, such as the DHS and the position of U.S. Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) were created in response, tasked with driving the process
of increased sharing of information and actionable intelligence between agencies and
individual actors. The creation of the DHS represented one of the largest reorgani-
zations of federal bureaucracy in United States history. According to Kettl (2003,
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p. 259), “Analysts have called the new department the biggest federal government
restructuring since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. In fact, it
is the most complicated restructuring in U.S. history.” While approximately $200
billion has been spent to strengthen internal security structures, by 2008, over $850
billion was spent to reduce or eliminate terrorist networks overseas through military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Feller, 2008).
Roberts (2007) indicates that the U.S. federal government’s immediate reaction
to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was to issue a raft of dramatic new mandates to the
states, without seeking their expertise or providing sufficient funding. According to
Eisinger (2006, p. 538),
Although cities immediately began to develop their own security plans on
an ad hoc basis and assign law enforcement personnel to guard vulnerable
infrastructure, Congress did not provide any federal funds to defray these
outlays until March 2003, a year and a half after the attacks, nor did the
Homeland Security Council provide any guidance for local planning or
strategies to begin taking on new homeland security responsibilities.
A lack of communication and trust between levels of government developed imme-
diately and persisted for years. At the local level, the newly-formed U.S. Office of
Homeland Security (OHS) introduced the National Strategy for Homeland Security,
a national plan intended to clarify the roles of multiple levels of government in com-
bating the terrorist threat.
Figure 1.2 shows the incident command structure of National Incident Manage-
ment System (NIMS) (DHS, 2008), the primary framework developed by the U.S.
for integrating responses to incidents at all levels (Buck, Trainor and Aguirre, 2006).
NIMS is an extension of Incident Command System (ICS), an emergency manage-
ment system and set of protocols, training, and accepted language designed to be
understood by a variety of actors working together under acutely difficult circum-
5
Figure 1.2: NIMS Incident Command System: Command Staff and General Staff.
(DHS, 2008)
stances, such as disaster response, and, as of 2005, was a condition for the receipt of
homeland security grant funding (Jensen, 2008). As DHS describes it:
ICS is a widely applicable management system designed to enable effec-
tive, efficient incident management by integrating a combination of fa-
cilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating
within a common organizational structure. (DHS, 2008, p. 45)
Figure 1.2 shows the general hierarchy and allocation of roles in the midst of an
incident, but does not prescribe the agency representatives that fill each role – these
are dependent on local circumstances and the nature of the incident.
Yet even strong federal reorganization and funding-conditional mandates do not
guarantee information sharing. While new legislation and DHS regulations have re-
quired certain types of communication, such as the requirements of the NIMS, these
procedures are generally only needed and followed once an emergency is already un-
derway, and individuals are in the middle of a high-stress critical situation. Despite
such rules for communications and information sharing across domains, pre-existing
structures of trusted professional networks can lead to imperfect implementation of
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these rules. At a January 2008 conference of Homeland Security professionals in
New York City, participants in one session expressed extreme frustration with the
state of communication among homeland security officials. As one participant in the
New York conference stated, “You can really only talk to people in an emergency if
you were able to swap business cards at the golf course in the past” (personal com-
municaton, 2008). Taking this statement on its face, one challenge for policymaker
principals in the counterterrorism domain seems to be to find ways to strengthen reg-
ular communication among agents across multiple bureaucracies and with external
stakeholders.
But mandated exercises, inter-organizational meetings and other formal institu-
tions are not sufficient for the development of trust. Now, the new homeland security
mission encompasses many more entities, from hospitals to private sector holders
of critical infrastructure. This provides fresh impetus for understanding the work-
ings of entities as the sub-federal level because, as Caruson and MacManus (2006, p.
523) point out, “Local governments must manage the vast majority of critical duties
associated with emergency preparedness while first-responder groups – emergency
personnel, firefighters, law enforcement, and local health care workers – provide the
first line of defense in the event of a terrorist attack.” Professionals in sub-federal
agencies are acutely aware of this burden.
Recent political science research on counterterrorism and homeland security has
focused on the allocation of defensive resources against terrorist threats (Powell 2007a;
Powell 2007b; Bueno de Mesquita 2007), public support for homeland security mea-
sures (Hetherington and Suhay 2011; Healy and Malhotra 2009), the effect of city
governance on homeland security outcomes (Chenoweth and Clarke, 2010), and home-
land security as a federalism problem (Scavo, Kearney and Kilroy Jr., 2007). Given
the dramatic changes that have occurred and continue to occur in laws and society
after 9/11, this is an area that seems likely to be a more important part of future
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academic discourse. In other words, it is an empirical domain that social scientists
are just beginning to understand, but is unlikely to become irrelevant.
1.1.1 The Policy Problem
How does interpersonal trust develop in the high-stakes environment of domes-
tic counterterrorism? Large-scale quantitative analyses of observational data have
provided numerous useful insights into the political dynamics of terrorism and coun-
terterrorism. But, at the end of the day, most defensive antiterrorism and much
offensive counterterrorism happens at the local level. The 9/11 Commission Report
(2004), in the best-known example, notes how hijacker Ziad Jarrah was pulled over
by local police in Maryland for a speeding violation on September 9, 2001. The very
first responders at the Twin Towers in New York were local police and firefighters.
The Millennium Plot was foiled in 1999 by an attentive border guard. My research
seeks to answer the question of why we observe greater levels of cooperation in some
counterterrorism communities than others. This matters because, as Joyal (2012,
p. 6) notes, “Trust is an indispensable quality that is difficult to bureaucratically
engineer. Thus, if the law enforcement community is truly to collaborate in the
shared goal of homeland security, the impact of interpersonal relationships cannot
be discounted.” I study these local agents directly in order to understand the ef-
fect of interpersonal trust on network cohesiveness across and between organizations,
particularly in settings with large legal and bureaucratic barriers to cooperation. I
argue that interpersonal trust within social networks is an important and measurable
intervening variable that is not captured by existing bureaucratic politics models.
My analysis is therefore at the level of actors in diverse bureaucracies who must
cooperate for a shared outcome. I seek to explain how trust forms in different net-
work conditions, such as those externally imposed by occupation, legal constraints, or
cultural norms. Interpersonal trust has both dyadic and network effects that magnify
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the efforts of any one individual, be they principal or agent. In an especially complex
system such as an international border community, with multiple overlapping and
competing jurisdictions and interests, agents face legal, procedural, and geographic
barriers that impede formal cooperation, often leaving informal cooperation as the
only alternative to failure in the face of potential threats.
In this setting, network trust is best thought of as a conceptual model:











where Tn indicates overall levels of trust within the network and is a function
of Te, individual levels of “trustingness” (at the ego-level, see Yamagishi, Kikuchi
and Kosugi 1999), Fa is a set of measurements of familiarity (culture), Pa considers
professional status (institutions), and Ψa captures a set of assessments about each
alter 1 named in the survey.
The link between enhanced communication and effectiveness is well-studied in the
organizational studies literature. Across multiple settings, including security contexts
in the U.S. and other countries, researchers have found that coordinated inter-agency
communication (Wang and Kuo, 2014), facilitating connections between agencies with
different missions (Kelman, Hong and Turbitt, 2013), and reducing hierarchical struc-
tures (Thatcher, 2004) result in measurably more effective outcomes in crisis response.
In contrast, failures in communication were shown to have exacerbated the disasters
of Hurricane Katrina (Farazmand, 2009) and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Birk-
land and DeYoung, 2011), as well as tornadoes (McEntire, 2002), wildfires (Weick,
1993), and earthquakes (Comfort, 1994).
Despite the important role of institutions such as NIMS, interpersonal trust can-
not be legislated or mandated, but can be facilitated or hindered by both policy
prescriptions and individual actions. Beyond the mandates of grant funding in the
1A given individual named by a respondent in the survey described in Chapter IV.
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U.S. (which require the exercise and use of the NIMS structure under simulated
emergency conditions), further interactions can facilitate the formation of trust rela-
tionships through demonstrated competence in real-world situation and information
sharing. This research suggests that better understanding the needs of sub-federal
actors can have policy implications that can potentially displace the need for difficult
legal modifications at the national and international levels.
My research draws from the interdisciplinary social science literature on trust
(Subsection 2.1) and the political science literature of bureaucratic politics (Subsec-
tion 2.2). The trust literature explicitly incorporates the role of norms in organiza-
tions and communities, but rarely examines how communities with different norms
interact with each other in order to achieve a shared goal. The bureaucratic politics
literature examines systems such as those inhabited by the homeland security agents
under study, but has done very little empirical research on the role of trust as a norm
moderating other identified influences within a bureaucracy.
Using new survey data supplemented by extensive qualitative interviews with a
rarely studied and difficult-to-access population, my dissertation examines interper-
sonal trust formation among bureaucratic agents in the defender networks of two
countries in an international counterterrorism community. It seeks to describe the
structure of these homeland security communities and explain how agents form trust-
ing relationships and perceive trust of others in the community. In studying the
unique bureaucratic structure of international homeland security communities, it pro-
vides a novel empirical contribution to the political science literature on bureaucratic
politics and a theoretical contribution to the larger social science literature on trust,
bridging the two by focusing on the overlap of shared social norms.
As noted in Equation (1.1), I argue that the formation of network trust, as an
aggregate measure of the trust within multiple dyads, is a function of a number of
covariates, including professional function and standing, length of relationship, and
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ego-level predisposition to trust. Although trust cannot be forced on agents through
legal mandates, principals can implement certain practices to facilitate trust forma-
tion and the desired output of improved inter-agency cooperation in cross-border
counterterrorism defender networks.
1.2 Why Homeland Security?
Focusing this study on homeland security provides both a limitation and an op-
portunity. This research is inevitably limited in the ways it can connect with prior
political science scholarship on the homeland security aspect of counterterrorism.
What has been published to date has focused on limited areas of this complex field,
in many cases what was ascertained through analysis of observational data which is
almost exclusively available at the federal level (see, for example, Prante and Bohara
2008; Mueller and Stewart 2011b; Mueller 2010; Chenoweth and Clarke 2010).
While the contribution of federal funding to state governments is a very expensive
and important component of homeland security, it is far from complete. Caruson and
MacManus (2006, p. 523) make the point that, “Many post–9/11 analyses emphasized
federal-state relations rather than federal-local or state-local relations in spite of the
critical role that local governments were expected to play in homeland security policy.”
I am only aware of one cross-sectional dataset (Mayer, 2009) that analyzes homeland
security expenditures at the sub-federal level, or homeland security funding which
is not due to federal pass-through funds but rather from local and state general
fund budgets (and therefore a closer reflection of the policy trade-offs made at the
state level). Despite major changes in funding, local officials remain the front line of
counterterrorism within the boundaries of the U.S., inevitably in the area of mitigation
and to some extent in the area of prevention.
As an opportunity, collecting data at the local level can provide greater insights
into the mechanisms driving outcomes observed using federal data. For example,
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Chenoweth and Clarke (2010, p. 9) utilize statistical tests on federal grant-level data
to conclude that,
[B]etter performance appears more likely to the extent that these ef-
forts create governance arrangements and nested institutions with well-
established partnerships and formal rules, compared with loosely struc-
tured relationships of more autonomous units.
This is a directly testable proposition, and my dissertation contributes evidence about
the presence and effect of such partnerships and rules in a homeland security com-
munity, and how these “nested institutions” can hinder or facilitate cooperation in a
challenging setting.
1.3 Generalizability beyond Homeland Security
Homeland security is a valid empirical domain for studying the mechanisms of
trust, because it involves actors who must both maintain vigilance against potential
terrorist threats and cooperate closely in crisis conditions. Studying homeland se-
curity actors helps political scientists understand the “black box” of decisionmaking
in a security context, providing greater insights into the psychological mechanisms
at play that are generalizable to other security contexts, such as national security
decisionmaking.
Just like politicians who get their start locally and move onto higher levels of
responsibility through their careers, a number of actors in the local homeland security
context have either come from national level security decisionmaking contexts, or
will end up there. It is not unreasonable to believe that some of the mechanisms
for developing trust in a security context at the local level are also observed at the
national level, making this work a potentially useful empirical contribution to theories
that seek to explain decisionmaking as part of international strategic interaction.
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According to Fry-Pierce and Lenze (2011, p. 2),
In foreign policy and by extension, homeland security, bureaucratic poli-
tics is often described as a one-dimensional battle for power at the exec-
utive level whereby “[o]ne may, at best, respect the crafty gamesmanship
of certain players, but underneath there is a fundamental unease with the
idea of bureaucrats operating in self-consciously political ways.”
Trust and communication are elements that come into play when describing such “po-
litical” behaviors, and bureaucratic structure is one possible factor affecting information-
sharing and organizational efficacy through interpersonal trust. My dissertation pro-
vides microfoundational research to help shed light into the actual mechanisms and
processes at work in ways that prior research has only done to a limited extent.
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter II provides an overview of the in-
terdisciplinary literature on trust and the political science literature on bureaucratic
politics. The trust literature is especially important for understanding the sources of
interpersonal trust in a bi-national, multi-organizational setting encompassing multi-
ple bureaucracies. Chapter III describes the theoretical model of trust suggested by
the literature, and how it might be observed in a social network setting. I present my
hypotheses and explain how and why I elected to study this topic through survey-
based social network analysis instead of potential alternative approaches. Chapter IV
describes the survey instrument and procedure in more detail and presents the new
data. I describe the characteristics of those individuals within the network, as well
as those outside the network. I review descriptive statistics for each question in the
dataset and test the hypotheses. In Chapter V, I share the qualitative interviews with
selected individuals in the survey study area. These interviews provide context for
findings from the survey data, and the subjects explain their own perception of the
issues of trust development, communication and effectiveness hinted at by the survey.
Finally, in Chapter VI, I review the findings, discuss limitations of this research, and
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suggest next steps both in terms of future scholarly research on homeland security
bureaucratic actors, and practical policy suggestions for the actors themselves.
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CHAPTER II
State of the Literature and Theoretical
Implications
To situate my argument that interpersonal trust relationships in the homeland
security context arise from repeated dyadic interactions incorporating the factors of
ego, culture, and institutions, my research draws from the interdisciplinary social
science literature on trust (Section 2.1) and the political science literature of bureau-
cratic politics (Section 2.2). The bureaucratic politics literature examines systems
such as those inhabited by the homeland security agents under study, but has done
very little empirical research on the role of trust as a norm moderating other identified
influences within a bureaucracy. The trust literature explicitly incorporates the role
of norms in organizations and communities, but rarely examines how communities
with different norms interact with each other in order to achieve a shared goal.
This dissertation does not focus on major parts of the current terrorism literature
– specifically terrorist mobilization, recruitment, organization, motivation, and other
related issues. While important, such issues are not central to the defensive actors
under study here. To put it bluntly – in this setting, it doesn’t matter why terrorists
want to attack, only that they might do so, along some continuum of risk. This
is consistent with the “all-hazards” approach to homeland security and emergency
management that seeks to prepare responders for a multitude of potential threats,
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both strategic and non-strategic (Brooks, Bodeau and Fedorowicz, 2012).
2.1 Trust
From an academic standpoint, this research contributes to study of trust in two
ways. First, it contributes useful evidence to the debate over which approach –
institutional rational choice or social psychology – better explains the development of
trust in a group that is rarely studied and has important public policy implications.
Second, the literature on trust incorporates norms in organizations and communities,
but less frequently discusses how these groups, communities or organizations establish
norms with each other. This is important because it is recognized that sub-group
cooperation is often needed to solve complex problems, a point emphasized by Ostrom
(2003, p. 60) when she stated, “The endogenous process would be to break up the
organization into smaller local associations in which face-to-face communication about
common problems within the smaller unit would be possible.”
Trust is not a necessary condition for cooperation to occur. According to rational
actor theories, cooperation can occur through the selfish motivations of individuals.
Yet, as the opening quotation from Elinor Ostrom indicates, trust can facilitate co-
operative outcomes in complex social situations. Mulder et al. (2006) differentiate
between internal and external motivations to cooperate, pointing out that outcomes
based on external motivations may not be reflective of trust at all, and may even
indicate distrust. One puzzle is how to disentangle which mechanism is at work in a
given social context.
A major challenge for effective communication in defender networks has been the
development of trust between different types of bureaucratic actors. For example, or-
ganizational distrust may exist between different law enforcement agencies, but also
between law enforcement as a whole and non-law enforcement actors, such as hos-
pitals, which have fundamentally different missions. Yet trust can be a contributing
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factor to achieving the benefits of cooperative outcomes. Dupont (2006, p. 178) pro-
vides a useful and concrete illustration of how trust operates to solve collective action
problems in the security community he studied:
One intangible manifestation of these emergent properties is the trust and
reciprocity that are instrumental in achieving collective outcomes: take for
example the case of a subway station located within a university campus
where frequent political demonstrations spill over on the crowded streets
in its vicinity. When good relationships exist between the campus police,
subway security and the municipal force, coordinated responses to equip-
ment theft, vandalism and potential disruptions to public order deliver
positive impacts that cannot be broken down according the measurable
contribution of each partner. The trust that binds them together (and
can be generated by a range of processes) is also a significant factor that
is rarely taken into account.
Although interpersonal trust is not always essential for achieving cooperation or col-
lective action, it is an important catalyst in a wide range of policymaking contexts
(Cook, Hardin and Levi, 2005). In a review of experimental work on trust, Ostrom
(2003, p. 34) finds that “Building trust appears to be a key link in the communication-
cooperation connection.” It is therefore important to begin with an overview of the
literature on trust.
Exclusions
Much of the most important work on trust in political science has been done on
the role of trust in institutions.1 The longitudinal decline in measures of trust noted
by Putnam (2000) are correlated with declining trust in government, politicians,
1See Levi and Stoker 2000 for an overview of the development of this line of research; also Citrin
and Muste 1999.
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and government institutions (Hetherington, 1998). Because my research is focused
only on people inside of bureaucracies, and not their relationship to the public at
large, I instead draw from the literature on interpersonal trust, which uses different
constructs.
2.1.1 Models of Trust in International Security
In political science, trust in an international security context has been studied
largely in the abstract, at a high level of decision making. In the rational choice
tradition, Kydd (2000) and Maoz and Felsenthal (1987), for example, combine formal
models of trust with illustrative case studies. In these cases, the predictions made
by these well-developed models are empirically supported by a limited number of
descriptive cases. The use of descriptive case studies in this fashion suffers from
potentially serious selection bias (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Geddes 1990) and
therefore can be problematic as a standard of evidence for assessing the theories
posited. McGillivray and Smith (2003) develop a comprehensive formal model of
trust without any empirical component at all.
Fearon and Laitin (1996) explore the consequences of trust through a formally
modeled social matching game. They argue that the most desirable equilibrium,
from the perspective of promoting social cooperation across groups, is one where
individuals cooperate with each other, except when their opponent is being publicly
punished by their own group. While their work examined interethnic cooperation, the
concepts are also applicable to the homeland security context, where, instead of ethnic
loyalties, individuals are grouped by different types of affiliations – professional (police
or firefighters), national (U.S. or Canada), level of government (local or national), and
sector (public or private), for example Ostrom (2003, p. 33) notes that laboratory
experimental work on trust reinforces this claim, stating that, “. . . many mutually
reinforcing processes are invoked when communication is allowed. Unless mutual
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trust in the promises that are exchanged were to increase, however, expectations of
the behavior of others would not change.” Taken together, these findings hint that
one of the mechanisms that facilitates cooperation is the presence of an institution
that effects communication of in-group public punishment.
As noted earlier, while such a public sanctioning system may increase coopera-
tion, it may not necessarily increase trust. Mulder et al. (2006, p. 148), in a series
of laboratory experiments, find evidence for this and argue that, “. . . a sanctioning
system can decrease trust that others are internally motivated to cooperate. Our
reasoning for this is that a sanctioning system could serve as a message of distrust
towards group members.”
2.1.2 Institutional Approches to Trust
In the view of scholars such as Ostrom (1998), institutions, with monitoring and
enforcement rules to detect and punish defectors, play an important role in the devel-
opment of trust in this context. She incorporates the major concepts of interpersonal
trust, generalized trust, and horizontal social networks to describe communities where
trust is an issue. Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994) speak specifically to the role of
social networks from the perspective of personal communications, focusing on whether
people communicate by participating in voluntary associations. Scholars have found
differing expectations for the role of enforcement in building trust and cooperation,
leading to a problem of confusing causation. As Leach and Sabatier (2005, p. 493)
note,
If institutions can be viewed as both a precursor to trust and a societal
response to distrust, then institutions and trust might correlate either
positively or negatively in a cross-sectional study. A positive correlation
would indicate that the rational-choice mechanism dominates. A negative
correlation would indicate that the social capital mechanism is stronger.
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2.1.3 Social Psychological Approches to Trust
From the perspective of social psychology, Leach and Sabatier (2005)’s Advocacy
Coalition Framework, in which professionals negotiate with others from a set of beliefs
unique to each actor, seeks to distinguish between “deep core beliefs” and “policy core
beliefs” suggesting that the latter is more important for actors trying to negotiate
policy. In this view, individuals must rely on heuristic shortcuts to assess the trust-
worthiness of others. Assuming that personal beliefs, rather than rational decisions,
are the main factor driving trust (or the lack thereof) between individuals, Leach and
Sabatier posit that trust develops when other individuals come to believe, either with
the help of a mediator or some other process, that the “core beliefs” of other line up
with their own. Leach and Sabatier find strong support for the importance of belief
in fairness and legitimacy of the process in developing trust, suggesting that, “One
strategy for pursuing such an integrated framework is to further define the scope of
the two underlying models. . . For example, scholars could seek to identify the range of
political situations where rationality dominates human behavior, and those that call
forth the psyche” (Leach and Sabatier, 2005, p. 500). I argue that communications
among members of a cross-border counterterrorism community fall into the latter
category.
2.1.4 Empirical Validation of Trust Models
Empirical validation for formal models of trust in political science has come from
several methods. Scholars working in the social psychology and behavioral economics
traditions utilize primarily experimental settings testing the assumptions of formal
game theoretic models.2 Parks, Henager and Scamahorn (1996) use lab experiments
to approximate how trust models from international relations may operate in a very
limited context. While such laboratory experiments with undergraduate subjects are
2See, for example, Arce, Croson and .Eckel 2011; Glaeser et al. 2000.
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more likely to be inferentially valid evidence for the theories posited, they suffer from
the well-known problem of generalizability to other populations. While this may be
less of a problem in psychology, where individuals are assumed to share a number of
psychological constructs and decision making processes over various situations, the
problem of generalizability becomes more acute in political science, which in certain
domains is explicitly interested in the behavior of political actors, or individuals acting
with a specific political motivation within the bounds of political institutions.
Survey research has also been used in the political science literature to provide
empirical evidence of theories of trust, most notably in the the General Social Survey
(GSS) and World Values Survey. In the security context, Brewer et al. (2004) use
survey data to assess how individual’s perceptions how their nation interacts with
of other nations helps shape U.S. foreign policy decisions. Hetherington and Suhay
(2011) and Green et al. (2011) use experimental survey methodology to understand
how individual attitudes toward civil liberties and authority have changed since 9/11,
while work by Merolla and Zechmeister (2009) use experimental survey methods to
find evidence of the effect of terrorist threats on U.S. voting behavior. While these
surveys have the benefit of generally covering larger populations and therefore having
greater external validity, their reliance on self-reports of levels of trust can limit their
effectiveness in measuring actual trust behaviors.
In other social science fields, large-scale surveys ask respondents to make self-
assessments of trust with questions such as “Do you trust other people?” which
may differ from actual trust behaviors, particularly in real world settings. In the
social network literature, Constant, Sproull and Kiesler (1996) found that network
colleagues who were “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973) provided better information
if they had access to better resources. This study was also important because it
examined the role of “diversity” in the value of information in response to requests,
finding that diversity may be valuable when the network consists of individuals with
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a wide variety of levels of experience. This concept is particularly important to the
study of counterterrorism communities, which now include an unprecedented variety
of actors, from law enforcement officers to hospital administrators.
Leach and Sabatier (2005) incorporate models of trust from both the theories of
institutional rational choice and social psychology to examine the development of
trust among policy elites using surveys of distinct stakeholder communities. Trust,
in their definition, comes from iterated interactions where an actor keeps her word,
noting that, “Trust ought to be correlated with the length, depth, and recency of past
collaboration” (Leach and Sabatier, 2005, p. 492).
This research seeks to extend this mode of inquiry by using such surveys as starting
point for understanding trust and collaboration in a different kind of community –
a counterterrorism community – where interperonsal trust may be formed differently
due to professional constraints and the unique pressures of facing a potential strategic
terrorist adversary.
2.2 Bureaucratic Politics
The political science research agenda of bureaucratic politics, with its emphasis on
unpacking the “black box” of group processes, provides the most useful theoretical lens
for examining these questions. Specifically, the literatures on organizational culture
(Monten and Bennett, 2010) and “politics from below” (Brower and Abolafia, 1997)
provide testable conjectures about how norms such as trust can influence processes
within and between bureaucracies for which policymaker principals seek to control
outputs.
This dissertation contributes to the study of bureaucratic politics in three ways.
First, it addresses the tension between rational choice models and social psychology
models of bureaucratic process by explicitly including psychological variables. Second,
it builds on the literature of organizational culture (Monten and Bennett, 2010), by
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providing empirical evidence for the existence and effects of a specific type of norm
– trust – in a novel setting. Third, it provides stronger evidence for the phenomenon
of “politics from below” (Brower and Abolafia, 1997), which examines in detail how
low-level bureaucrats exercise power in ways that appear only as “friction” in models
of higher-level decisionmaking.
Exclusions
At the outset, it is important to note what is not included in this research. Bu-
reaucratic politics literature deals with the development of policy at the legislative
and rulemaking level first, and the implementation level second. Analysis of the leg-
islation and presidential directives which created the DHS comes from, for example,
May, Jochim and Sapotichne (2011) and Inamete (2006). As this research was carried
out at the local level, the legislative and rulemaking components of the bureaucratic
process, including those that influence the rules with which the participants are ex-
pected to comply, were not studied. Instead, local implementation is the focus.
Interest groups, their roles and influence, are also a major focus for bureaucratic
politics scholars. Interest groups usually have the greatest stake in bureaucracies
during the creation phase, and ongoing stakes in modifying the actions of the bu-
reaucracy to fit their preferred outcomes (Yackee, 2006). While interest groups in
the field of homeland security are legion and important, they do not directly affect
the bureaucracy at the level I am studying it, and therefore are not included in this
analysis.
Instead, this research seeks to explain how trust between actors inter-organizational
forms in different network conditions when working in a complex environment of mul-
tiple public and private bureaucracies at the local, international level.
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2.2.1 Bureaucratic Politics – Rational Choice Models
Rational choice approaches (Bendor and Moe, 1985; Hammond, 1986) provide
one important analytical framework for addressing the questions of bureaucratic pol-
itics. In the domain of bureaucratic control or delegation, a number of rational choice
models illustrate important concepts of strategic bureaucratic behavior which are rele-
vant to international homeland security communities. Building on Huber, Shipan and
Pfahler (2001)’s comparative theory of legislative delegation to bureaucrats, which in-
corporates concepts of political context, professional capacity, bargaining costs and
non-statutory control opportunities to explain how legislative principals can encour-
age resistant agent bureaucracies to carry out desired policy, this research takes a
comparative approach to the question of trust between bureaucracies by examining
two homeland security communities where many factors are the same, but certain
cultural and insitutional factors differ.
I also utilize Gailmard and Patty (2007)’s “slackers” and “zealots” model of in-
trinsic motivation of individual bureaucrats, which captures, although formally, the
connection between individual norms, time spent working in a particular organization
and the development of relevant expertise, which is operationalized as an indepen-
dent variable in the survey component of the research. Tenure of this sort, in turn,
is linked to norms in the literature on trust. Huber and McCarty (2004)’s model
of bureaucratic capacity, particularly related to the threat of punishment for certain
agents, is also applicable to the setting being studied.
Although there may be some ability for centralized policymaker prinicipals to
exercise control over the federal agents in the homeland security community, there
is less ability to control local agents, and essentially no control over agents from
other countries and the private sector. Fostering interpersonal trust, from the ground
up, is one way for principal policymakers interested in effective communications at
international border regions to achieve their preferred policy objectives.
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2.2.2 Rational Choice and Social Psychology Models of Bureaucracy
The rational choice approach to bureaucratic politics is not without its critics.
Moe (1995), for example, suggests that the economic assumptions underlying ratio-
nal choice-driven theories are inappropriate due to unique characteristics of public
bureaucracies. He notes that public bureaucracy is the closest analog to the firm,
but differs due to the involuntary nature of bureaucratic structures, two-tiered polit-
ical firms, political uncertainty, and political compromise, leading to no gains from
trade. To explain why the organization of public bureaucracy is tied to politics, he
suggests explicitly including interests groups and bureaucrats along with politicians
as competing actors in a bureaucratic politics model:
Public bureaucracy is a product of American democracy with foundations
wholly different from those presumed by economists. Political institu-
tions shape the incentives and opportunities of those who exercise public
authority . . . It is a theory unavoidably about separation of powers, leg-
islators and presidents, professionals, civil service, sub governments, and
a range of topics familiar to political scientists but completely foreign to
economic theorists. (Moe, 1995, p. 148)
Incorporating organizational culture and ego-level “bottom up” concepts as indepen-
dent variables in this research can bridge some of the gaps identified here between
rational choice and social psychology models.
2.2.3 Bureaucratic Politics – Allison (1971) and Inter-Bureaucratic Com-
petition
In contrast to the rational choice approach, the major components of Allison’s
(1971) bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy crisis decision making (also known
as his Model III) include an emphasis on individual human decision making as an
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explanation for observed policy behavior, the influence of individuals on each other
within a given institutional structure, and the role of persuasive political leadership.
In this model, decision makers are limited by the inertia of the bureaucracy. Those
in charge of various state responsibilities make predictable arguments based on their
present position, and policy “outcomes” are the result of negotiations among these
leaders. A later revision of the original theory (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) extends
the model to account for an individual’s bureaucratic loyalties and well as level of
responsibility. Other bureaucratic politics scholars (see, for example, Jones, Hesterly
and Borgatti 1997) have usefully included additional variables, to account for the
varied interpersonal dynamics that may occur in different topic areas.
Extending Allison’s 1971 analysis of inter-bureaucratic competition, Drezner (2000)
analyzes the role of organizational culture and norms by comparing “missionary agen-
cies” and “embedded agencies” along the dimensions of faithfulness to their original
mission and long-term durability. Drezner’s argument for conceptualizing bureaucra-
cies as strategic actors themselves, using organizational culture for self-preservation
is relevant to the study of cross-border counterterrorism networks because it accounts
for how norms and trust may be shared across organizations, and even across inter-
national borders.
For example, at an August, 2011 meeting of homeland security representatives
from the Port Huron-Sarnia region (Michigan-Ontario), the fire Chief of Sarnia,
Robert Eick, gave me a copy of an interagency memorandum of understanding dating
from 1998 between his department and the city of Port Huron, allowing firefighters
from both communities to quickly cross the international border and help their co-
professionals on the other side. One explanation for this observed voluntary cooper-
ative behavior is the shared sense of professional duty among firefighters regardless
of location, that may help to overcome collective action problems of adequate fire
protection for two relatively small communities. This specific case will be discussed
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in more detail in Chapter V.
Ting (2003) develops a formal model to explain why redundant bureaucratic struc-
tures are deliberately placed to ensure policy implementation. Ting’s work is relevant
to the homeland security communities being studied as his first game theoretic model
(Ting, 2003, p. 282) accounts for the presence of multiple agents with jurisdiction
over a preferred outcome or policy task where a number of the redundant agents are
outside of the control of the principal. As Ting notes,
Redundant structures tend to help most when the set of agents available
for a task are relatively ‘unfriendly,’ or disinclined to choose policies that
P would like. Here the collective action problems are not serious enough
to hurt aggregate policy production, which is increasing in n. But if P
has access to a friendly agent, then adding agents will tend not to help
performance. (Ting, 2003, p. 287)
According to his proof, structurally, the presence of bureaucratic actors theoretically
representing the principal’s wishes, i.e. DHS officials, will make the overall outcomes
worse in the presence of agents, such as Canadians and owners of private infras-
tructure, with no interest in the principal’s wishes. DHS has a role for “Protective
Security Advisors,” who act as liaisons to local communities in this fashion
The models of Allison (1971), Drezner (2000), and Ting (2003) are important for
advancing theories of inter-bureaucratic cooperation and competition on the federal
level, between federal agencies. But this is not the only level where bureaucracies are
expected to cooperate to achieve a shared outcome. The local level is a particularly
important location to study these dynamics, particularly in the domain of countert-
errorism, and has been insufficiently studied to date (Caruson and MacManus, 2006).
Cooperation between bureaucracies can be expected to vary based on factors other
than federal bureaucratic affiliation, including institutional factors such as national
affiliation, cultural factors such as professional affinity, and network factors such as
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interpersonal trust. Current theories about inter-bureaucratic cooperation and com-
petition are therefore incompletely generalizable without studying communities where
the variables used to develop the theories may differ.
2.2.4 Organizational Culture – Effects of the Norm of Trust
In purposeful contrast to Allison’s “where you stand depends on where you sit”
model of bureaucratic bargaining, Monten and Bennett (2010) argue for an alter-
native model of “organizational culture” that accounts for the presence of norms in
a bureaucracy, stating: “The organizational culture model centers on shared under-
standings within the organization about what it does, how it does it and the values
and human relationships that tie together these ends and means.” These norms can
come from professional identification, mission, or interactions of individual agents
with personal convictions. This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature by
empirically examining organizational cultures before a catastrophic emergency, in a
context where a high-stakes crisis, such as a terrorist attack, could happen.
2.2.5 “Politics from Below”
Looking specifically at such “bottom up” political dynamics, Brower and Abolafia
(1997) extend Allison’s logic to the bureaucracy of a state-level agency, focusing
particularly on how low-level employees include status hierarchy in their decisions
and preferences. Defining “politics from below” as “action or intentional inaction that
defies, opposes, or sidesteps the rules, roles, or routines of the organization,” (Brower
and Abolafia, 1997, p. 308) they find support for such actors using strategies to bypass
formal institutional mechanisms that are intended to constrain and direct their work,
particularly at their level of responsibility. They focus their ethnographic study on
examining how individuals with a strong individual sense of morals or ethics can
undermine bureaucratic goals by undermining or thwarting bureaucratic directions
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from the top with which they do not agree.
This suggests that ego-level cultural factors such as professional affiliation may
further trust between individuals of different bureaucracies, while also hampering co-
operation with individuals across functional professional areas. Brower and Abolafia,
p. 305 find that, “because of their relatively less powerful hierarchical positions,
lower participants engage in political activities that are primarily about the pursuit
of identity rather than specific organizational outcomes.” In keeping with the focus
of this part of the bureaucratic politics literature, I include as agents in my study
traditional bureaucrats – high-level appointees or careerists – along with individuals
in the field – such as front line police officers – who are exclusively civil servants.
In case of an emergency, each of these agents has a role that may or may not be
disproportionate to their professional status, and I did not wish to set limits on the
subjects of study which the participants do not themselves see as important. The
RDS or snowball sampling methodology of defining the boundaries of the network is
part of this approach, as well, and is described in more detail in Chapter III.
Sabatier (1986) examines the analysis of “bottom up” approaches to bureaucratic
decision making with some skepticism, but concludes that, “The bottom-up approach
is more appropriate in situations where (i) there is no dominant piece of legislation
but rather large numbers of actors without power dependency, or where (2) one is
primarily interested in the dynamics of different local situations” (Sabatier, 1986, p.
30). Both of these situations are applicable to the international border region that is
the focus of this dissertation.
By systematically collecting information on participants on a homeland security
community at multiple levels, this research is important in testing for the effects of
this kind of behavior in a situation of multiple bureaucracies. Furthermore, it will
strengthen the evidence beyond ethnographic studies, such as Brower and Abolafia
(1997).
29
2.2.6 Contributions to Bureaucratic Politics Literature
As Drezner (2000, p. 734) notes,
The bureaucratic politics approach has focused exclusively on crisis de-
cision making in security bureaucracies at the expense of longitudinal
analyses of ‘routine’ foreign policy, which is odd since this is the policy
category that bureaucratic politics should matter most. . . Expanding the
range of cases can help to broaden the explanatory power of bureaucratic
politics in foreign policy.
Jones (2010) indicates a number of ways in which bureaucratic politics research can
move forward, stating,
There is an active and potentially rich contemporary research agenda asso-
ciated with the bureaucratic or governmental politics approach to foreign
policy analysis. . . These lines of inquiry are likely to include: attempts
to respond to the criticisms associated with Model III with particular
attention to making it a more genuine social scientific and analytically
useful framework; and efforts to examine and broaden the cross-national,
decision maker, and issue area applicability of the model.
The proposed research can contribute to both of these needs. First, generating
and releasing new data, amenable to multiple forms of quantitative analysis, can
help other scholars apply more rigorous scientific tests of components of the research
agenda. Second, expanding bureaucratic politics research into a new type of security
community, with international components, can help to assess the generalizability of
the model outside of the limited scope of U.S. foreign policy making.
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2.3 Conclusion: Interpersonal Trust and Bureaucratic Con-
straints
Extant political science literature on bureaucratic politics which relies on rational
choice arguments cannot explain policy failures which are attributable to variations
in human decisionmaking within an organizational context. At the same time, social
psychology models discount the role of institutions such as NIMS, which are the back-
bone of emergency response, and function in an acute emergency when individuals
do not have the ability to deviate substantially from their roles. A more complete
understanding of how interpersonal trust forms in different network conditions can
strengthen scholarly understanding of both literatures and help homeland security
policymakers reliant on local actors find solutions to difficult cooperation problems
at the front line of emergency response.
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CHAPTER III
Hypotheses, Procedures and Methodology
My main argument is that, for individuals who work in the homeland security
context and function under tremendous pressure and frequently in high-stress crit-
ical situations, the first step in the development of interpersonal trust comes as a
result of interactions that give professionals the opportunity to get to know other
in non-emergency settings. Because such meetings are not sufficient for the develop-
ment of trust, repeated interactions are necessary for individuals to prove professional
competence and share important and relevant information. From these extended in-
teractions, interpersonal trust can act as a complement or a substitute for formal
institutional requirements under certain conditions.
Equation 1.1 in Chapter I describes a basic conceptual model of the components
of trust within a network based on ego attributes, as well as cultural, institutional,
and network factors. In this chapter, I expand on that model, specifically the effect
of culture and institutions on the formation of trust within and between subgroups.
I argue that, in repeated interactions, culture and institutions can facilitate cognitive
biases within groups, potentially exerting a negative influence on the development of
dyadic interpersonal trust relationships throughout the network.
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3.1 Model
Model: Trust Among Strangers and Friends
First, consider social networks on a continuum based on familiarity of network
actors. At one end are networks of total strangers S, sharing information through
prices in the perfectly competitive markets of neoclassical economic theory. At the
other end are social networks of actors who know each other very well T , such as
spouses, family, and friends.
According to Axelrod (1984) and others, cooperation emerges from the shadow of
the future, or the idea that actors will meet again (the discount parameter in rational
actor models). In this way, the perfect market of strangers is more like a one-shot
game, and cooperation and coordination would not be expected. This produces a







Figure 3.1: Information Value in Two Networks





TrustedNetwork : ΓT = τ
∞∑
i=1
(γi − µi)n (3.2)
A trusted network has not only greater connections between at least two actors,
but also more opportunity for detection and punishment of cheating, valued as τT .
It also, however, suffers from the potential of Sunstein (2007)’s proposed cognitive
biases
∑n
i=1 λi, which vary among individuals, may be related to group membership,
and increase with the size of the network. The curve representing value of information
ΓT as a function of network size is convex for the trusted network, increasing, but
not necessarily rapidly, as the number of trusted actors grows. Figure 3.1 graphically
depicts this hypothetical relationship between information and network size.
Interpersonal trust can therefore be defined as ψi,j, or how much i trusts j, and




j=1 ψiψj∀i, j. In the network of strangers described
above, therefore, with no connections between any pair of i, j, Ψ = 0. In the trusted
network, Ψ > 0 as long as there is some level of trust between any two i, j. The
greater amount of trust between dyads and between members of different dyads, the
greater the value of Ψ.
ψi,j is operationalized as the mean of the value of self-reported levels of trust
between two individuals. For example, if individual A reports a connection with
individual B, and a value of 4 out of 7 on the Likert scale, and B reports a connection
with individual A, and a value of 2 out of 7 on the Likert scale, ψAB = 3.
Relationships, however, are not always reported as reciprocal. If, for example,
individual B does not report a connection with individual A, it would bias the resulting
analysis if the value was reported as 2 (i.e., an assumption of 0 trust from B to A).
Graphically, these results can be reported as undirected ties, however, statistically,




A high value of Ψ could therefore represent a situation where there is substantial
in-group cohesion, measured by high levels of in-group trust, but very little cross-
group cohesion. In this description, this is represented as the total value of the
cognitive biases inherent to each group, Λ. The literature indicates that high levels of
Λ could be problematic, particularly as groups are required to coordinate to achieve
a preferred outcome. This leads to my first hypothesis:
H1 : Individuals will have greater levels of trust with other members of their in-
group than members of other groups.
While this hypothesis may seem tautological on its face, the complexity of poten-
tial groups, especially in an inter-organizational and international setting (Kapucu
et al., 2010), makes it useful to consider when reviewing the data of this study. In
this context, “in-group” could have multiple meanings. It could refer, for example,
to all U.S. respondents or all Canadian respondents, all firefighters or all law enforce-
ment. Alternatively, it could refer to all local employees or all federal employees. The
analysis presented in Chapter IV accounts for each of these different ways of describ-
ing members of the communities studied. Furthermore, the challenges of working in a
security situation under threat force professionals in organizations to learn from each
other (Brower et al., 2009), which may create different “in-groups” and “out-groups”
such as those who are constrained by legal institutions and those with more freedom
to collaborate.
Because of this, it is necessary to account for the level of trust between groups.
One solution may be to assign a weight to the value of each reciprocated ψi,j that is
higher if i and j have different group memberships. The sum of these values Ψweighted
can then be compared to the unweighted sum, or the situation Ψunweighted in which
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all individuals are hypothetically part of the same in-group. The difference Ψweighted
- Ψunweighted is therefore the value of cooperation across groups, Ψcoop.
I expect a negative correlation between Λ and Ψcoop. If each group has strong
cognitive biases, as represented by in-group cohesion or professional norms, we would
expect to see lower levels of cross-group cooperation. This leads to my second hy-
pothesis:
H2 : Greater levels of trust within in-groups is correlated with lower levels of trust
between groups.
It is difficult to develop trust in situations, such as cross-border counterterrorism
networks, where there is the constant presence of a threat. It is possible, however, that
the members of the network do not see the threat as coming from other actors, but
rather from an external source. This is certainly true for weather disasters, which are
out of the control of any of the agents, and is likely true for terrorist threats as well.
While the literature on in-groups and out-groups posits levels of distrust between
groups, it is also possible that terrorists are seen as an “out” out-group, which may
foster the development of trust among individuals who might otherwise only see their
professional differences as the main factor determining group status.
3.3 Methodology: Survey-Based Social Network Analysis
Sinclair (in Fowler et al. 2011) notes that, in many social network analysis studies
carried out by political scientists, they fail to account for the “bowling alone” effect,
wherein more political communication now occurs online than in real-world situa-
tions traditionally measured by social scientists. The problem, from her perspective,
is problematic inferences made by sampling from large national datasets such as the
American National Election Studies (ANES). I agree, and discuss the comparability
on measures of trust between aggregate surveys and individual measures in this sec-
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tion. As geography defines the boundary of these communities, it is appropriate to
collect and utilize network variables in the analysis.
Social network analysis provides a uniquely useful set of tools for analyzing the
role of trust in a cross-border counterterrorism community. To the best of my knowl-
edge, international homeland security communities have not yet been studied in a
network context. One of the few studies using network methods to study security
communities at all is Dupont (2006). Therefore, it is difficult to make predictions
about the structure and shape of the network based on prior observations. Nonethe-
less, social networks exhibit a number of well-known properties that may also be
expected to arise in this this network as well. Similarly, bureaucratic politics models
make implicit assumptions about the structure of the networks of individual actors
and the transmission of information within those networks.
For example, rational choice delegation models, such as Huber, Shipan and Pfahler
(2001) assume a direct flow of information from principals to agents, who, at the im-
plementation level, may have no connections to the principals at all. A number of
interesting questions can arise from this: Does the average path length from the prin-
cipal to the agent correlate with implementation effectiveness? Do greater levels of
eigenvector centrality between the principal and her agent(s) correlate with a higher
probability of the principal achieving her preferred outcomes? To take another exam-
ple, the model of Ting (2003) on redundant bureaucratic structures, does this assume
a scale-free network model, which is more robust to node failure (agents hostile to
the principal)?
As O’Toole, Jr. (2010, p. 11) argues, “The conventional political science literature
on control has it that political overseers seek to direct administrative agents, and
research tries to show shifts by agents or their outputs when principals change or
initiate new policy. But if the agents are typically multiple, the principal-agent model
is mis-specified from the outset.” Political science scholarship on the role of trust in
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policy networks of individuals in multiple bureaucracies cooperating for a shared
outcome (in this case, estuary policy) can be found in Berardo (2009) and Berardo
and Scholz (2010). Both studies find support for greater trust in denser networks and
but also for those with a few highly centralized network hubs.
Most social networks are assumed to be scale-free, but evidence is not conclusive.
Bearman, Moody and Stovel (2004), for example, use social network methodology
in an epidemiological setting to study the diffusion of STDs through a network of
sexually active adolescents. They find that this social network is in fact a spanning
tree,1 and illustrate that traditional models of disease diffusion are reliant on an
assumption of random mixing of nodes that is not compatible with real-world behavior
that transmits diseases. Mis-specifying these networks by assuming a certain kind of
structure has the potential to overestimate the potential effects of communications
mandates such as NIMS, particularly when there are an excess number of structural
holes, lack of bridges, or excessive cliques. In other words, the reason for observed
policy failure may not be captured in existing models that do not account for the
social structure in which agents make their decisions.
In an experimental study of diffusion of health behaviors in an online network,
Centola (2010) also finds unexpected results when the structure of the network is
artificially varied. He found that networks with high degrees of clustering – as might
be expected with a homeland security community with distinct organizational cultures
– spread behavior both more quickly and more diffusely.
In studying communication within a network, I am also extending the method-
ology of McCubbins, Paturi and Weller (2009), who included network measures in
laboratory experiments to study the ability of a group to solve a dynamic coordina-
tion problem, specifically a graph coloring problem. Under various forms of network
structure, they find that greater average degree in a network is associated with greater
1“. . . a long chain of interconnections that stretches across a population, like rural phone wires
running from a long trunk line to individual houses” (Bearman, Moody and Stovel, 2004, p. 51).
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coordination and speed in solving problems in both symmetric and asymmetric co-
ordination game settings. Specifically, they find greater coordination in groups with
network structures in which individuals have a very local set of connections (the
“0-chord cycle network”), those with two distinct groups and a few connections be-
tween them (the “barbell network”), and highly interconnected groups (“the cylinder
network”). They conclude that,
. . . our results suggest that increasing the density of the network, ceteris
paribus, can improve coordination. In particular, when coordination is dif-
ficult because of asymmetric incentives, these results suggest that building
connections between actors can facilitate coordination. For instance, in
settings where policy coordination is desirable, the results indicate that
it may be useful to develop institutions that create more connections be-
tween various actors. (McCubbins, Paturi and Weller, 2009, p. 916)
Notably, McCubbins, Paturi and Weller (2009) found no significant effects for
network structure on group coordination behavior for strongly hierarchical networks –
in their experiment, those with a few “leaders” who are connected to many individuals.
In the policy problem of homeland security, however, this is exactly the kind of
structure that is expected for law enforcement and other agencies. This suggests
that these sub-components of the networks themselves may be a hindrance to greater
cooperation and trust.
3.4 Methodology: RDS
Rothenberg (1995) describes this sampling method: “The snowball procedure is
defined as one that enlarges an original node sample by joining adjacent nodes”
(Rothenberg, 1995, p. 105). This method of snowball sampling as applied to social
networks within bureaucratic structures was first used by Hull and Hjern (1982) to
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study small firm cooperation in Germany. They began with a representative sample
of 20 to 30 percent of the firms they wished to study, and followed up with those
firms and the firms named as contacts. They then gathered the information needed
for their study through semi-structured oral interviews and surveys administered by
mail. Their goal was to understand “firms’ subjective perceptions of how much or
little they benefited from each of their contacts” (Hull and Hjern, 1982, p. 190). They
then connected this information to available observational data to link observable
output in the trends they were interested in.
Chen and Chen (2008) tested for the representativeness of snowball sampling on
14,400 simulated data sets and found that,
. . . snowball sampling performs better than simple random sampling in
estimating the magnitude of social inter-correlations, but the advantage
of snowball sampling over simple random sampling reduces in networks
characterized with the scale-free power-law distribution for the number of
connections of each member. (Chen and Chen, 2008, p. 2)
Nonetheless, they find that snowball sampling is superior to simple random sampling
for social networks because it is less likely to produce a downward bias in estimates
of the magnitude of ties. Despite its utility for social network analysis, snowball
sampling and RDS suffer from the same statistical flaws as any nonrandom sampling
method.
3.4.1 Criticisms of the Snowball Sampling Method
Rothenberg (1995) warns that the use of snowball sampling may require different
assumptions than those frequently made in statistical analysis, which are based on
probability samples. He notes that,
The population reached in a study is an unknown subset of some larger
group, but not a sample in the usual statistical sense. It may have intrinsic
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coherence, but it cannot be used to estimate the size of a larger group
without invoking other techniques (e.g. capture-recapture methods, or
demonstration by multiple means that the potential for further members
is exhausted). (Rothenberg, 1995, p. 107)
Similarly, Kwak et al. (2006) note that snowball sampling has a bias towards “hub
nodes,” or subjects who are already highly connected. Kossinets (2006, p. 249) points
out that, “Omission of actors may lead to significant changes in network statistics.”
This is especially true in small networks, where exclusion of particular nodes can have
severe consequences for common network statistics such as average network degree.
Conversely, omission of actors is less of a problem for analysis of larger networks,
unless the nodes are not missing at random.
In the case of the proposed research, it is a significant concern that certain mem-
bers of the network may not wish to be contacted or participate, and in particular
that this self-exclusion may be systematic. An example in the counterterrorism net-
work context is individuals who are working undercover, for agencies that do not
wish to be identified, or conducting work which may not necessarily be legal (con-
sider, for example, the domestic wiretapping case.) This problem may be exacerbated
in the international context where, despite their close alliance, individuals identified
with different nations may not wish to reveal certain information across borders.
Kossinets (2006) identifies the separate statistical inference problems from such a
situation as boundary specification problems, survey non-response, and, to a lesser
degree, respondent inaccuracy.
This is a potentially serious problem, as the boundaries of the network are not
known, even to the participants themselves, however, I utilized several procedural fixes
in the data collection stage which minimized the need for later statistical adjustments,
as well as a number of additional analytical corrections that were made after the data
collection procedure had occurred. Missing data in networks with unknown bounds
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and members actively trying to conceal their participation is an empirical problem
that has been considered before, specifically in the analysis of terrorist networks (see,
for example, Clauset, Moore and Newman 2008).
3.4.2 Corrections – Design Stage
Kossinets (2006) suggests one correction to the boundary specification problem,
noting,
An approach advocated by Laumann et al. (1983) is to focus on measur-
able interactions. The network boundary is then defined by recording who
is interacting with whom in a certain context . . . It requires an operational
specification of the interaction setting or context, and then including all
actors who interact within this context. (Kossinets, 2006, p. 249)
In the survey, this was handled by clearly specifying the domain of interest – home-
land security in the U.S. and public safety in Canada – when asking individuals to
name their contacts. This is important to specify because almost all actors have
multiple roles, and the homeland security role is often a small part of a larger set
of responsibilities. For example, the routine operations of law enforcement – patrol,
arrests, and court appearances, for example – take up the majority of their time, but
I was interested only in connections that they considered in the homeland security
context. See Appendix C for the exact wording of this limiter in the survey.
Another proposed correction involves handling of nonreciprocal ties. Accounting
for situations where one person names a contact, but the contact in turn does not
respond to the survey can provide an approximation of some of the missing data in
the network. Non-responsive individuals were assigned different weights based on
whether they were identified by one or more other individuals in the network survey.
See Subsection 4.1.1.1 in Chapter IV for the analysis of this type of missing data in
the survey.
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Finally, Kossinets (2006) identifies the potential problem of “fixed-choice” designs,
where individuals are asked to name a fixed number of contacts. I minimized this
effect by giving individuals the opportunity to name fifteen contacts. As discussed
in Chapter IV, most respondents provided the maximum number of contacts in the
name generation task.
RDS sampling has been successfully used by researchers from economics and so-
ciology who study diffusion in social network analyses. The main reason for using
snowball sampling is best described by Hjern and Hull (1982, p. 109), who point
out that, “The methodological imperative for describing a policy system is to iden-
tify the decisionmakers who populate it, in order that its goals, environments and
resources become determinate.” As my research seeks to understand how actors work
together in a networked setting, it is appropriate in the first phase to use sampling
methods such as this which are actor-driven, instead of being based on limits set by
the researcher.
3.5 Methods Justification
In order to assess the appropriateness of using the methods of social network
analysis to study questions of trust and bureaucratic politics in a cross-border coun-
terterrorism community, it is important to consider other potential approaches and
their drawbacks.
3.5.1 Alternative Methodological Approaches
One option is to use this research to falsify predictions made by bureaucratic
models posited by the political science literature and trust models from the interdis-
ciplinary social science literature. According to Schrodt (2010, p. 12), “. . . scientific
inquiry, while accepting the principle of falsification, only rarely proceeds using strict
falsification norms. Instead, the general tendency is to do extensive exploratory work
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and substitute paradigms only when a superior alternative is available.” This sort of
analysis could either lend support to existing theories or undermine them, and given
the importance of homeland security now and in the future, it is important to carry
out rigorous data collection now. The proposed research provides a completely new
dataset on a novel community, incorporating network characteristics which could be
of potential use not only to political scientists, but sociologists and policy analysts.
Another approach to testing models is to conduct a computer simulation such as
agent-based modeling (ABM). These models require a set of pre-specified rules in
order to operate, where each agent within the computerized system interacts with
all others in an iterative fashion until patterns can be observed. The benefit of such
simulations is that the rules can be programmed based on observed behavior from any
number of methodologies, including qualitative methods and experiments. They also
allow for observation of the historical process of agent interaction over long periods
of time. As Macal and North (2010, p. 151) summarize, “Agent-based modeling
offers a way to model social systems that are composed of agents who interact with
and influence each other, learn from their experiences, and adapt their behaviours so
they are better suited to their environment.” On the other hand, such simulations
can potentially suffer from some of the same flaws inherent in the models themselves,
specifically, being sensitive to assumptions made for computational operability and
initial conditions. With respect to network situations, they can be as sensitive to
systematically missing nodes as any other form of analysis, such that if the missing
nodes and their behavior are not programmed into the system, their influence will not
be known. Nonetheless, agent-based modelling could be a useful future complement
to the sampling and network survey approach I utilize in this study by allowing for
the modeling of different types of missing nodes. As will be discussed further in the
next section, nodes may be missing because they wish to remain hidden or because
they are doing something potentially illegal, and these variations in behaviors may
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have differential impacts on the other actors in the network. It is also possible to
model the effect of each of the types of missing nodes by varying the number of
visible connections they possess. Finally, ABM can be used to vary the structure
of the networks in which known actors interact, providing policy insights into which
network structures might optimally produce desired communication outcomes.
Laboratory experiments are another possible avenue for the falsification of models.
While producing the gold standard of causal information for experimental manipu-
lations, such experiments are necessarily very limited in scope and generalizability.
Nonetheless, McDermott (2002, p. 341) points out their benefits when she states that
Experiments also offer clear advantages over other methods in particular
areas of investigation, such as the validation of theories developed by for-
mal modeling, or in further theory testing and refinement. Experiments
offer useful insights in work that investigates the underlying process of a
particular phenomenon as opposed to its outcome. Finally, invoking mul-
tiple methods, including experimentation, in investigating a phenomenon
allows greater confidence in consensual results.
A laboratory experimental approach to the study of cross-border counterterror-
ism communities would require that professionals participate in behavioral economics
experiments in a laboratory. Such an approach would be subject to a number of logis-
tical problems, primarily related to coordinating the schedules of a sufficient number
of busy professionals together in a laboratory setting. An additional problem arises
when trying to include “higher status” professionals, such as the departmental direc-
tors or politicians. In practice, it is difficult to gain cooperation from such individuals
to participate even in large-scale, government funded exercises, such that even table-
top exercises occur only once every few years, such as the Top Official (TOPOFF)
exercises conducted by the DHS.
Even with these limitations, the laboratory setting might be useful to test re-
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lationships and interactions, either between individuals or in small groups, where
professional status is acknowledged to be part of the experiment. For example, if a
researcher were able to secure cooperation of a police department by offering to share
results or add questions or aspects of the experiment which may serve an institutional
goal, it may be feasible to conduct laboratory experiments on site. Two major limita-
tions with this approach include: 1) Self-selection into cooperation by organizations
which are more inclined to change or “outside the box” thinking may bias results and
2) It would likely only be feasible to test small networks or small sections of a larger
defender network.
To understand the variables underlying my argument that the development of
interpersonal trust begins as a result of initial interactions in formal and informal
non-emergency settings, followed by repeated interactions that demonstrate reliability
and the willingness to share information, the methodological tools of survey-based
social network analysis provide the most effective instruments. They incorporate
ego-level variables, but more importantly, are uniquely suited to analyzing the dyad-
level variables of interpersonal trust. While trust is sometimes measured in large-scale
social surveys such as the ANES, these surveys do not focus on the professional roles
of respondents, and the sampling methodologies used do not permit the collection of
network variables where respondents have the ability to identify other respondents
as network connections. Despite the reliance on the sampling method of RDS, social
network analysis provides valuable insights into the question of trust formation that




The central question of this research is how ego, culture, and institutions interact
in a networked setting across the multiple interactions – formal and information –
necessary to form trusting relationships. The first step in understanding how inter-
personal trust develops at the individual and community levels in the high-stakes
networked environment of domestic counterterrorism is to map the networks of lo-
cal homeland security actors in an international border community. As noted in
Chapter III, this is no easy task in a location where the bounds of the network are
largely unknown, even to the respondents themselves, and where certain actors in the
network may remain hidden. Subsection 4.1 describes the process of collecting the
quantitative network data that is the focus of the quantitative analysis.
Section 4.4 tests the two hypotheses of group membership and interpersonal trust.
Specifically, I test for greater levels of trust within in-groups and whether that is con-
nected to lower levels of trust between groups. The variation in the name generation
questions used in the survey helps to understand trust formation by asking respon-
dents to name their alters under a variety of conditions – from informal networking
to crisis situations – and then assess those relationships. Indeed, the data shows that
occupational clustering occurs more under certain conditions (in response to specific
types of name generator questions) than others. The variation in alter assessments
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is also informative – there is very little variation in assessments of credentials, and
most people name others as having good credentials. Since cooperation based on
credentials is the basis of formal policy structures such as NIMS, an exploration of
those assessments with greater variation is potentially informative about the role of
trust in a networked setting.
4.1 Data: Survey Development and Deployment
In January 2013, the first wave of surveys (Wave 1 ) was deployed in the primary
study region (Port Huron-Sarnia) on both the U.S. and Canadian sides. The goal was
to gather information about professional social networks, as well as to recruit new
respondents who were not part of the initial wave of surveys (Wave 2 ). In this way,
much of the community was mapped – not just by their individual characteristics,
but by their relationships with each other. Beyond simply asking for a connection,
the surveys sought to understand the strength of the relationship by asking questions
about past shared work experiences, and perceptions of the named individuals. The
final n for the survey described here is 275.
4.1.1 Survey Procedure
The identification of respondents for the RDS procedure proceeded in two waves.
In Wave 1, all individuals in who participated in a semi-structured qualitative inter-
view1 were included as potential respondents. In addition, the project sponsor, Mr.
Jeff Friedland of the St. Clair County, Michigan (SCC) Office of Homeland Security
and Emergency Management, provided a list of mailing labels that was partially gen-
erated from an internal list of invitees to an annual community-wide fundraiser called
the “Emergency Services Breakfast.” I supplemented this list from a breakfast follow-
up email Mr. Friedland sent to 104 people, including myself, where I could view the
1See Chapter V for a more detailed description of the qualitative interview procedure.
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email addresses of the other respondents. This is a large event with several hundred
individuals from all sectors of the community, including the U.S. and Canada, local
political and business leaders, law enforcement, fire and EMS at all levels.2 Mr. Mark
Wetering, Emergency Manager for Lambton County, Mr. Steve Bicum, Deputy Fire
Chief, Coordinator of Training and Safety, St. Clair Township Fire Department, and
Mr. Cal Gardner, Sarnia Emergency Management Coordinator, also provided names
and addresses of contacts on the Canadian side. For Wave 1, all necessary informa-
tion was provided by these individuals, including for each respondent their full name,
organization, and mailing address.3
4.1.1.1 Individuals Outside the Network
Wave 2 included only individuals who had not been identified in the first set of
provided contacts. Because the responses to Wave 1 surveys were written by hand,
it was more difficult to ascertain the names of the individuals identified. Sometimes,
I knew the individual who was being referenced, and could easily locate the mailing
address, as a colleague had been a Wave 1 respondent. Other times, an alter would
be identified as “Fire Captain,” for example, or an alter was named who was known
to be outside of the study area, or a name was simply illegible. Table 4.1 provides the
most frequently cited alters who were impossible to include in the network analysis,
because there was no way of identifying who they were.
When a name was legible but unknown, in order to maintain confidentiality,4 I
2To provide a sense of the scope and scale of the breakfast event, one interview respondent, the
executive director of a non-profit ambulance and EMS service in the U.S. stated, “In fact I’ll tell
you even when Jeff [Friedland] brings the state folks in - he brings state homeland security folks in
on a pretty regular basis – and they say that this event does not occur anywhere else in the state
of Michigan. And what you will find at the meeting is you will find nearly every police, fire, EMS,
township board, county official and hospital official from our county at this meeting. It’s the one
time of the year in which everybody comes. We will have probably somewhere in the neighborhood
of three to four hundred people there.” In 2013, I attended this breakfast as a guest.
3The figures in this section were produced with Stata 12.0. See Appendix E for the complete log
file for this data.
4Because sharing information about other respondents by name would have been a violation of











Table 4.1: Unidentifiable Names Provided by Network Respondents
did not seek information from the project sponsor, and instead sought out informa-
tion through publicly accessible internet and library searches. I researched publicly
available information on fire and police departments, accessed local newsletters that
covered local municipal events, such as the St. Clair Township Beacon and the Suncor
Energy in Your Community newsletter, accessed Michigan Department of Commu-
nity Health (MDCH) and Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) statewide
contact lists, and searched professional association websites for contact information.
I searched as exhaustively as possible, but some individuals were not identifiable for
the purposes of this survey.
There were 119 unique names (including nonspecific descriptors such as “Fire-
fighter”) which were not included in the survey in either wave. Forty of the named
individuals were outside of the study region. No contact or occupational information
whatsoever was provided for twenty-eight individuals, making it impossible to locate
them. Eighteen were agents with U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP)
or U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) for whom I could not
locate any address information.
Because of the structure of the survey, however, it was not impossible to identify
basic ego-level information about these individuals, even if their specific address could
not be located for the purposes of a Wave 2 follow-up survey. Figure 4.1 is a histogram






























































Figure 4.1: Occupations of those Outside the Network
study region of St. Clair County, Michigan and Lambton County, Ontario.5 As
noted earlier, more than a third of the law enforcement contacts who could not be
located were with the U.S. federal government. Five additional Law Enforcement
contacts were from FBI and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and four more were from
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Canadian Coast Guard, or the Canadian
military.
The next largest group of out-of-network alters were from the Fire services. In
both the U.S. and Canada, many of the fire departments that protect small towns
are staffed by volunteers. Although they are accredited for their profession, and part
of the community, they were often difficult to identify, because they work only part-
time. Individuals from Critical Infrastructure, in this case almost exclusively the
petrochemical refiners in Canada, were similarly difficult to locate specific addresses
for, as the private sector owners of such facilities publish little information online
5Although I did include in this count named alters who were affiliated with state or federal
organizations with a responsibility for an area in the study region, but were not physically located







































Figure 4.2: Sector/Level of Government of those Outside the Network
Figure 4.2 indicates the distribution of levels of government or sector for those
outside the network reported here, but within the study region. The large number of
Local alters is primarily driven by respondents from local fire and police departments.
In many cases, I did know the address of the department in question, because another
department member had already responded to the survey. I excluded many of these
because of resource constraints, and because I wanted to diversify the respondents
as much as possible. Due to the budget constraints I was operating under for this
project, I had only printed 300 total surveys, including postage and all additional
material. As the Wave 2 surveys were being prepared, I started to receive requests
for duplicate surveys from Wave 1 respondents who had received a survey, but lost
or misplaced it. I was becoming concerned that I would have no more surveys to send
if I started to saturate departments that I had already retrieved information from.
This was not an ideal situation, but I consciously tried in Wave 2 to reach out to as



















Figure 4.3: U.S. and Canadian Alters Outside the Network
Figure 4.3 shows that the distribution of those outside the network was about equal
between U.S. and Canadian alters. There were slightly more U.S. than Canadian
alters who could not be identified or were not selected for Wave 2 surveys, but the
division is evenly balanced.
Because I could not locate any additional ego-level information, those individuals
who were not identifiable or otherwise not included in Wave 2 surveys are coded in
the data as “NA” and excluded from the analysis reported below. There were a total
of 181 unique respondents identified in Wave 1 and 94 unique respondents in Wave
2, for a total n of 275.
4.1.1.2 Survey Procedure and Supporting Documentation
In both waves, potential respondents were given a pre-notification postcard by
mail approximately a week before receiving the survey. The first batch of survey
pre-notification postcards were mailed on January 19, 2013. This postcard had the
logo of the project sponsor, the SCC Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
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Management, an entity known to almost everyone in the professional community,
along with a message from the Emergency Manager, Mr. Jeff Friedland, indicating
his support for the project.6
The survey booklet, described in more detail in Subsection 4.1.2, was mailed with
an IRB-approved statement of informed consent giving respondents the opportunity
to opt out of the study.7 Enclosed with the survey were two letters, written in plain
language, from myself and Mr. Jeff Friedland, explaining the purpose of the research
and directly asking potential respondents to help by completing the survey. I provided
my email and phone number to answer any questions.8 I also included my business
card with each packet.
The survey, return envelope, and associated documents were mailed in a large
and relatively heavy envelope. For Canadian respondents, this was mailed in bulk
from a station in Windsor in order to reduce the substantial costs of international
postage (from the U.S. to Canada). A pre-paid return envelope was included with
every packet to minimize respondent burden. Due to limited resources and the bi-
national nature of the survey, it was important at this stage to minimize costs while
encouraging a minimally disruptive process for respondents to return their completed
surveys. At the time of survey deployment, the cost of postage for Canada Post
U.S.A. Letter-post service was (return postage for the survey) was $2.37 per piece
and U.S. Postal Service (USPS) First Class Mail postage was $1.50 per piece. Future
iterations of this study would likely benefit from the use of certified or tracked mail
in both initial survey and response, as the findings of del Valle et al. (1997) suggest,
6See Appendix D for the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board (IRB)-approved
version of this postcard.
7As opposed to requiring respondents to sign an opt-in consent form, as originally requested by
the IRB. I argued that the serious concern over response rate, given the sensitive questions being
asked in the survey, would make a separate opt-in task excessively onerous for the respondents, who
were in any case professional adults capable of understanding the language of the informed consent
document and refusing to participate by simply ignoring the survey.
8Only one potential respondent, from Wave 1, called me directly, asked questions about the
research, and explained that they would refuse to participate in the survey.
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however, the limited budget available at this stage limited my ability to provide more
sophisticated forms of survey deployment.
The cover of the survey featured a unique six digit number created by a manual
stamping machine. This was the only unique identifier for the survey. In creating this
system of identification, I hoped to give respondents a greater sense of anonymity in
filling out the survey, which requested them to give the names and contact information
of others. Respondents were notified in multiple ways that their name would not be
known to others or publicly linked to the six digit number on the survey they filled
out. While the procedure necessitated creating an electronic file linking names and
unique codes, in accordance with the informed consent document, the identifying
names were removed from this file once the survey was complete. Thus, the survey
data reported here has been anonymized to protect the privacy of all respondents.
Those who did not return their survey in a timely fashion were sent two concurrent
follow-up letters, from myself and Mr. Jeff Friedland, to encourage participation.9
4.1.2 Survey Instrument
The survey questionnaire itself consisted of an 18-page booklet (see Appendix
C) modeled on one developed by sociologist Ronald Burt for an internal study of
the human resources network of the Merrill Lynch corporation (Burt, 1996). The
interactive booklet was structured to help respondents map their social networks
through a series of prompts about professionals from other agencies in the community
who they may have interacted with recently.
The survey contained three distinct components:
Ego Characteristics:10
1. A self-reported measure of “trustingness” from a 6-point validated Likert scale
9See Appendix D for the IRB-approved letters.
10See Subsection 4.3.1.2 for more detailed information on these questions.
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assessment developed by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994).11
2. Four questions about job experience, tenure, and level of responsibility.
Name Generation:12
1. Ten question prompts designed to generate the names of fifteen alters in the
professional community, along with their contact information.
• Who was the last person from a different agency with whom you went out
to breakfast, lunch, coffee, or other drinks, one-on-one?
• Name a few homeland security, public safety, and/or emergency manage-
ment professional you meet regularly in a non-professional setting. For
example, bumping into them at kids’ sports games or at church. (Up to
three potential alters.)
• Think of an emergency situation that sticks out in your mind from the last
few years that involved multiple agencies and countries – Who as the first
person you looked for when you arrived on the scene?
• Think of an emergency situation that sticks out in your mind from the
last few years that involved multiple agencies and countries – Who was
the first person who approached you when you arrived on the scene?
• Think of an emergency situation that sticks out in your mind from the
last few years that involved multiple agencies and countries – Who was
the most important person there who helped you get your job done?
• Think of an emergency situation that sticks out in your mind from the last
few years that involved multiple agencies and countries – If applicable, who
was the most important person from another country who helped you get
your job done?
11See Subsection 4.3.1.1 for more detail on this measure.
12Because individuals often think of others within their own organization, it was repeatedly em-
phasized that they name individuals “in organizations or agencies other than your own.”
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• Now, think about day-to-day operations, not a specific emergency situation
– Imagine you have an innovative new idea for the professional community,
that is not ready for prime-time. Who would you discuss it with first?
• Now, think about day-to-day operations, not a specific emergency situ-
ation – From time to time, people seek out advice from someone in a
different agency on homeland security, public safety, and/or emergency
management-related matter. Who would you seek out for advice?
• Now, think about day-to-day operations, not a specific emergency situation
– Think about a situation where someone from a different agency asked
you for advice on a homeland security, public safety, and/or emergency
management-related matter. Who asked you for advice?
• If you had to put together a task force including people not named already,
who would be on it? (Up to four potential alters.)
Alter Characteristics:
1. Two questions assessing the length of relationship and frequency of contact for
each alter.
2. Eight questions to determine if specific characterizations apply to each alter:
• If you wanted information about an area of expertise other than your own,
who would you talk to?
• Who are the “go to” people for questions about homeland security, public
safety, and/or emergency management in the region?
• Who has a reputation for getting the job done?







The overall survey response rate was 33.82 percent.13 292 unique surveys were
mailed, seventeen of which were duplicates in Wave 1, which were sent on request
when respondents reported misplacing or not receiving the original survey and re-
quested another.14 93 unique surveys were completed and returned.
The response rate for Wave 1 (n = 182) was 38.12 percent and the response rate
for Wave 2 (n = 93) was 25.53 percent. As noted earlier, Wave 1 respondents were
those identified by key members of the community in the U.S. and Canada who had
already been interviewed on the record and agreed to provide contact information for
relevant members of the community. Wave 2 respondents were contacted because
they were not identified in Wave 1 and were only identified by Wave 1 survey re-
cipients. 23 Canadian respondents (n = 108) returned surveys for a 21.3 percent
response rate and 70 from the U.S. (n = 167) responded, for a response rate of 41.92
percent.
Professional function was divided into ten categories: law enforcement, fire, emer-
gency management, medical, dispatch, administration, critical infrastructure, educa-
tion, nonprofit, and unknown. In the analysis, each respondent was assigned to only
one professional category. For simplicity and tractability, it was necessary to group
13This is below the average response rate for individuals in organizations identified by Baruch and
Holtom (2008), but within their identified bounds. They found an average response rate of 52.7
percent, sd = 20.4 across all media, and an average response rate of 44.7 percent, sd = 21.8 for mail
surveys, such as the one reported here. Their study did not evaluate the response rates of social
networks surveys specifically.
14Not all of the duplicate surveys were returned. The n reported here represents the count of
unique surveys without duplicates, so total n = 275.
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several related functions into one category.
Coding decisions were not necessarily straightforward, however. While, for exam-
ple, a local fire department chief is easily categorized as Local and Fire, it was more
challenging to code individuals with unique or unusual positions. For example, one
of my interviewees was a Special Agent with the Canadian National Railway Com-
pany (CN) Police. With a history of armed protection going back to the earliest days
of private railroad ownership, the CN Police is a fully accredited and empowered law
enforcement agency, with law enforcement powers granted by the governor of each
state where CN owns property. In this case, I coded this individual as Private and
Critical Infrastructure because the sector limits the individual’s scope of work – CN
Police does not have jurisdiction outside of CN property. This respondent’s role as a
representative of the Critical Infrastructure sector is more important to their position
in the network than their role as a law enforcement officer.
The following non-exhaustive list provides a general overview of the specific func-
tions and examples from the respondent set for each:
• Law enforcement: Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), Sarnia Police, Marysville
Police, St. Clair County Sheriff, Michigan State Police, ICE, CBP, USCG,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada (RCMP).
• Fire: Sarnia Fire Rescue, Marine City Fire Department, Point Edward Fire
Department.
• Emergency management: Corporation of the County of Lambton Office of
Emergency Management, St. Clair County Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management.
• Medical: St. Clair County Health Department, Tri-Hospital EMS, St. Joseph
Mercy Hospital, MDCH, Lambton County Community Health Services Depart-
ment, County of Lambton Emergency Medical Service Department.
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• Dispatch: St. Clair County Central Dispatch, Sarnia Police Service dispatch,
Emergency Amateur Radio Services, South East Regional Emergency Services
Authority, Michigan (SERESA).
• Administration: Petrolia Municipal Council, Mayor’s Office, City of Port Huron,
St. Clair County Board of Commissioners.
• Critical Infrastructure: Blue Water Bridge Authority, CN Police, Ontario Min-
istry of Transportation, Imperial Oil, NOVA Chemicals.
• Education: St. Clair County Community College, St. Clair County Regional
Educational Service Agency (RESA).
• Nonprofit: Salvation Army, Red Cross.
• Unknown.






Law Enforcement 90 33 36.67%
Fire 75 25 33.33%
Emergency Management 18 7 38.89%
Medical 27 8 29.63%
Dispatch 9 5 55.56%
Administration 27 2 7.41%
Critical Infrastructure 16 6 37.50%
Education 3 1 33.33%
Nonprofit 6 2 33.33%
Unknown 4 4 100%
Total 275 93 33.82%
Table 4.2: Response Rate by Professional Function
Respondents were also categorized by the level of government or sector that they
worked for. Figure 4.4 is the visual equivalent of a cross tab showing the distribution
of occupational functions by level of government or sector. Local was the broadest
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Nonprofit (n = 2)
Education (n = 1)
Critical Infrastructure (n = 5)
Administration (n = 2)
Dispatch (n = 5)
Medical (n = 8)
Emergency Management (n = 8)
Fire (n = 25)
Law Enforcement (n = 33)










































Figure 4.4: Occupation by Level of Government/Sector
categorization, including everything from Michigan or Ontario townships of just a few
hundred people to the large metropolitan communities of Port Huron, Michigan, and
Sarnia, Ontario. County, State and Federal categories were clearly delimited by the
research question, and anyone affiliated with a government agency at each level was
classified accordingly. Certain entities in the region, such as the Blue Water Bridge,
are owned jointly by Canada and the U.S. On the Canadian side, the bridge is owned
by a subsidiary of the Canadian federal government, while on the U.S. side, it is owned
by the state of Michigan through the MDOT. In this case, respondents were classified
as state or federal depending on their geographic location. The Private category
largely overlaps with the previous category of Critical Infrastructure, but is restricted
to private holders of critical infrastructure (petrochemical facilities, railroads) only.
• Local: Clay Township, Burtchville, Sarnia, Port Huron, Petrolia, Alvinston.
• County: St. Clair County, Lambton County.
• State/Province: Michigan, Ontario.
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• Federal: U.S., Canada.
• Private: NOVA Chemicals, Imperial Oil, Sunoco, CN.
• Unknown.
Response rates for each level of government/sector are reported in Table 4.3. The
largest number of surveys received was from the Local level, but the largest percentage
was from the County level.





Local 144 48 33.33%
County 68 26 38.24%
State/Province 22 3 13.64%
Federal 16 6 37.50%
Private 23 8 34.78%
Unknown 2 2 100%
Total 275 93 33.82%
Table 4.3: Response Rate by Level of Government/Sector
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
4.3.1 Ego Characteristics
Other than the information captured by the general survey response rate, such as
profession and location, the survey asked additional questions specific to the respon-
dent (ego), without regard for their relationships with others (alters).
4.3.1.1 Generalized Trust
The level of generalized trust at the ego level (i.e. the general trust or distrust of
others) and tenure of personal and professional experience were hypothesized15 to be
15See Equation (1.1).
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ego-level characteristics that may be expected to influence dyad- and network-level
interpersonal relationships.
First, I measured generalized trust, what Yamagishi (2001) defines as the “default
expectation of the trustworthiness of others.” This focuses on what level of trust
individuals have in others in the absence of any evidence on way or the other. The
General Trust Scale is a validated set of questions from Yamagishi and Yamagishi
(1994) as follows:
1. Most people are basically honest.
2. Most people are trustworthy.
3. Most people are basically good and kind.
4. Most people are trustful of others.
5. I am trustful.
6. Most people will respond in kind when they are trusted by others
Each question is Likert scored from 1 to 5, corresponding to “Strongly Disagree,”
“Disagree,” “Neutral,” “Agree,” and “Strongly Agree” and the overall score is divided
by 6 for a final Generalized Trust Score. If, for example, a respondent were to answer
“Strongly Disagree” to all six questions, they would receive a score of 1, while if they
responded “Strongly Agree” to all questions, they would receive a score of 5.
These six items were found to have the highest factor loadings for predicting
behavior in social situations where trust was required. Yamagishi (2001) used these
survey questions to classify individuals into types – high-trusters and low-trusters –
in order to assess their gullibility when dealing with others and finds that both types































































































Figure 4.5: Ego Levels of Generalized Trust by Occupation
Similarly, I used the General Trust Scale to assess a basic level of generalized trust
among respondents at the ego level. For all respondents, the mean Generalized Trust
Score was 3.94 (sd = .46) with a minimum score of 2.5 and a maximum score of 5.
Figure 4.5 uses box-and-whisker plots to indicate the median values of the aggre-
gated General Trust Scale responses by occupation, along with the 25th and 75th
percentiles, and outside values. Using a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), I
compared the mean of each occupational group to the overall mean for this statistic.
Despite their differences, none of the groups was statistically significantly different
from the overall mean.
Figure 4.6 shows the median values of generalized trust by level of government or
sector. Using a one-way ANOVA, I compared the mean of each occupational group to
the overall mean for this statistic. The model reported a p-value of 0.02, indicating
that there are statistically significant differences between individuals working in dif-
ferent sectors or levels of government. The most “trusting” were Unknown (unfortu-



























































Figure 4.6: Ego Levels of Generalized Trust by Level of Government/Sector
were State/Provincial (x¯ = 3.77, sd = 0.39) and County (x¯ = 3.97, sd = 0.37).
Figure 4.7 indicates that there is a difference in ego-level general levels of trust
between respondents in the U.S. and Canada. The mean score for U.S. respondents
was 3.89 (se = .06), while the mean score for Canadian respondents was 4.06 (se =
.06).
However, an independent two-tailed group means t-test, with an assumption of
equal variances, produced a p-value of 0.11, and I cannot reject the null hypothesis
(at the 95% confidence level) that the difference between those in the U.S. and those
in Canada is not different from zero. Overall, along most ego-level categorizations,
respondents tend to “Agree” with these generalized measures of trust.
4.3.1.2 Professional and Community Tenure
I also hypothesized16 that the amount of time in the professional community would
































Figure 4.7: Ego Levels of Generalized Trust by National Affiliation
level measures of cohesion. I expected that more time working in the area would
allow individuals greater opportunities to develop connections through networking
and professional encounters. With an eye toward maintaining respondent anonymity,
my survey contained four questions designed to assess the length of time a given
respondent has been in the community, in the professional community, and their
approximate level of responsibility.
The following survey questions are followed by the overall mean (x¯), sd, minimum,
and maximum for each question:17
1. How long have you been in this job sector? (not necessarily in this job or at
this level). (x¯ = 22.55, sd = 9.32,min = 5,max = 42)
2. How long have you been in this specific job? (x¯ = 9.22, sd = 8.41,min =
.08,max = 42)
3. How long have you lived in this community (the St. Clair County/Lambton
County region)? (x¯ = 36.56, sd = 17.43,min = 0,max = 62)
17The figures in the first three questions are reported in years, the fourth question is a count.
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4. Approximately how many people work for you? (number of employees you
supervise, number of people under you in your department or division, number
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Figure 4.8: Ego Levels of Generalized Trust by Tenure in Occupation and Community
In a pairwise correlation analysis of each tenure question and the aggregated
General Trust scores, there is a statistically significant18 and positive correlation for
each measure, with one exception. As Figure 4.8 indicates, there is a slight positive
correlation between generalized trust and tenure in a specific job but a slight negative
correlation between between generalized trust and tenure in the community. The
median number of years for this measure is 42 years, indicating individuals who may
have lived there for their entire lives. A closer analysis of the data reveals that
the negative effect is limited only to those respondents above the median (42) – for
those below the median, generalized trust is positively correlated with tenure in the
community. It is unclear why individuals who have lived in the area for a very long
time have lower levels of generalized trust: This could be a function of more exposure
18At the 95 percent confidence level.
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to life’s travails, or it could be indicative of inherent problems in the community itself.
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of Organizational Leadership
Figure 4.9 shows the distribution of the final question of how many individuals
work for the respondent. Given the large number of respondents from the local level
– including a large number of very small communities with small fire and police
services – it is not surprising that most respondents have few employees working for
them. Although this question was intended to be a proxy for the level of professional
responsibility of a given individual, this confounding factor makes it less useful as an
ego-level variable.
4.3.2 Dyad-Level Characteristics
This section describes how the respondents (ego) perceived the individuals they
named in aggregate, in other words, how did the respondent feel about the entire
group of individuals they named as alters?19 Two questions assessed the strength
19Including those who are not included in the network analysis of n = 275.
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of the interpersonal relationship by asking how long each ego knew the alters they
named, and how frequently they had worked together in the past year. Of the
71 non-missing responses for this measure, egos reported that they knew their all
of their named alters (in aggregate) an average of 10.98 years (sd = 5.33,min =
2.82,max = 26). In terms of frequency of professional connection, for all alters
named, the 70 respondents with non-missing answers reported a mean total of 24.54
(sd = 30.99,min = 0,max = 173.33).
In coding the assessment section of the survey, I counted 1 if the respondent
indicated a particular alter with a check mark (as per the instructions in the survey),
missing if the respondent provided no response to any alters in a given section, and
0 if the respondent did not provide a check mark for a given alter, in the presence of
other responses on that section. While I really wanted to know for each alter, “Do
you trust this person?” most interview respondents indicated quite strongly that
they would never answer such a question. Therefore, the questions in this section are
proxies for the ego-alter trust dynamic, and the alter assessment questions were set
up to gradually become closer to the main questions of interest, without ever asking
it directly.
Assessment of Non-Missing
Alter Observations Mean SD
Who Would You Talk To? 68 .6210 .2885
Who are the go to people? 68 .4758 .3020
A reputation for
getting the job done? 68 .5757 .2709
Demonstrated proficiency? 68 .7073 .2762
Good Credentials 67 .8598 .1990
Reliable/Dependable 66 .8577 .2167
Skilled/Competent 67 .9061 .1797
Experienced 66 .8759 .1958
Table 4.4: Average Assessment of Alters (Non-Missing Values)
Respondents were generally positive about the alters they named. Table 4.4 shows
the mean responses of non-missing observations for each of the alter assessment ques-
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tions. The top half of the table is a series of four questions about the each named
alter, and the bottom half is a series of questions asking for personal assessments of
each alter. In response to the first question about alters, “If you wanted information
about an area of expertise other than your own, who would you talk to?” more than
62% would talk to the alters they named. However, less than half of the named alters
would be considered the the “go to” people for public safety and homeland security
questions.20 More than half of respondents (58%) responded affirmatively for their
named alters for the question, “Who has a reputation for getting the job done?” But
over 70% indicated that their named alters had “demonstrated proficiency.”21 In the
descriptive section (the bottom half of the table), respondents were most likely to de-
scribe the alters they had named as “Skilled/Competent” and least likely to describe
them as being “Reliable/Dependable.”
4.3.2.1 Assessments Under Differing Network Conditions
Recall from Subsection 4.1.1.2 that ten questions were asked as part of the name
generator task in order to develop a list of fifteen potential alters. While the goal of
a name generator is to create a list of alters for assessment, it is often not fruitful
to begin with questions such as, “Tell me the names of 15 people you know in the
homeland security/public safety community.” Instead, I took the approach of asking
individuals a series of prompts that would trigger their memory about specific indi-
viduals that they interact with as part of their professional network. These questions
asked respondents to respond to different types of settings, which may have influenced
the names provided. In this section, I review the responses for each question.
Figure 4.10 shows the percentage of responses to each of the name generation
questions. This figure represents any time an alter was named, even if that alter was
20The actual survey question was: “Who are the ‘go to’ people for questions about homeland
security, public safety, and/or emergency management in the region?”


















Informal food/Drinks Informal meeting in community
Informal meeting in community Informal meeting in community
On scene: Who did you look for? On scene: Who approached you?
On scene: Who helped you? On scene: Who helped you (other country)?
Discuss innovative idea You seek out for advice
Sought you out for advice Task force
Task force Task force
Task force
Figure 4.10: Response Rate by Name Generator Question
outside of the study region or otherwise unidentifiable. The figure only represents
the response of individuals to the question; in other words, were these questions suf-
ficiently motivating as name generators? This figure shows that – for most questions
– they were. 80% of respondents were willing to name someone that they seek out for
advice, and 79% were willing to name someone that they would bounce a new idea off
of. On the other hand, less than a quarter of respondents could name someone from
a different country who helped them on the scene of an emergency situation – this
can be expected because the question explicitly stated “if applicable.” It is possible
that not everyone who responded had been in an international emergency situation.
Q1: Who was the last person from a different agency with whom you went out to
breakfast, lunch, coffee, or other drinks, one-on-one?
The purpose of this question was to assess individuals with whom the ego has a
personal or informal relationship that is close enough that they may meet for drinks










































































































Figure 4.11: Informal Networking Clusters by Occupation
tions, this question uniquely looks at both professional and informal interactions. In
addition to providing a name, it hints at a “stronger” and more personal tie between
a given ego and alter. Figure 4.11 shows that, for each ego occupation code (in this
case law enforcement and fire), respondents were often more likely to have had the
last informal one-on-one meeting with someone from their own occupational field,
even if they were not from an individual’s own department. This is not surprising,
as professionals often have the most in common (and the most to talk about over
drinks) with each other, as well as the most opportunities to meet informally.
Q2 – Q4: Name a few homeland security, public safety, and/or emergency manage-
ment professional whom you meet regularly in a non-professional setting. For exam-
ple, bumping into them at kids’ sports games or at church. (Up to three potential
alters.)
This is an informally worded question to get people thinking about individuals
in their community, without regard for specific affiliation or job responsibility. For
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example, it may be that a low-level ego frequently sees a high-level alter because they
happen to attend the same church. Such individuals may not be expected to have any
kind of working relationship, but they are both professionals is the same general field,
making this question useful for simple name generation without the presumption of
a specific value to a relationship, if any even exists. As Figure 4.10 shows, it is not
surprising that the number of responses decreases from the first to last of this question
– perhaps respondents could only think of one or two people that fit this criteria, but
not three.
The next set of questions seek to generate names based on professional function in
a professional setting. The question was purposely left open-ended to give respondents
the opportunity to draw on a setting that was most memorable to them – and most
likely to actually generate names instead of forcing them to remember a specific event
where they may not have been present.
These questions are important for understanding the development of trust in an
emergency setting. Recall my main argument, that real-world interactions provide
important opportunties for professionals to develop trusting relationships through the
demonstration of competence on reliability under pressure.
Q5: Think of an emergency situation that sticks out in your mind from the last few
years that involved multiple agencies and countries – Who as the first person you
looked for when you arrived on the scene?
This question is intended to focus the respondent on a specific situation of their
own choosing. Unlike earlier questions, asking about “the first person you looked
for” invokes professional responsibilities closely tied to job function, role, and level
of responsibility. Recall from Chapter I the incident command structure of NIMS in
Figure 1.2, which assigns specific duties to individuals in the midst of an emergency.








































































































Ego other than Fire
Who was the first person you looked for?
Figure 4.12: Most Respondents Look for Firefighters First
they will look for, so that they can quickly assess and assume their assigned role within
the NIMS structure set up for a particular incident. This specific question says little
about the potential tie strength between a given alter and ego, but provides a useful
point of reference for individuals recalling a specific event. It is also useful as a name
generation question, because it should refer to individuals who are in the network
being studied.
Figure 4.12 shows that, by a wide margin, individuals in the firefighting profession
are the first stop when on the scene of an emergency. This is true even if the ego is
not from the fire services themselves, as indicated by the panel on the right side of
Figure 4.12. However, Figure 4.13 shows that members of law enforcement tend to
look for each other when they arrive at the scene of an emergency.
Q6: Think of an emergency situation that sticks out in your mind from the last few
years that involved multiple agencies and countries – Who was the first person who






















































Ego = Law Enforcement
Who was the first person you looked for?
Figure 4.13: Law Enforcement Looks for other Law Enforcement First
This question is slightly different, as it reverses the roles for the respondent re-
calling a specific event. While the individual may have known who they wanted to
approach in the emergency setting to understand their role in the NIMS structure,
they have no way of knowing who will approach them first. Again, this question does
not speak to the potential strength of a given tie, but rather serves as a useful name
generator for procuring names of individuals who should be expected to be in the
network due to their professional function.
Q7: Think of an emergency situation that sticks out in your mind from the last few
years that involved multiple agencies and countries – Who was the most important
person there who helped you get your job done?
Q8: Think of an emergency situation that sticks out in your mind from the last few
years that involved multiple agencies and countries – If applicable, who was the most
important person from another country who helped you get your job done?





















































Who helped you get your job done?
Figure 4.14: Firefighters and Law Enforcement Help Others get their Jobs Done
a subjective assessment of a given alter by the ego. In any situation, but especially
a complex emergency involving multiple agencies, some individuals are better than
others at carrying out their job functions, be it making decisions and giving orders or
following orders correctly. Everyone has a job to do, and these questions assess the
role of a given alter in helping the ego when needed. Given the wording of the ques-
tion, however, this only speaks to positive interactions. Figure 4.14 shows that, for
all occupations of ego respondent, law enforcement and fire were the most important
agents in helping others get their jobs done.
Q9: Now, think about day-to-day operations, not a specific emergency situation –
Imagine you have an innovative new idea for the professional community, that is not
ready for prime-time. Who would you discuss it with first?
In this question, I sought to elicit alters who are part of the day-to-day commu-
nity. Instead of asking generally, however, I attempted to elicit a response based on
positive, trusting connections. No one wants to look like a fool in the professional
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community, but they may have learned about a new technique or idea from a pro-
fessional association meeting, through internet message boards, or through friends or
family members in the same profession, but outside of the community. I wanted to
understand who might be a confidant of a given ego, who could be trusted with a
novel idea and be able and willing to provide feedback. These questions are important
for understanding the development of trust by assessing the sharing of information,
which, other than real-world emergency settings, are important to the development
of trusting relationships.
Q10: Now, think about day-to-day operations, not a specific emergency situation –
From time to time, people seek out advice from someone in a different agency on
homeland security, public safety, and/or emergency management-related matter. Who



















































Who would you ask for advice?
Figure 4.15: Emergency Managers are a Good Source of Advice
In a similar vein, this question seeks to learn the names of alters that the ego trusts
enough to ask for advice. Asking for advice is a potentially vulnerable situation, as
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is indicates lack of knowledge or understanding about a relevant issue. This question
can be seen as representing a greater tie strength between an ego and alter than other
questions which only serve to generate names. Figure 4.15 is striking because, despite
their small presence in the network, most respondents would ask emergency managers
for advice. This reinforces the important role that emergency managers play in any
region – they are specifically tasked with knowing members of the network, their
roles, and how they can work together to accomplish important multi-organizational
tasks.
Q11: Now, think about day-to-day operations, not a specific emergency situation –
Think about a situation where someone from a different agency asked you for advice
on a homeland security, public safety, and/or emergency management-related matter.
Who asked you for advice?
This question flips the previous question around, focusing on the role of the ego
as the more knowledgable party, compared to another. Unlike the prior question,
however, this may or may not indicate that the ego feels a strong affinity with the
alter. It is possible, for example, that the named alter was a brand-new professional
with very little experience, asking the most senior person they felt comfortable talking
to. Even without the possibility of learning about a stronger tie from the ego to alter,
this question remains useful for a name generation task.
Q12 – Q15: If you had to put together a task force including people not named already,
who would be on it? (Up to four potential alters.)
The last question was purposefully open-ended. What kind of task force? For
what purpose? I left these to the imagination of the respondent. The main purpose
of this question was to give respondents an interesting task that they might find
engaging to generate an additional set of relevant names from the network.
Overall, these questions advance my argument about how the the first step in the
development of interpersonal trust begins as a result of interactions under a variety of
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conditions, and the importance of repeated interactions for providing the opportunity
to prove competence and share information.
4.3.3 Network-Level Characteristics
I begin by describing the basic structure and practical meaning of the n = 275
survey-based network that is the primary focus of this analysis.22 For each network
graph, the layout emphasizes the number of connections (also referred to as ties or
edges) by focusing on the people (nodes or vertices) in the middle. For the following
figures, the edges only represent any connection between two nodes – where an alter
was identified via the name generation task on the survey. The dots closest to the
center represent individuals who have many separate connections – both self-reported
and reported by others. Those at the periphery have only one or two.
Figure 4.16 shows graphically the directed network of respondents, excluding iso-
lates (those individuals who are not named by anyone else in the network) highlighting
the connections by national affiliation. The arrows in this figure indicate the direction
of identification from ego to alter – some arrows are two-headed, indicating that both
respondents identified each other, while others show that one respondent identified
the other, but not the reverse. Mirroring the response rate data in Section 4.2, this
figure shows that there are a larger number of respondents from the U.S. than from
Canada, and that U.S. respondents appear to be more “clustered”23 than their Cana-
dian counterparts. While there are a few Canadians at the center of the network,
there are more U.S. respondents overall.
Figure 4.17 portrays a directed network showing the network positions of respon-
dents by occupational sector only, for respondents in both the U.S. and Canada. This
figure indicates that Fire and Law Enforcement play central roles in the network –
22The figures in this section were produced using the statnet package (Goodreau et al., 2008) in
R version 2.13.0.
23In a colloquial sense – this concept as it is used in social network analysis will be described in




Figure 4.16: Social Network by National Affiliation
they have many connections to others in the network and to each other. However,
the most connected individuals in the network are in Emergency Management, la-
beled here in green. This is not surprising, since the role of emergency managers is
to act as central contact points, facilitating connections between all members of the
networks, regardless of the job function of other network members.24 Table 4.5 shows
the number of referrals for the most central individuals the network.
Figure 4.17 also shows that the pink nodes of Administration – general community
leaders such as mayors or departmental civil servants – mostly lie the periphery of the
network. Many of the Administration nodes are only named by one other respondent.
This indicates that individuals in this role are often not considered as part of the












Figure 4.17: Social Network by Occupation













Table 4.5: Occupational Category and Number of Referrals for Most Central Network
Members
network, likely because they are not first responders to incidents, and are often not
involved until an incident has escalated significantly. Given the connection of public
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Figure 4.18: Social Network by Level of Government/Sector
Figure 4.18 shows the connections within the network by Level of Government
or Sector. Substantively, this figure shows who talks to whom, and how, if at all,
respondents are able to make trusted connections to other levels of government or
sectors other than their own. It is not surprising that respondents from the Local
level have the greatest connections to each other. First responders, such as Law
Enforcement and Fire, are frequently from local departments, such as cities, and
have the greatest opportunities to talk to each other and get to know each other due
to regular professional interaction. Their shared local concerns and, at times, need
to share resources facilitate contacts. Nonetheless, the most connected people at the
center are from the county level, which is where most respondents from Emergency
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Management work. County-level agents, such as the St. Clair County Sheriff’s Office,
are often also first responders, and some are also important parts of the network.
Also note that state and provincial nodes – in green – are often on the outer edges,






Figure 4.19: Many Isolates in the Social Network by Level of Government/Sector
Figure 4.19 shows the entire network, including isolates. Isolates are those who
were not named at all by any survey respondent, although they were in the first wave
of contacts provided by St. Clair County Emergency Management and Lambton
County Emergency Management. This means that they are on official lists such as
the Emergency Management Breakfast list, and thus have some official function in
the community. These are not people who did not respond to the survey, but rather
those who were not named as contacts.
There were eighty-seven isolates in the network. The reasons for their exclusion
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are not clear – this group had an average time in the profession of twenty-two years,
and an average time in their specific job of almost thirteen years. They are not,
therefore, new to the community. Nineteen people each in Law Enforcement and
Fire were not named by anyone, along with eleven in Emergency Management, ten
in Medical, five in Dispatch, twelve in Administration, six in Critical Infrastructure,
three in Nonprofit and one Unknown. The large number of isolates indicates the
sparsity of the network: These individuals may have some role, but because they are
not named, I cannot describe what that role may be in detail.
4.3.3.1 Network Density and Basic Network Measures
This directed network of size n = 275 has 43,943 total edges, 43,363 missing edges,
585 non-missing edges, and 48 mutual edges. The overall density of the network is
very low at 0.007763769. With the lack of an available comparison group, it is chal-
lenging to know if this network is denser or less dense than other homeland security
networks. Further, the lack of access to certain key components of the network,
specifically employees of the U.S. federal government (See Chapter V) restricts the
conclusions I can draw about the importance of network density. Because of this, I
limit the networks component of the statistical analysis to descriptive statistics only,
and instead try to draw conclusions about network density from the qualitative in-
terviews in Chapter V. Instead, I give a basic overview of some of the important
properties of this network.
Outdegree refers to the number of people named by others in a network. For
outdegree, x¯ = 2.109 (min = 4,max = 2). Indegree describes the number of times
individuals in the network are named by others. Figure 4.20 shows the distribution of
Indegree in the network – the distribution of how many times a given individual was
named, showing, for example, that most people who were named were named once.
Figure 4.21 shows the link between being named in the network and naming others.
84














Figure 4.20: Distribution of Indegree in the Network
Recall that the survey was limited in the number of alters that could be named. Each
respondent could only name 15 unique alters, although in practice, many respondents
named the same alter repeatedly and/or did not provide a full set of fifteen names.
The mean x¯ for indegree was 2.109, (min = 2,max = 43). This means that, for those
who were not isolates and not named by anyone, the average respondent (ego) was
named by about 2 other respondents.
In the next section, I analyze the network by focusing on the effect of specific














































































Figure 4.21: Indegree and Outdegree in the Network
4.4 Data Analysis and Hypothesis Testing
The hypotheses proposed in Subection 3.2.0.1 of Chapter III were based on theo-
retical expectations of the role of trust in group behavior. In this section, I formally
test two of these hypotheses using data from the survey described here.
H1 : Individuals will have greater levels of trust with other members of
their in-group than members of other groups and H2 : Greater levels of
trust within in-groups is correlated with lower levels of trust between
groups.
Across all name generation questions, Table 4.6 shows that certain occupational
groups tended to name others from the same occupation. Over 73% of law enforce-
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Table 4.6: Not All Respondents Named Others in Same Field
Stats LE Fire EM Medical Dispatch
mean .7311828 .7096774 .5483871 .3333333 .0645161
sd .4457477 .4563714 .5003505 .4739596 .2470017
Admin CI Educ Nonprof
mean .2258065 .2150538 .0645161 .0645161
sd .4203785 .4130865 .2470017 .2470017
ment and 70% of fire professionals named others from the same profession (but differ-
ent organizations.) Just over half of emergency managers did, as well. However, other
fields were less likely to name alters from within their own profession (note that they
were underrepresented relative to law enforcement and fire, however.) On its face,
this indicates clustering of occupations within the network and thus less opportunity
to develop trusting relationships with others. Recalling the earlier discussion on the
different meanings of different name generator questions, however, it is important to
look deeper into these results in order to understand their meaning.
Table 4.7: Ego-Alter Same Occupation: Informal Food and Drinks
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN1
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 3 1 4
Law Enforcement 23 10 33
Fire 19 6 25
Emergency Management 1 6 7
Medical 5 3 8
Dispatch 3 2 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 5 1 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 64 29 93
Table 4.7 shows a cross-tabulation of named alters to the first name generation
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question specifically,25 which asked the last person with whom the respondent had
a meal or drinks. For this question, Law enforcement was more than twice as likely
to have named someone who was not from Law enforcement. Fire was more than
three times as likely to have dined with someone outside the fire services. For the two
largest groups of respondents, this indicates a significant amount of cross-occupational
connection in an informal setting, something that interviewees in Chapter V indicated



















Q1 Informal food/Drinks Q2 Informal meeting in community
Q3 Informal meeting in community Q4 Informal meeting in community
Q5 On scene: Who did you look for? Q6 On scene: Who approached you?
Q7 On scene: Who helped you? Q8 On scene: Who helped you (other country)?
Q9 Discuss innovative idea Q10 You seek out for advice
Q11 Sought you out for advice Q12 Task force
Q13 Task force Q14 Task force
Q15 Task force
Figure 4.22: Occupational Clustering by Question
For all occupations, Figure 4.22 shows that the tendency of any given egoi to
name an alterj in the same occupational group as themselves (for example, firefighters
naming other firefighters, even if they are not in the same organization) varies by the
name generator question being asked. For all respondents, a minority responded to
the question with an individual of the same occupation type, with the exception of
question 9, asking about who the respondent might be willing to discuss an innovative
idea yet that is not ready for prime-time. In this case, most respondents would discuss
25See Appendix F for crosstabs for all name generation questions.
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the idea with someone in the same career, possibly because they would have a greater
shared understanding of the developing idea and may be better suited to help the
respondent frame the idea to others.
Alter Obs Mean SD
1 60 .7833 .2345
2 57 .7058 .2837
3 52 .6434 .3043
4 47 .6155 .3051
5 93 .8639 .2431
6 51 .6925 .2768
7 93 .8352 .2787
8 19 .6644 .3334
9 62 .7577 .2824
10 65 .7862 .2611
11 56 .6347 .3187
12 60 .7434 .2482
13 60 .6973 .2390
14 57 .6923 .2485
15 54 .6835 .2518
Table 4.8: Average Assessments of Alter Relationships
More generally, how do respondents assess the alters they named among the dif-
ferent proxy assessment questions? This gets to the core of the hypothesis that
professionals may be more trusting of others within their same occupational pro-
fession than others. The individual assessment questions, or proxy trust questions,
answered at the end of the survey, provide more information about how different
groups assessed the alters that they named. I generated a new variable that captured
the average assessment of the alters named across all questions. Table 4.8 shows the
mean of average assessments of each alter by egos across the proxy trust questions.
Figure 4.23 shows the average assessment for each named alter 1–15 across all eight
of the proxy trust questions. These indicate that there was variation in the average
score – on the whole, respondents did not give their named alters a check mark for
each and every question, indicating their belief that the questions were applicable to
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Average Assessments of Alters
Alter 1 Alter 2
Alter 3 Alter 4
Alter 5 Alter 6
Alter 7 Alter 8
Alter 9 Alter 10
Alter 11 Alter 12
Alter 13 Alter 14
Alter 15
Figure 4.23: Average Assessment of Named Alters across all Proxy Trust Questions
The following figures show the average assessment levels of named alters by the
occupation of the ego and the specific assessment question asked in the survey. It is
helpful to understand the survey responses at this level in order to better assess basic
levels of alter trusting behavior by occupational subgroup. In other words, do some
professions tend to rank their alters higher than others?
Figure 4.24 shows that law enforcement and fire have different patterns of average
assessments for their named alters. This figure indicates that there is more variation
in the responses of fire across more questions, and that law enforcement tends to have
a more uniform pattern of positive assessments than fire.
There is less variation of alter assessments by those in the medical field, primarily
public health and EMS, as indicated by Figure 4.25. They also have lower average as-
sessments of the first alter named, in response to the question about sharing informal
drinks or food.























Ego = Law Enforcement
Average Assessments of Alters
Alter 1 Alter 2
Alter 3 Alter 4
Alter 5 Alter 6
Alter 7 Alter 8
Alter 9 Alter 10
Alter 11 Alter 12
























Average Assessments of Alters
Alter 1 Alter 2
Alter 3 Alter 4
Alter 5 Alter 6
Alter 7 Alter 8
Alter 9 Alter 10
Alter 11 Alter 12
Alter 13 Alter 14
Alter 15























Average Assessments of Alters
Alter 1 Alter 2
Alter 3 Alter 4
Alter 5 Alter 6
Alter 7 Alter 8
Alter 9 Alter 10
Alter 11 Alter 12
Alter 13 Alter 14
Alter 15
Figure 4.25: Average Assessment of Named Alters: Medical
alters for the question “If you wanted information about an area of expertise other
than your own, who would you talk to?” This figure shows a wide variation in
assessments by law enforcement and emergency managers. Professionals from the fire





















SN3 Would Seek for Info



























SN5 Reputation for Getting Job Done






Figure 4.27: Average Assessment of Alters by Occupation: Get the Job Done
Figure 4.27 shows a different pattern, however. The average assessment by fire
for their named alters on this measure – “Who has a reputation for getting the job
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done?” – is higher than law enforcement, emergency management, or medical. Along
this dimension, fire tends to think more highly of the alters they named than the


























Figure 4.28: Average Assessment of Alters by Occupation: Good Credentials
Finally, it is interesting to see the patterns of assessments across occupational
groups for the question of having good credentials. Figure 4.28 shows that, in most
cases, egos believe that their named alters possess good credentials, which could be
defined as adequate training, for example, or professional titles that are recognizable
signs of professional success. This recognition of credentials is especially pronounced
for law enforcement.
I test the first and second hypotheses together by examining the survey data in
more detail and running a series of logistic regressions on the key survey questions
of interest that assess the ego’s assessment of a given alter, the proxy trust questions
that are the last eight questions in the survey. These logistic regressions seek to
answer the basic question of whether, for any given egoi-alterj dyad, being in the
same occupational field makes respondents more or less likely to select “yes” for each
93
of the alter assessment questions. For example, suppose alterj is named in response
to the name generator question 5: “Who as the first person you looked for when
you arrived on the scene?”, I want to know egoi’s assessment of alterj along the
dimension of one of the proxy trust questions, question 8: “Reliable/Dependable.”
Recall that this assessment is binary: the respondent could either provide a check
mark on the survey indicating that this proxy trust question applied to the “Who
as the first person you looked for when you arrived on the scene?” alter, or leave it
blank, indicating that this characteristic does not apply to this person.26
More formally, the logit model used for this estimation is:
Pr(Yijq = 1|X) = exp(X
′β)
1 + exp(X ′β)
(4.1)
where Yijq is the egoi assessment of a given alterj for a specific proxy trust question
qn and X is a vector of covariates including whether or not they share the same occu-
pational code, the occupational code of egoi, ego’s trusting score, national affiliation,
and level of government.
The logit model is the most appropriate test for this relationship because it is
assessing the probability of observing a binary outcome. Even though the analysis is
based on data that was collected in a network setting, the observations from specific
survey questions are independent of others. Prima facie, there is no reason to expect
that an ego’s assessment of one alter has any direct effect on the assessment of other
alters, particularly because alters are from other organizations. The logit model
is also appropriate for this data since it helps understand the marginal effects of
the independent variables on the binary dependent variable – whether or not an
ego affirmatively answers a proxy trust question for a given alter. I estimated 300
logit regressions: ten regressions for each ego-alter dyad (by occupation), estimating
26For these questions, responses were only counted as 0 in the presence of other responses indicated
with a check mark. In other words, for respondents who did not answer any of these questions at
all, blank proxy trust question fields were coded as missing data.
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the probability that the ego would mark that named alter as 1 for each of the ten
assessment questions. 150 regressions were of the base model with the single covariate
of shared occupational category, and 150 with the expanded model including the
additional ego-level covariates of ego occupation, trusting score, national affiliation,
and level of government.27
With one exception, none of the 300 regressions were statistically significant for
any of the covariates, including shared occupation. The only exception was the single-
covariate regression model of same occupation for social network question 4: “Who
are the ‘go to’ people for questions about homeland security, public safety, and/or
emergency management in the region?” which was positive and statistically signifi-
cant at the .05 level. Table 4.9 shows the results of this specific estimation.







Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Substantively, this means that, without controlling for any other ego-level factors,
respondents were significantly more likely to say the their named alters were the “ ‘go
to’ people” if they shared the same occupational function. This is a surprising result,
given the frequency with which emergency managers were named more frequently
than individuals from other professions, as indicated by Table 4.5, and frequently
sought out for advice by others, as indicated by Figure 4.15. Based on the interviews
reported in Chapter V. I am puzzled by the finding. In any case, this question is no
longer statistically significant in the full model, as indicated by Table 4.10.
27The single covariate model was Pr(Yij = 1|SameOccupationij) while the multivariate model is
Pr(Yij = 1|SameOccupationij + TrustingScorei + NationalAffiliationi + Sector/Leveli)
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Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
What about the main concern of the hypothesis, however? Do certain groups tend
to trust each other more than they trust other groups?
Law Enforcement
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
alter le 0.424∗∗ (0.129)
alter fire 0.182∗ (0.082)
alter em -0.159 (0.109)
alter med -0.200 (0.154)
alter disp -0.557∗∗ (0.042)
alter admin 0.010 (0.174)
alter ci 0.093 (0.152)
alter edu 0.562∗∗ (0.131)
alter np 0.614∗ (0.228)
Intercept 0.203† (0.113)
Table 4.11: OLS Regression of Alter Assessments for Law Enforcement: SN3
Table 4.11 displays the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on
the dependent variable of law enforcement’s average assessment of named alters for
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question 3. OLS is the appropriate in this case because it is measuring an average
across multiple assessments, instead of the probability of observing a binary outcome
for a given ego-alter dyad pair. Unsurprisingly, the alters of other law enforcement
and fire services are statistically significant and positive, along with education and
nonprofit. What is surprising is that the named alters from Dispatch have a statisti-
cally significant and negative sign. This may indicate that Dispatch is not considered
an important source of information in the community. According to law enforcement,
they also have statistically significant and negative evaluations for questions 7–10.
However, across further regressions (not shown) this relationship is not static. For
question 5, “Reputation for Getting the Job Done,” Dispatch was statistically signif-
icant and positive, while Administration has a statistically significant and negative
sign. For question 7, “Good Credentials,” Fire, Dispatch, and Education are statisti-
cally significant and positive, while Administration has a statistically significant and
negative sign. For question 8, “Reliable/Dependable,” Fire and Education are signif-
icant and positive. For question 9, “Skilled/Competent” question 10, “Experienced”
and Fire and Education are significant and positive.
Figure 4.29 shows the average assessment of alters who are and are not law en-
forcement members for the assessment question “If you wanted information about an
area of expertise other than your own, who would you talk to?”. A two-sample t
test with equal variances, however, indicates that this difference is not statistically
significant. This suggests that law enforcement does not “silo” itself, at least with
respect to seeking out information.28
Figure 4.30 plots the average assessments of law enforcement of their named alters
along this measure for all named alters. It graphically shows the highest level of
assessments for other law enforcement, but lower assessments for others. This does
not necessarily mean that law enforcement will “circle the wagons” and blindly defend
28In fact, in t-tests of all assessment questions, the difference in assessment levels between law





















Not Both Law Enforcement Both Law Enforcement
Ego/Alter = Law Enforcement
Assessments of Alters: SN3 Would Seek for Info





















Ego = Law Enforcement
Assessments of Alters: SN3 Would Seek for Info
Alter: LE Alter: Fire
Alter: EM Alter: Medical
Alter: Dispatch Alter: Admin
Alter: CI Alter: Edu
Alter: NonProf
Figure 4.30: Law Enforcement Seeks out Emergency Managers and Medical for In-
formation
the actions of other law enforcement.
Compare this to Figure 4.31, which indicates the highest level of assessments by




















Ego = Law Enforcement
Assessments of Alters: SN6: Demonstrated Proficiency
Alter: LE Alter: Fire
Alter: EM Alter: Medical
Alter: Dispatch Alter: Admin
Alter: CI Alter: Edu
Alter: NonProf
Figure 4.31: Law Enforcement Rates Firefighters Highly on Demonstrated Proficiency
in past incidents?” Here, named alters from firefighting actually rank higher (x =
.804, sd = .272) than the in-group named alters from law enforcement (x = .638, sd =
.323). The average assessment of other law enforcement officers could indicate an
exposure to more incidents where fellow officers underperformed, or it may indicate
an authentically high regard for individuals in a different profession. It is in any case
additional evidence that law enforcement includes other types of professions in its
network in a positive manner.
Fire
Table 4.12 displays the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on the
dependent variable of fire’s average assessment of named alters for question 3. It is
interesting that none of the coefficients in this regression are statistically significant.
This makes it challenging to make conclusions about trust coming from those in the
fire services along this dimension. For question 4, the “go to” person for fire can be
found in critical infrastructure, positive and significant at the .01 level. Fire also has
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Table 4.12: OLS Regression of Alter Assessments for Fire: SN3
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
alter le -0.059 (0.138)
alter fire -0.022 (0.109)
alter em 0.049 (0.145)
alter med -0.254 (0.143)
o.alter disp 0.000 (0.000)
alter admin -0.248 (0.253)
o.alter ci 0.000 (0.000)
alter edu -0.247 (0.220)
o.alter np 0.000 (0.000)
Intercept 0.669∗ (0.230)
a more positive relationship with Administration which is positive and statistically
significant for question 7, “Good Credentials” and question 8, “Reliable/Dependable,”




















Assessments of Alters: SN4: Go-to Person
Alter: LE Alter: Fire
Alter: EM Alter: Medical
Alter: Dispatch Alter: Admin
Alter: CI Alter: Edu
Alter: NonProf
Figure 4.32: Fire Seeks out Law Enforcement for Information
Fire shares some of the same assessments of law enforcement as law enforcement
does of itself. Figure 4.32 shows that they are more likely to describe alters in law
enforcement as the “go to” people, even higher than other firefighters. Medical gets






















Assessments of Alters: SN6: Demonstrated Proficiency
Alter: LE Alter: Fire
Alter: EM Alter: Medical
Alter: Dispatch Alter: Admin
Alter: CI Alter: Edu
Alter: NonProf
Figure 4.33: Firefighters Assess Each Other as Demonstrating Proficiency
Similar to the responses of law enforcement, firefighters are also the most likely
to say that other firefighters demonstrated proficiency in past incidents. They also
rank emergency managers slightly higher than law enforcement as well.
Emergency Management
After law enforcement and fire, emergency management is next largest respondent
group. Nonetheless, because of their lower representation in the data, these results
are not as robust as for the first two occupational groups.
Emergency managers rank law enforcement highly, at least as far having a repu-
tation for getting the job done, as Figure 4.34 shows. They were also likely to assess
law enforcement as skilled/competent, reliable/dependable, and having good creden-
tials. Finally, they named more individuals from critical infrastructure than other
respondents, and gave them high marks.
Overall, these results suggest mixed support for H1, that individuals will have





















Ego = Emergency Management
Assessments of Alters: SN5: Reputation to Get Job Done
Alter: LE Alter: Fire
Alter: EM Alter: Medical
Alter: Dispatch Alter: Admin
Alter: CI Alter: Edu
Alter: NonProf
Figure 4.34: Emergency Managers Assess Law Enforcement Highly for Getting the
Job Done
groups. While it is the case that some professions rank others with the same occu-
pation more highly than others, this is not true across the board. Depending on the
question, or the specific aspect of professional function being assessed, some occupa-
tions rank others more highly. This is a promising precondition for the development
of trusting relationships, as will be explored further in Chapter V.
These results also suggest rejection of hypothesis H2, that greater levels of trust
within in-groups is correlated with lower levels of trust between groups, at least to
the extent that in-group is defined by professional function. The logistic regressions,
specifically those which account for the full model including ego-level covariates, also
support a rejection of this hypothesis, as this kind of “siloing” is not necessarily true
across the board in this community.
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4.5 Conclusion
The core argument about the development of interpersonal trust is that individuals
begin such relationships through informal and formal meetings, but dyadic trust
actually develops as the result of repeated interactions in real-world settings that
allow professionals to demonstrate competence, as well as share useful information.
In Chapter III, I argued further that group affiliation might hamper the development
of trusting relationships if such membership bolstered cognitive biases. Some of the
findings from the quantitative data reinforce findings from the literature, such as
group cohesion among select sub-groups, but others challenge it.
The data presented here suggest that the high levels of mutual trust between
law enforcement and fire indicated by the proxy trust questions here is a result of
the dynamic of shared on-the-job experiences. The findings on law enforcement, in
particular, also indicate that, at least in this relatively small community, they are
less insular than some may expect. They do have positive and trusting connections
with professionals from other fields, a factor which helps facilitate communication
and information exchange.
The lower ranking of medical by other groups similarly suggests that the lack of
shared experiences and opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities hurts the ability
of those in medical to develop trusting relationships, either as ego or alter. At the same
time, medical thinks more highly of their named alters as providers of information,
indicating a potential cognitive bias in this group that is less apparent than other
groups. As I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, those in the medical
profession are especially challenged by formal institutions that impede cooperation
because there are more regulations governing both the practice of medicine by EMTs
(emergency medical technicians) and complex national-level rules for those in public
health. This is an important example of the conflict between formal institutions and
the development of interpersonal trust, when accounting for group-level dynamics.
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One limitation of the survey is that it is not longitudinal, and therefore is of limited
utility to addressing how the observed trusting relationships within the network de-
veloped over time. To better understand the mechanisms driving these observations,
I turn in the next chapter to qualitative interviews.
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CHAPTER V
Qualitative Evidence: Interviews from a
US-Canada Border Region
The main argument of this research is that, for security professionals working in
high-pressure potential threat conditions, interpersonal trust relationships start with
the opportunity to meet, but develop when both sides can demonstrate professional
capabilities and share useful information. The opportunity for repeated interactions
allow both demonstration and sharing to occur, allowing interpersonal trust to act as
a complement or even a substitute for formal institutions governing the professional
relationship between two individuals in the community.
But how do professionals in the community subjectively understand the role of
trust? One DHS official interviewed for this dissertation described interpersonal trust
in the homeland security setting as,
. . . a complex relationship that is based on genuine authenticity, that is
one definition. And, another definition suggests that true trust is when
your problems become someone else’s problems and their problems become
yours. And because of the requisite security system, the core issue is, that
people enter these relationships and they basically take on each others
problems as their own in order to take on the desired outcome that is really
not possible. So those are two concepts of trust seeking, trust making,
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that I would consider on this idea. This idea that a complex relationship
takes authenticity and care, it comes obviously over time. There is an
underlying commitment beyond empathy is literally one person’s problem
is yours and yours is theirs. So this idea of. . . a joint mutual support, even
at a personal or professional cost.
Note that this definition, coming from a working practitioner, dovetails with the
academic definition of trust described in Chapter II of shared “core beliefs” (Leach and
Sabatier, 2005). It requires shared interests and shared problems where an individual
recognizes their own stake in a shared outcome. Based on the interviews, most of the
professionals in the St. Clair County/Lambton County region deem “trust making”
a critical component of their job.
How do professionals in the community develop and maintain trust? Interviewees
described the trust they have with each other as coming from various sources includ-
ing shared professional backgrounds, historical events stretching back for decades,
having friends and family that work in related professions on both sides of the bor-
der, participating in joint training exercises, attending social events together, and
witnessing others effectively handle complex emergencies. They described the pro-
cess of developing trust as one that develops over time in multiple settings, as one
metropolitan fire chief described:
Okay, so one of our main mottos is that we believe in networking and
the first time we meet somebody shouldn’t be on an emergency scene.
So we host meetings for sure quarterly, and more often with committees
and things like that. It’s just a way to get to know people. So St. Clair
and Port Huron have been very active in hosting meetings over on the
American side. On the Canadian side, we host meetings with homeland
security or border patrol and Canadian border patrol just so that we’re
getting face to face, we’re meeting people so we know each other the first
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time we have an emergency response. And it’s worked famously. I mean
I can truly say that chief Eick in Port Huron is a friend, same with Jeff
Friedland and that’s a wonderful relationship that’s been built over the
years. So it’s more of the casual meeting, business to be done, but not
during an emergency scene.
Another respondent, a field manager with a large multi-national chemical company
with pipelines crossing the international border, also described the development of
trust as involving both informal components and learning about the professional
background of others:
You start with a quick meeting, and then you have another meeting, me
I’ll say after a meeting let’s have a beer! Then you just start exchanging
stories, how long have you been in the business? You’re new at this, I’ve
been at it. Then I start saying, you know I can help you, you can help me,
and then you go into the relationship. I mean you talk like that you. . . So
this, I just say what are you going to do, let’s have a beer. Okay, okay,
now I know who I can call now, if I’ve got that relationship. I’ll go back
to work and say “Oh, Cali knows that!”
It is possible that trusting relationships like this are simply a by-product of be-
ing as well-known part of the community, or being referred by a trusted individual.
However, there are important ways in which new individuals could be introduced to
the network. I was specifically interested in this dynamic, and asked respondents
what they do when a new person joins the local homeland security community. One
respondent, the director of emergency response for a large petrochemical processing
company, who also leads technical training of firefighters throughout North America
on chemical response, described his own experience being the “new person”:
Well, I think you try to get to know them a little bit. You try to welcome
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them to the fold. You don’t want them to feel like: “Oh this is the good
old boys club, and you’re not welcome.” That would not make anybody
feel good about joining up and like: “Oh man, I’m an outsider,” and you
know how it is when you walk into a room and everybody knows each
other but you don’t know them, and you feel very insecure, and I know
that happened to me in 2004, when I started. And very quickly, the other
chiefs or somebody that you met once or twice would quickly introduce
you to everyone and say: “This is chief Eick from Port Huron, and this is
this person and that is that person,” so you get to know them, and they’ll
talk to you, they’ll come over and say: “Hey, if you ever need any help,
if you have any questions, call me.” I’ve told him that many times. “If
you’re concerned about anything going on around here, give me a call.
I’m happy to answer the phone. Or call me at home, I don’t care. That’s
fine.”
With the exception of one respondent who refused to be identified or recorded,
all of the subjects that I interviewed in the St. Clair County/Lambton County study
site were part of the Wave 1 group of survey respondents, and most of them in
fact completed and returned their anonymous survey. In this chapter, I use the
information from qualitative interviews to give context to the data from the surveys
by giving participants the chance to share their perspective of the network, and their
role in it, in their own words.
As noted earlier, I selected the St. Clair County/Lambton County region for
reasons of feasibility and importance to the research question. This region is rel-
evant to other northern border cases, such as the Detroit/Windsor region or the
Buffalo/Niagara region, which also have a large presence of critical infrastructure,
multiple major international land border crossings and thus a similar presence of
federal border agencies and international threats. They also face similar predictable
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emergencies, such as major winter snowstorms which can rise to the level of being
declared disasters at the state and provincial levels. While trying to avoid the selec-
tion of cases on the dependent variable (Geddes, 1990), I was limited in what I could
feasibly accomplish given the time and funding constraints of a dissertation research
project.1
5.1 Interview Methodology
In this section, I follow the guidance of Bleich and Pekkanen (2013) in laying out
the process of conducting these interviews in great detail.2
Due to the sensitive nature of the questions being asked, I sought out potential
interviewees primarily based on referrals from others in the network. See Appendix B
for the interview sampling frame, comparing field interviews to survey data collected
in this study region. Once I had been “vetted” by the positive experiences of early
interviewees, many others were interested in participating. In both the U.S. and
Canada, representatives from Local Fire and Law Enforcement, Emergency Man-
agement, and Private Critical Infrastructure (primarily petrochemical facilities and
railroads) were especially helpful and willing to talk.
1I applied for research funds unsuccessfully from the following: The Canadian Studies Doctoral
Student Research Award from the Embassy of Canada, Fulbright Canada (2), The Morris Abrams
Award in International Relations, the National Institutes of Justice Ph.D. Graduate Research Fel-
lowship (2), the NSF Political Science Dissertation Award, and the Smith Richardson Foundation.
I am grateful to the National Institutes of Justice for substantive, high-quality feedback on my two
proposals that improved this project, SCC Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Man-
agement, who ultimately funded the survey research, as well as the Department of Political Science,
Ford School of Public Policy, the Graduate Seminar on Global Transformations and the University
of Michigan Rackham Graduate School who provided additional research funds to complete this
work.
2They write, “For us, the most important thing a scholar can do is report about the nature of the
interviews he or she conducted. Of course, a full description of all these elements for each interview
would be time and space consuming. But it helps a great deal if researchers are explicit about key
interviewing techniques, such as how the researcher created a record of the interview – through live
recording, simultaneous note-taking, or post-event note-taking (and the delay between the interview
and the note-taking) – whether interviews were structured, semi-structured, or unstructured; and
the length of interviews, especially when the researcher relies on them for critical observations or
elements of the analysis” (Bleich and Pekkanen, 2013, p. 92).
109
However, despite my best efforts, some interviews were simply impossible to ob-
tain. This was especially true with representatives of U.S. federal agencies, who were
required to get permission to participate in academic research.3
When interviewing respondents, I explicitly followed the methods laid out by
Leech (2002) and Rubin and Rubin (2005) in their book, Qualitative Interviewing:
The Art of Hearing Data. Rubin and Rubin describe the interview process as one
of “conversational partnership,” and their guidance about locating useful contacts,
establishing trust, expressing empathy, and structuring the interview were particu-
larly important for working with a population that is both busy and suspicious of
researchers asking about security issues.4 An analysis of security networks requires a
high degree of trust and credibility, and my professional experiences gave me a unique
ability to successfully carry out this research. I worked for two years as an Assistant
Policy Advisor for the Governor of Michigan, developing functional professional ex-
pertise and professional networks in public safety, corrections and homeland security,
then worked for three years as a policy analyst for the Governor’s Homeland Security
Advisor, BG (ret) Michael C. McDaniel, in the Michigan National Guard. Once I
secured official sponsorship of the project from the SCC Office of Homeland Security
and Emergency Management, Mr. Jeff Friedland, the emergency manager, agreed to
field any concerns from interviewees or potential survey respondents.
3For example, many interviewees described one particular person who was the head of an impor-
tant federal critical infrastructure facility, whose father was the former police chief, and who had
lived in the area his entire life. I had already interviewed many individuals in other agencies who
were his professional colleagues, and he was interested in sharing the point of view of his agency.
When he asked the Public Affairs Liaison for Field Operations in the Detroit Field Office for his
agency for permission, I sent all of my information, including details of the study and other contacts.
Ultimately, the Public Affairs Liaison denied my request to meet with this individual. This individ-
ual did return a survey, however, meaning that he is included in the data analysis in the previous
chapter.
4In fact, one survey respondent, a police chief interviewed at the beginning of the project, told me
a story where someone had falsely claimed to be a researcher on security issues. The chief explained
that he called his colleague, another police chief in Canada, to verify the credentials being presented
by the researcher and discovered that the individual was a criminal. It was not clear to me if I was
being told as a way of expressing doubt about me, but after this, I secured a letter of introduction
from Dr. Stam, and conducted most of my interviews on a referral basis only.
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For each interviewee, I arranged an in-person meeting, usually at their office. The
interviews were semi-structured, following the suggested protocols laid out by Rubin
and Rubin (2005).5 I began by introducing myself, providing my business card,
and giving a brief overview of my research. I always began with a broad question
about the respondent’s work, giving them an opportunity to explain their role and
function without regard for my research question. I asked main questions related to
the content of the survey, but utilizing Rubin and Rubin’s suggestions for getting
precise and useful information from respondents, for example: “Tell me about a
specific event where you worked with other members of the homeland security or
public safety community? (Walk me through it).” This allowed the respondents
to focus on a specific representative example event, describe it in detail, including
the setting, other participants, challenges and successes. From the main questions, I
asked follow-up questions and clarifying probe questions to elicit factual detail. At
the end of each interview, I asked respondents their opinion on my survey (which
they had not yet seen), specifically if they would be willing to answer questions about
their professional contacts. I also asked for specific names and the permission to
contact others for the purposes of conducting a similar interview. Each interview
took between one and two hours to complete.
With two exceptions, all interviews were recorded using a LiveScribe pen, an unob-
trusive recording device that is built into an actual ink pen, allowing for simultaneous
note-taking and recording.6 While not all scholars who conduct interview research
advocate recording (Woliver, 2002), I found it a useful and unobtrusive tool that re-
sulted in tangible results. I always requested permission to record the respondents,
and showed them the LiveScribe pen and how it worked with the note-taking paper.7
5See Appendix A for an example of the actual interview protocol used.
6The LiveScribe pen produces both an audio file and an interactive graphics file that shows the
actual notes being taken. The audio can be exported or it can stay on the pen, in which case it can
be accessed by tapping on the location in the notes where the user wishes to hear the audio recorded
at the specific time the note was written.
7Many interviewees were intrigued by the LiveScribe pen, and asked how it worked, its price, and
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All interviews were then transcribed.
5.2 Ego-Level Indicators of Trust
In Equation (1.1) in Chapter I, I hypothesized that capturing ego-level “trust-
ingness” is an important part of understanding the role of interpersonal trust in a
social network. Some individuals may be less trusting of everyone, even others in
professional settings, due to their own background and personal experiences. Recall
from the discussion in Chapter IV, however, that there was not a systematic de-
tectable variation by profession or sector in ego-level trusting behaviors according to
the validated scale developed by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) and utilized in the
survey.
Some interviewees, however, volunteered to discuss their own perceptions of ego-
level trust. One county-level deputy undersheriff in the U.S. described how he had to
consciously shift from the “questioning” mentality of police work when he advanced
in his career to positions requiring more inter-organizational cooperation:
[B]eing in police work for so long, sometimes I go the opposite way. I
actually try to go out of my way to not alienate or anything like that.
When I was back before when I was on the road just doing regular police
work, you had to develop that certain kind of questioning sense right
off the bat, and I’ve been really trying to develop in this past three years
some more of trusting sense until somebody proves me wrong.. . . [B]ecause
I realized pretty quickly when I go to these meetings and I kind of said, I
don’t know any of you, I’m not going to release anything, I don’t want to
tell you what I can and cannot do or what our department can and can’t
do. Don’t worry if you need us we’ll be there, kind of that attitude, and
after a short time I realized that I’m not getting anywhere with this and
how it might function for them in their professional roles.
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I will need to rely on these people at some point. So if I don’t expand
myself a little bit, how can I expect them to do the same, you know? I
realized that pretty quickly doing this thing, I can come to these meetings
and not share and not participate very much and just here because I have
to be here and try to gather information, or I can be an active participant.
But being an active participant kind of forces you to trust people.
Another interviewee, a female manager in a U.S. county public health department,
referred to other types of ego-level characteristics as a way of developing trust and
rapport in inter-organizational settings. She related:
I think the most important thing with the group is not pretending like
you’re something you’re not. Like passion. If you come into a room
passionate, and you say, “Look, this is what we do, this is how we do it.”
And willing to realize that, and women are very good at that. Men are
not, generally. I’m usually in a male dominated environment and most
of them quietly and politely sit and look at each other, and speak when
spoken to. You don’t get a lot of cross conversation and the human part
of me, if something was not right or correct, I found my passion kicked
in and I said, “Now wait a minute. That might not work, because,” and
then offer that. And I just think that if you don’t believe in what you’re
doing, and you don’t understand what you are doing, you shouldn’t be
doing it, because you represent a whole discipline.
This individual was the only woman in the St. Clair/Lambton study region that I
interviewed, which is why I did not seek to gather additional demographic information
in the surveys, in order to preserve anonymity in response. The issue of gender in
interagency communication in a security setting is a potentially fruitful area of future
research that I did not explore further in this project.
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The public health manager related that her passionate determination and pro-
fessional commitment eventually helped her gain the trust of others in the regional
homeland security community. She continued:
And you’re the face for that whole organization, and you put out on the
table, and people disagree with you and interact with you more, they’re
going to respect you. You got to take your punches basically. And some
days you get so down, but the hardest part was I found I was more willing
to share information more willing to talk about issues openly than many
of them were because they are so disciplined. And maybe that is where
the trust comes in. Maybe I am transparent. I know my health officer is
very transparent, we try to be that way. Because maybe we don’t always
impress other organizations, but the [public] community has got to trust
us. Because those people we got to get the meds into and the pills into in
a worst case scenario, and if we are not transparent, they are not going
to come to us. And it’s going to be very very bad. So we got to just
put ourselves out there and take the cuts. You know it’s my personality.
I’ve met people, just by the way they talked, and you know they’re here
for the right reason. They’re not here to look good, they’re not here to
pretend. Because they couldn’t do any other job. They’re here because
they’re that good. And you know them.
Emergency managers have a unique role in the homeland security community, be-
cause they are tasked with connecting with and organizing a large number individuals
from a wide range of disciplines in order to accomplish a shared goal. In this role,
they must balance competing budgetary, organizational, and bureaucratic interests,
as well as mollify any interpersonal conflicts. In public safety settings, emergency
managers frequently use collaborative management techniques to help different types
of organizations better understand each other (Kelman, Hong and Turbitt, 2013),
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making the process of building interpersonal trust among others central to their job
(Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). The characteristics associated with successful col-
laborators, including open-mindedness, patience, respectfulness, and persistence are
associated with greater levels of ego-level trust (O’Leary, Choi and Gerard, 2012). A
county-level emergency manager in the U.S. described how his profession influenced,
and was influenced by, his ego-level trustingness of others:
If the person in that position has a similar thought process, similar desires,
goals, then naturally you’re going to improve that relationship and become
closer. That’s what I think happens, is you maintain your basic level of
relationship. I mean, you got to do it with so many agencies, departments,
there’s that individual relationship, but definitely you need to capture
where the people that have the influence, but have the similar likenesses,
such as yourself. I mean, you can kind of be blue in the face to talk to
somebody that doesn’t believe in what you’re doing and you get the lip
service.
This orientation towards people instead of tasks is characteristic of emergency man-
agers generally (McGuire and Silvia, 2010, 2009).
Emergency managers are not the only individuals required to utilize ego-level
trust to facilitate trusting relationships, however. One interviewee is the executive
director of a non-profit coalition of private sector owners of critical infrastructure in
Canada, primarily petrochemical processing facilities. The non-profit has multiple
roles, including community coordination and outreach, and serves as a facilitator
between the chemical plants and the surrounding communities. The director described
how he builds trust when reaching out to municipal police and fire departments:
Generally speaking, speaking from the experience that [another director]
and I had is that I’m pretty sure they look at us like we didn’t have a
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clue and they were right and to this day, I will tell anybody who wants
to listen, when it comes to an emergency, the last guy you’d want here to
would be me. I recognize there are guys, there are people who are trained
who do this much better than I do. . . whether it be fire people, whether it
be police people. They didn’t know me from a hole in the ground. They
might have heard my name before but they really didn’t know before. I
think the other thing, some people always say, “You see and tell us what
to do.” Somebody else might. I wouldn’t. I know where my strengths
and capabilities lie, certainly not in telling people how to put out fires,
certainly not to tell people how to do law enforcement. I was never trained
to do that sort of stuff. Matter of fact, part of the beauty of this job is
learning about that stuff.
While I did not ask about ego-level trust directly in the interviews, the respondents
provided different examples of how ego-level trust functioned in their professional
roles and roles in the network. In the next section, I discuss how culture, the second
variable identified in In Equation (1.1) in Chapter I, interacts with individuals’ ego-
level trusting characteristics when dealing with other alters in the network.
5.3 Professional and National Culture
5.3.1 Professional Culture
“Culture” can operate as a set of shared norms that facilitate communication
and trust within a network. Recall from Table 4.5 that two of the top three most
frequently named alters were from the fire services. Individuals in the firefighting
profession play a central roles in the St. Clair County/Lambton County network. In
the survey, and in interviews, individuals who were currently in the fire services, or
even had a past history in the fire services, reported high levels of trust with each
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other. This was due to a shared cultural understanding of the danger firefighters face
on the job, the level of expertise needed to work effectively as part of a firefighting
team, and the standards of professionalization that apply to all fire services.
One former firefighter, who is now director of emergency response for a large petro-
chemical processing company, and leads technical training of firefighters throughout
North America on chemical response, commented on the way that fire services net-
work informally with each other. He described the funeral of a firefighter in a nearby
community:
You know, chief Eick [Chief of Port Huron Fire] was there, out of respect
for the firefighter from Point Edward [who died in a training exercise],
not even in the same country as him, so for me, that builds a lot of my
respect for him, as in: isn’t that nice that he would come over and freeze
like the rest of us standing out there on the road for 2 or 3 hours while
we were marching in to the funeral? And I know that he hadn’t known
that individual, I didn’t know the individual either, but we were there out
of respect for that group. You know, there’s a certain amount of those
types of things were you would build a respect for the person just by his
actions, so the fact that he’s there, the fact that he had someone there,
you know, again, you build a bit of camaraderie there. Now, after the
funeral, when they’re having a lunch, we have a chance to chat and just
sit in an informal place. So you get to know them a little bit better. So
I would say that it’s at minimum other than work related things, but we
always find a time to be pleasant to one another and just kind of chat. I
mean, firefighters are probably pretty informal people.
This informal setting was an opportunity for the Port Huron fire chief to demonstrate
respect for a deceased colleague based on a mutual professional connection. The
chief was widely known and respected in both communities for his expertise, and the
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funeral visit was a way to strengthen existing ties, as opposed to developing trust
relationships from scratch.
This was not their only interaction, however. The director of emergency response
described another, that illustrated the importance of sharing information as a basis
for developing trust:
As a matter of fact, when we had the [major industrial] fire I talked about
earlier, when we had mutual aid, I was at a meeting and chief Eick was
there, and I hadn’t seen him in a while, and it was after the incident,
he came over and started talking about my accident, and I said: “Oh
yeah,” and we were answering questions and talking back and forth, and
he said to me: “Would you like a video of it, of your fire?” And I was like:
“Video? My fire? How would you own a video of my fire?” He said: “Our
city hall security cameras caught the entire thing on video.” I said: “I
would love to have that.” Well, see, in that case, I had no idea that they
would have anything, and there were a few things that we’re looking at
that had tried to understand what had happened, and we didn’t have any
really good idea, because our recollections are recollections, right? And
I knew that the initial fire we had was an explosion, and then we had
a secondary explosion a little while later after I got here. And I said to
them: “This happened,” and a number of people were saying: “Oh no,
that never happened.” And when he sent me the video, it was timelined,
so it had a timerun, because it’s a security camera, so 8 minutes after
the first explosion there was a second explosion, that’s the one I saw, so I
had it all on tape, so I had the exact timing, so I could see exactly what
happened, so it was so much help for me to have that, and I’m glad he
told me, because otherwise I would never have known.
This development of trust through informal information sharing was repeated
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by others in the community. One individual – a field manager with a large multi-
national chemical company with pipelines crossing the international border – drew
on his background as a former firefighter in his new role.
That’s what me and [a local fire chief] did, just started. Now he realized
[how it might just help] to have a firefighting background. He picked up
on that. As we got stronger and stronger, at one point he said well what
if this valve needs to be shut under the concrete? Well you bring them in,
you know how to turn the valve. I said you trust me walking in to your
guys – that’s definitely not protocol. I really saw that this man saw in us.
I trust you with my life, you trust me with yours. When he said that to
me I thought holy Jesus, if the world knew that. . .
Eventually, the field manager ended up informally sharing a substantial amount of
information with the local fire chief, including sensitive proprietary information about
the monitoring system for the pipes. This was a mutually beneficial arrangement
to the fire chief, as he was concerned about how to respond to a potentially very
dangerous chemical release given the limited resources of his small town. In the
chief’s words:
If they have whatever it may be, whether it’s a storm event that causes
a release into the river or a chemical release that’s either into the river
or airborne. Depending on the companies, because they’re also trying to
protect their stockholders. So most of this all revolves around private
companies: So a lot of times they’re really cautious about who they tell
what to because they don’t want to necessarily get it out into the media
until they find out exactly what it is. But we always try to stress early
notification. We’d rather find out about it and have it be nothing than
wait until it’s too serious and we’re behind the eight ball. So it’s a real
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fine line as developing those relationships so they feel confident to tell
us knowing that we’ll protect their interest until we determine you know
what the true hazard is.
In this case, the mutual firefighting background of these two individuals helped them
establish a trust-based relationship, even though they were not necessarily working
together in a firefighting capacity.
The high level of trust between the fire services of Port Huron and Sarnia dates
back for decades. In our interview, the fire chief of Sarnia described the Sarnia-
Port Huron mutual aid agreement, which had in fact been in place in some form for
over sixty years. Prior to 9/11, this mutual aid agreement had been uncontroversial,
however in the new security environment, it has been tested, as the chief described:
And it’s much to the chagrin of the federal government, for example the
opinions of the RCMP really had an issue with it because it’s an inter-
national agreement and I’m not sure how law deals with it on his side
but because it’s way above our authorities in the sense that we have an
agreement with another nation. And so it’s really – I’ve had to deal with
it twice since I’ve been chief. Not in a horrible way but certainly we’re
being told that it’s not a legitimate or legal document. But in fact, Port
Huron and city of Sarnia, both mayors had the opportunity to speak to
both of them very much feel it’s valid. . . . In their time of need or our time
of need, we’re there for each other. Don’t care about the federal rules.
Because I don’t think anyone’s going to stop us from helping. . . . We’re
just helping, we’re about helping each other.
This mutual aid agreement is one of many examples of how agents in this commu-
nity use interpersonal trust to overcome significant bureaucratic and legal obstacles
to cooperation and the sharing of information and resources, particularly across in-
ternational borders. This will be discussed in more detail in Subsection 5.4.2.
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5.3.2 Professional Culture: Law Enforcement
Law enforcement, in both the U.S. and Canada, has a unique role in any com-
munity, including the local the homeland security community that I studied. After
9/11, new institutions such as local, state, and regional intelligence fusion centers
have helped to increase the sharing of information (Joyal, 2012), but law enforcement
retains a unique culture that is worth exploring in more detail, as it affects their role
in the overall homeland security network.
As noted in Chapter I, the National Strategy for Homeland Security developed
immediately after 9/11 brought a fundamental change to the mission and focus of all
U.S. police agencies. Even local agencies were affected:
While law enforcement agencies will continue to investigate and prose-
cute criminal activity, they should now assign priority to preventing and
interdicting terrorist activity within the United States. . . . We will rede-
fine our law enforcement mission to focus on the prevention of all terrorist
acts within the United States, whether international or domestic in origin.
We will use all legal means – both traditional and non- traditional – to
identify, halt, and, where appropriate, prosecute terrorists in the United
States. (U.S. Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 25–26)
Despite the provision of additional federal funding, this change of mandate, par-
ticularly the need to work with other organizations, was not immediately welcomed
by law enforcement. Unlike other community professionals, police officers generally
deal with the most unpleasant people in the community with the greatest problems,
often work in the absence of immediate supervision, and, as individuals or two-person
teams, are highly autonomous (Cordner and Scarborough, 2010). They also work in
difficult conditions under high stress. As a Sarnia police inspector put it:
I think the biggest thing, especially for police officers, I think honestly I
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think we’re probably the most arrogant profession there is because there’s
a saying, we can deal with 5% of the population 95% of the time. So you
get a jaded view of people, right? And . . . where I’ve seen our officers fall
down or get themselves in trouble is they’ve just dealt with some strung
out meth junky and they’ve been spit on and the guy says, “I have AIDS
and now you do” and then they come to talk to you. And they treat you
the same way and you can’t do that because then you’re offended, right?
But a funny quote that I heard at a recruiting conference is the biggest
disadvantage to recruiting police officers is that we have to recruit from
the human race.
In both the U.S. and Canada, the shared sense of responsibility and duty as police
officers leads to a sense of trust, even when threat conditions are quite different, as a
city police chief in Canada stated,
Of course you would extend the hand to assist a fellow officer. You know
that there is you quite see a lot of times where there’s an exchange back
and forth, there’s a lot of good cooperation and respect to that because
you do trust them. You know that no police service is going to ask a
police service to do something illegally. And that’s respected. But it’s
the fact of the matter is that they’re doing the same type of work we are,
which in reality I think the job across the states is more dangerous than
here because more people are armed than here.
Researchers have found that police officers tend to believe that, “all essential
police knowledge is thought to be contextual, substantive, detailed, concrete, tempo-
rally bounded, and particularistic” (Manning, 1992, p. 370) making them reluctant
to share information with others, especially those outside of the law enforcement com-
munity in the absence of informal contacts and cultural norms (Alain, 2001). This
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culture also makes it difficult for law enforcement officers to reach out to others for
needed help and information. A deputy undersheriff at a county-level law enforcement
agency explained:
[L]etting people know what their capabilities and where their weaknesses
lie. That’s something by nature that I didn’t like to do. It’s tough to go
into a group of professionals and say we are out of ideas for handing the
situation. So to be able to look at that and go the personality and me
then I’ve been trained over years as if there’s nothing I can’t take care of,
so don’t worry about it, I’ll take care of it. But then you start to realize
that you may not really be preparing for a risk at this point. You certainly
can’t do it alone. So to be able to sit in a group of people and say I can’t
handle this. I need help is something that you have to be able to kind of
do. Bottom line is a lot of these police officers – they don’t want to admit
that or do that.
In some cases, having a shared background in law enforcement, even if it was with
a small organization or one outside of the community, was enough to bridge some
of these communication and cooperation problems. One individual interviewed in
the U.S. was currently the fire chief of a small municipality, but was previously in
law enforcement. This helped him speak the language of law enforcement, and gain
the trust of law enforcement officers in the community. Even without this specific
background, law enforcement and fire services are used to working together, since
they are often statutorily required to respond to emergencies. This gives them an
opportunity to develop trust through the mutual demonstration of capabilities, an
important indication of trust mentioned by most respondents.
One interviewee, a police investigator with a private critical infrastructure facility,
described a series of regional “investigators meetings” where representatives from a
wide variety of law enforcement agencies meet to share notes on cases, in an informal
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setting. In these meetings, they often find similarities in crimes and cases that cross
jurisdictional lines. The investigator described them as an important setting for
developing trust between individuals in different law enforcement agencies:
I personally think as being new to it and being a part of it, I think it
works very well to build that trust because if you’re in that meeting and
you’re sharing information, you’re giving information, you’re receiving
information, now you have a point of contact - “Hey, you know what, I
remember one of our officers comes up and says, ‘You know we’re having
this problem with this.’ ‘Oh I remember one of the directors talking about
that in the meeting two months ago, let me give him a call. Oh, hey do
you remember talking about this in the meeting a couple months ago? Do
you have any more information on that because we’re having that problem
now with this.’ ” And it’s a networking system and it’s very beneficial in
my opinion.
The nature of this culture of law enforcement was repeated by almost all respondents.
As noted in Chapter III, however, I had hypothesized that greater levels of trust
within in-groups could be correlated with lower levels of trust between groups. Inter-
viewees indicated that this may be magnified for law enforcement specifically, when
compared to other groups in the region. Law enforcement is not uniform, however.
Appendix B lists the entire sampling frame of everyone included in the survey. One
theme that was echoed by several local and county respondents was the perception
of non-cooperation among federal agencies themselves, including federal law enforce-
ment agencies. A fire chief of a small border community with a prior career in law
enforcement explained his perspective:
Because being on the border here we have so many different homeland
security departments that don’t tend to want to talk to each other at
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the federal level like Coast Guard, and Border Patrol, and Customs. It
seems like for being one agency, falling under one umbrella for homeland
security, it seems like we have better relationships with them than they
have amongst themselves as far as information sharing.
Clearly, there is variation among trust within law enforcement itself, making the des-
ignation of law enforcement as a homogenous “in-group” a likely oversimplification.
5.3.3 Professional Culture: Public Health and EMS
Health services, including state and county public health agencies, private hos-
pitals, EMS, and federal agencies such as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), play an important role in the expanded homeland security mis-
sion. Since the inception of the DHS, the concern about bioterrorism and other
health-related threats has been paramount for national and local leaders in both the
U.S. and Canada. In the U.S. alone, billions of dollars have been spent since 9/11 on
public health preparedness at the national level, including the materiel of the Strategic
National Stockpile (SNS) and National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS), the epidemiolog-
ical laboratories of the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), and multiple levels of
medical disaster response teams (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
2007). Due to generous federal funding direct to state and local health-related agen-
cies and experience dealing with non-terrorism-related outbreaks such as meningitis,
individuals working in the health sector have been among the first to become fully
immersed in the new homeland security mission. However, since most of their work
is not related to emergency situations,8 they are not fully immersed in the security
community the way fire services and law enforcement are.
One county-level public health manager in the U.S. explained that the public
health community does not really see themselves as part of homeland security, due
8Michigan Department of Community Health 2006
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to their traditional non-security roles. According to the manager:
Emergency Management was developed like a Band-Aid approach in a
sense to be the entity, to bring the disciplines to the table. So they
had all the subject matter experts present during an event, and you get
the best of the best, and everybody knows what the other is doing, and
the communications are better. But, Public Health wasn’t there. And
there was probably a couple reasons. One, we are much older than most
of those organizations. We go way back to quarantining the harbor, and
immigrants, and in New York I think, Public Health is probably 300 years
old. It’s from before we became a country that we had public health. So
we are one of those entities that do not have a badge, sirens, uniforms
and any of those other things. We just quietly do our thing behind the
scenes, so it’s not obvious we are present. And if you do not need our
services, and you ask most people, Public Health is about head lice and
STIs. When in fact, we do quite a bit more than that.
This tendency of security agencies to overlook health agencies is not limited to
the U.S., as one Canadian EMS official noted in describing preparation for an inter-
national boating event in international border waters:
[T]he EMS was kind of the last one they thought about, police had quite
a lot of meetings and conversation and Coast Guard and water rescue,
they had a lot of conversation, but it was kind of week before the event
that they went: ‘Oh I guess we really do need to talk to the EMS as
well.’ So were were kind of last ones on the table, which isn’t uncommon,
I don’t know why that is, I guess we don’t have the same level of public
relations that police and fire tend to have over the years, so at the end
of the day were kind of the ones that are forgotten a little bit, but were
getting better, things are getting better.
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Like the fire services, professionals in the health care sector, including EMS, hos-
pital officials, and public health agencies have shared professional norms. In both the
U.S. and Canada, they are subject to significant licensing and regulation, specifically
related to the administration of medications, that hampers their ability to cooperate,
even in an emergency. The executive director of a non-profit service in the U.S. that
operates ambulances and EMS noted that,
[W]e’ve got a waterway that’s roughly two or three miles wide, or a couple
miles wide and I guess the best way I describe it is I’ve got another ambu-
lance company that’s roughly two or three miles away from me that I can’t
use simply because we’re two different countries. Now I understand that
we’re two different countries and I understand the legal and/or licensing
issues on both sides. The interesting part about it is I think that if you
were to analyze it and dissect both of our companies you would find that
as it relates to how we treat patients and how we operate, we’re probably
not very different at all. In fact, we’re very similar.. . .
Nonetheless, many respondents who were not in the health care sector described
them as being insular, and apart from the day-to-day work of other first response
agencies. At the state level, a local liaison from the State of Michigan Public Health
and Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) office explained that he rarely talks to “non-
health people” as part of his daily professional functions, instead focusing on the
connections between levels of the public health field. This may be due in part to
the substantially different set of state and federal regulations that workers in the




Most interviewees repeatedly reiterated the concept of the Port Huron/Sarnia
(St. Clair County/Lambton County) region as one community separated by a river
boundary. Recall from Subsection 4.3.1.2 that average tenure in the community was
36.56 years (sd = 17.43,min = 0,max = 62). Many interviewees had known each
other for many years, and even knew the extended families of other professionals. As
with many U.S.-Canada border communities, significant numbers of people live and
work on both sides of the border, crossing daily as commuters (DHS, 2012b). One
Canadian respondent, a civilian working in a law enforcement agency, illustrated:
The other thing is historically my mom and dad growing up in Sarnia,
we didn’t have a bridge and we had ferries going across back and forth.
So there’s a lot of inter marriages between this area and Michigan. A lot
of us have family in Port Huron or in Michigan somewhere and we went
to church across the river, they shopped, whatever, right? And the other
thing is, is that over 50% of the nursing staff to this day in Port Huron are
Canadians. 50% – that’s high. So after 9/11 that was a big issue because
even though officially the bridges weren’t shut down they weren’t moving.
Nonetheless, there are differences in professional cultural norms between respondents
in the U.S. and those in Canada, primarily related to the national laws governing
certain occupations.
One legal and cultural difference is the approach to firearms by law enforcement.
The problem of armed USCG officers entering Canadian waters has been a long-
standing issue requiring careful negotiations at the national level (DHS, 2012a). Put
simply, while armed Canadian law enforcement officers may freely bring their service
weapons into the U.S. while in the course of official duty, U.S. law enforcement cannot
do the same. This also creates differences in how law enforcement officers conduct
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daily police work in both countries. The Emergency Planner (emergency manager)
of Sarnia, a civilian housed in the Sarnia police department related one example;
[E]very time you pull that gun out you have to file a report. And then if
you do have to use your gun you have to say this officer pulls his gun this
many times, he’s gun happy. So. . . and then you probably have strict gun
regulations in Canada, too, so it’s just not the same. We had an officer
who had a shooting here a few years ago and we couldn’t find an officer
that had been involved in shooting a suspect. So we actually went to the
States and they volunteered to come over and talk to those officers for us.
A police inspector in an urban police department in Canada described in more
detail how the different cultures within law enforcement lead to different approaches
to the same fundamental problem:
Being a border city, from the Canadian point of view is that Canada
and the U.S., although they’re cooperative and friendly, our outlooks on
things are far different. . . . just simply the right to bear arms in the states
and people having all the guns and Canada doesn’t believe in that. We
don’t have as much gun issues. My personal finding, because I have sat
on these committees for cooperation between the agencies that have been
involved in the mass project, the U.S. is far more concerned in general with
terrorism than Canada is, post 9/11, right? I think that for instance when
I am at a meeting with these people, with my counterparts in the states,
if we’re developing say a mock-emergency for practice, the Canadian side
would tend to say, ‘Okay, there’s a fire at the refinery and a ship has
run aground. There’s been a major tornado or. . . ’ Whereas the U.S., it
would usually be some sort of terrorist attack that they’re planning for.
That’s just a mindset I think, I don’t think it’s terribly different in how
we respond, more of the anticipated issues.
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5.4 Institutional Roles
As noted earlier, institutional roles can help individuals develop trusting rela-
tionships that facilitate professional functions in the network. A shared professional
background, for example in firefighting, can help new people more effectively leverage
information sharing, even in a different setting.
However, institutional roles can also serve as barriers to cooperation, information
sharing, and ultimately the development of interpersonal trust. In this section, I
examine how institutions – the observable functions determined by statute or regula-
tion and most frequently studied by political scientists – can have both negative and
positive effects on information sharing and, ultimately, the ability of the network as
a whole to respond to a variety of potential threats. While many documents, such
as the decades-old emergency assistance agreement between Port Huron and Sarnia,
are matters of public record, it was only through qualitative interviews that I was
able to learn just how important interpersonal trust is for the actors in the network
to overcome institutional barriers to cooperation.
5.4.1 Federal Institutions and Grant Funding
Federal grant funding in the U.S. has been the topic of a large volume of political
science research on homeland security to date.(Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Mueller and
Stewart, 2011a; Goerdel, 2013) 9. It has also been an important focus for scholars in
public policy and public administration (Inamete, 2006; Caruson et al., 2005; Roberts,
2007; Scavo, Kearney and Kilroy Jr., 2007). This is largely due to the availability
of public datasets that describe allocation of grant money at the federal level (DHS,
2004; Reese, 2005), making this issue a better fit for extant theories of federalism and
domestic politics. However, the focus on federal level grant data overlooks the impact
9Due to its system of dispersed federalism (Simeon, 2004), Canada does not allocate anywhere
near the amount of funds to the local level as the U.S., which has spent over $3 billion per year since
9/11 dispersing funds directly to states and localities (Eisinger, 2006).
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these grants have on those charged to administer them and carry out desired federal
policies at a local level.
These grants, while intended to foster cooperation, can in fact have the opposite
effect, dividing local actors who otherwise have shared interests. One respondent, the
director of a non-profit EMS organization that provides and coordinates ambulance
services on the U.S. side, suggested that federal grant funding may contribute to the
problem of marginalization of the health services in homeland security and public
safety planning and response efforts.
One of the concerns I have as I look at homeland security and all of the
needs of disaster response and so on is that the [U.S. federal] government
has seemed to have set up multiple avenues for addressing homeland se-
curity needs and often those of us who are attending all these partnership
meetings, it almost feels like there’s competition going on between them
rather than coordination going on between them. . . Some of our health
departments, who are very important integral part of the overall plan-
ning process - sometimes because they have acquired grants through other
sources - through the CDC and other avenues - those grants require cer-
tain plans to be developed and certain programs to be created but they
don’t always coordinate with the local group, if you understand what I’m
saying, so we end up with. . . kind of all these different groups going in dif-
ferent directions without a single source of coordination and I think that
it becomes frustrating to those of us who are providers on the frontline
sometimes because we get the plan from the Health Department that may
not be consistent with the plan from Homeland Security or the plan from
the Healthcare Coalition and we’re like ‘Which one are we following here?
Can we get these together?’
The lack of coordinated plans coming from the requirements of federal grants has
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the potential to create breaks in the system during a time of emergency, as the EMS
director illustrates:
One of the plans at the regional level calls for the activation of what
they refer to at the regional level ‘casualty transport system.’ Essentially
what that is, is it’s an ambulance. . . it’s the ambulances, okay? They
call it ‘casualty transport system,’ for whatever reason. There’s a lot of
debate as to who can activate this casualty transport system. Well if you
look at the statute and follow the chain of command if you will, all away
from emergency management at the governor’s office on down, it’s pretty
clear that emergency management has that authority. That authority
rests with in that department yet the region has plans in place for them
to establish a coordination center in the time of a disaster. . . Most of us
who are participants of that have kind of settled with, ‘when real disaster
hits, we’re going to probably ignore the region because they don’t really
have any regulatory authority anyway,’ it’s emergency management and
homeland security that has all the regulatory authority. So while these
guys have plans for CTS [casualty transport system] activation, they don’t
really have any authority to activate it, and so it puts those of us in
that CTS in quandaries of ‘okay, do they activate it or do they activate
it? And which one do I follow’ and so we tend to follow the local plan
and emergency management and so while these other plans exist, nobody
seems to really know why they exist. They just exist because the grant
requires them to be in place in order for the local region to get the funding
but in reality, this is a grant program that has no regulatory authority
over anybody, they’re not an official entity, they’re really just an entity
receiving funds is all they are.
In Canada, there is far less funding directly from the federal and provincial levels
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of government to local agencies. The deputy fire chief of a small border community
in Canada illustrated the outsize disparity between the opportunities available to
professionals in the U.S. and those in Canada who face shared threats in this small
region:
What I found between my experience with working with Jeff [Friedland]
and the different departments and entities in the U.S., they seem to have
more of an organizational structure that, I want to say is integrated. . . I
guess the easiest way to put this is like Jeff and his staff, as emergency
planner for the county of St. Clair, there’s himself and then he has, I don’t
know half a dozen or dozen staff, that implement all these programs and
one of the big things they’re always talking about there is their funding
and their grant program and all that sort of thing. When you come
to our side of the river, our county emergency planner consist of one
man in the county office that has no real financial backing. All of the
emergency planning, a lot of the stuff that Jeff is involved with, is left to
the municipalities, the individual municipalities within the county. We go
to these meetings across the border and they talk, ‘let’s do this, let’s do
that.’ And they seem to have more staff and more resources to put towards
that, whereas we don’t receive federal funding. We don’t receive provincial
funding. This alerting system, it’s been our single municipality’s effort to
get that in place. We found the funding for it. We did the leg work for
it. There’s 3 of us in this office and that’s it. I find that’s been the big
difference between the two sides, as far as the emergency planning and the
way we react. In Canada we do have those other groups. We have federal
level emergency planning, we have provincial level emergency planning
but we don’t tend to have like homeland security directive type that come
up with a standard or a direction for the entire country and then have
133
some sort of backing I guess. This is my perception. Maybe that’s not
the case over there but it’s certainly is what seems to be from our side of
it, whereas from our direction it’s really a lot more locally driven.
In Sarnia, for example, the lack of provincial and federal grant support means that
most response initiatives must come out of the municipal policing budget, directly
trading off with other community priorities. The Emergency Planner (emergency
manager) of Sarnia, a civilian housed in the Sarnia police department, related:
In Canada communities have to. . . there’s not the big federal dollars com-
ing. For example, we’re talking about $155,000 and we think we’ve hit
the jackpot. Whereas I know with Jeff [Friedland, emergency manager of
St. Clair County], he’s got a number of projects last year in million dollar
figures. That’s not heard of here, in Canada, anywhere. So the reason
why we do it is because industry has been here for so long. We repre-
sent 80% of the chemicals either manufactured, transported, produced or
shipped in Ontario [. . . ] or that’s equivalent to 40% for Canada.
The fire chief of Sarnia, who was actually the recipient of a rare federal grant,
described the comparatively small scale of funding of another Canadian federal grant
program through the Canadian Research Council:
The one opportunity we had, which we called the JEPP program, which
is joint emergency preparedness program which you could sometimes get
funding up to 50%, well actually I think as high as 60% one time, was
just canceled this year. So we don’t even have access to that anymore,
and it was only to the maximum 50 thousand dollars or 70 thousand
dollars anyway. But it was just canceled. The federal government has
deemed that they’ve reached their mandate and everybody’s fine, that
the emergency preparedness is at the goal has been achieved.
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This forces small communities at the border, especially those with large indus-
trial facilities such as Sarnia, to greatly increase their cooperation with the private
sector, and their local, county, and state counterparts in the U.S., in order to address
security concerns. Lacking stand-alone capabilities, local Canadian first responders
in the Sarnia/Lambton county area rely on the capabilities of the SCC dive team
for water rescue and the materiel provided by industry through the Chemical Valley
Emergency Coordinating Organization, Sarnia (CVECO) organization, to name just
two examples.
CVECO has a particularly notable history that illustrates the long-standing role
of partnerships between the small border municipality of Sarnia and both private
and international partners. Sarnia’s Emergency Planner described the origins of the
public-private CVECO partnership, which goes back more than sixty years.
And we’ve been doing this role since about ’52, 1952 I guess so before we
were legislated we had some type of emergency planner of some kind. And
it started historically with a major fire down in the Palmar plant, where
numerous people went down to see the fire and crews could not control
it because they were already there, fire services, ambulances couldn’t get
through, it’s an explosion. And so in ’52 [. . . ] Ernie Duffield got together
with four of the plants, Esso, Dow, Palmar plant which is the rubber plant
and. . . I’m sorry, one other plant [. . . ] and they formed a traffic committee.
And later that year a fire committee was formed. Anyways the first call
for help, or the first offer for help came from the governor of Michigan
back in May of ’53. Days if not weeks before anyone in Ontario offered
the city any help. So that probably set the stage for our co-operation.
Other interviewees also described the lack of direct participation from either the
Canadian government at the federal level, or the government of Ontario at the provin-
cial level. The director of Lambton county EMS noted that, while his relationships
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with the local OPP officers were positive, these lines of communication and trust-
based relationships were quickly cast aside in an emergency situation. He described
two specific disaster situations – a tornado and a debilitating snowstorm – that be-
came declared regional disasters:
I mean, [local detachment OPP] are very quick to come and over and tell
us what they’re doing, what they need help with, or what we’re doing and
what we need help with. The problem is when it kind of wraps up shortly
thereafter, when they realize the extent of that emergency, it jumped
up to kind of regional OPP looking after it, so instead of it just being
the local guys, it kind of goes up to the regional command, that type of
thing. As soon as that happens, communication stops. I don’t know if it’s
because they’re not used to working with us one-on-one, but when that
happened, we lost really that open window of communication.. . . Once
they take charge, it becomes their operation, and it is almost. . . They just
don’t seem to see the same value in that level of communication, I think.”
For Canadians, the lack of financial support from the federal and provincial gov-
ernments makes them feel especially vulnerable, and therefore much more active in
developing trusting relationships with local private owners of critical infrastructure
and U.S.-based professionals with greater resources. For those in the U.S., while they
receive more federal grant support, the system of grants comes from different federal
agencies and creates a fragmented system that sometimes impedes policy implemen-
tation at the local level. While the federal government in both countries expects the
locals to act as effective first responders to a serious emergency, this connection is not
seamless.
136
5.4.2 Legal Institutions Affecting Network Actors
Individuals in this network operate under tremendous and overlapping legal and
bureaucratic constraints, many of which are expressly designed to hamper commu-
nication between agencies, particularly between professionals in the U.S. and those
in Canada. This is particularly challenging, as many individuals are long-standing
members of the community, which, prior to 9/11, operated as a local region largely
unencumbered by national divisions. As one respondent noted, and others echoed, the
St. Clair County/Lambton County county region has long felt like “one community
with a river running through it.” Even as they work within their required legal and
regulatory frameworks, actors repeatedly gave examples of how they used interper-
sonal trust as a substitute for legal institutions that sought to prevent communication
and cooperation between them.
There are a number of major differences in the laws between Canada and the
U.S. that make cooperation difficult. One example is laws pertaining to privacy and
information sharing. While in the U.S., intelligence fusion centers have become an
important tool in sharing information between different levels of government (United
States Senate, 2012), international intelligence sharing, at least for actors at the local
level, has been much more challenging. The chief of a local urban police force in
Canada related:
I think one of the biggest issues right now going back and forth is how much
information can be shared. In Canada, we’re heavily protected by freedom
of information legislations, what we can and can’t give out. Whereas I
think it’s a little more lax. I think probably [U.S.] homeland security can
get any information they want when they want. And sometimes we’re
even tighter because from privacy commissioners, what information can
go out to the public, what information cant go to the public, right down
to the court rulings, we have to dot all our I’s, cross our T’s when we’re
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guarding information. Privacy issues are major in this country.
There are also legal restrictions on the ability of provincial law enforcement in
Canada to leave the country, making their regular cooperation in cross-border meet-
ings less frequent than for locals. The deputy fire chief of a small border community
said,
On our side, we do, because again fire here is a municipal requirement but
the policing and EMS are provincially mandated, we do have informal
breakfast meetings, informal meetings with the representatives from the
OPP and from EMS, supervisors and staff sergeants and that sort of
thing where we’ll just. . . sit down and we discuss these kinds of issues in
an informal matter and we kind of hash those out. It works so well for us
because again they’re provincially driven so they know their requirements
on that side of it, so we get a better perspective on that side of it, so we
get a better perspective from that. It also allows them access to what’s
going on internationally because we go to these meetings. We can freely
go to these meetings with Jeff [Friedland], whereas as I said, the OPP
you need written permission to leave the country. Their interaction is
extremely limited and it has to go through the hierarchy and it has to be
authorized and all that sort of thing, whereas we have the freedom here to
pursue these ideas and concepts and that sort of thing, and then in turn,
at least at a local level, we can kind of push that up the provincial chain
to those guys.
The director of a U.S.-based EMS described the challenge of working through
established legal protocols when trying to cooperate with his Canadian counterpart
for providing acute care in emergencies:
What we have proposed to both the Ministry of Ontario as well as the
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state of Michigan is some kind of a reciprocal agreement where again,
drilling down to our level we both see ourselves as very similar in terms
of how we operate so what we have proposed is when we would go over to
Canada, we would abide by our local protocols and guidelines, established
and proved by the state of Michigan, and when they come over here, they
would abide by the Canadian protocols. Again, when you’re treating a
heart attack, not a lot of different varieties in how to do it. We’re both
administering pretty much the same medications, we’re treating it the
same way and so that is really what we have been proposing all along,
and we just have not been able to get both governments to agree to a
treaty or anything that would allow that to occur in writing.
Other legal restrictions on cooperation include the sharing of emergency radios
and frequencies across the U.S.–Canada border (Michigan uses 800 MHz radios, while
Canada uses an incompatible system nationwide), the carrying of weapons across the
border, and the ease of crossing the border with an ambulance in the case of an acute
emergency. Each of these is a legal issue at a higher level of government that the local
respondents are not empowered to officially change. As many indicated, however, they
have found informal workarounds based on established trust relationships that they
would only consider using under the most dire circumstances.
5.4.3 The Institutions of Planning and Exercising
The process of planning and exercising before a critical disaster occurs is an im-
portant institution to everyone in the professional community. These exercises can
either be compulsory for certain grant funding, or organically developed based on the
needs of individuals in the network.
Exercises are a potentially important vehicle for individuals from different agen-
cies to meet and learn about the operational plans of others whom they might not be
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familiar with. They are especially critical for helping agencies see how others might
respond based on different organizational priorities. A public health emergency coor-
dinator in St. Clair County, Michigan used one example to illustrate how her agency
saw potential problems very differently:
One of the exercises, they were going to have this very SARS like outbreak
and we didn’t know in advance. While that was going on, there would
be fires, a drowning, a murder, a school’s bomb threat. All these things
were on the table. And every discipline had only their own thing going
on. I’m worried about the first responders getting exposed to the thing
and not knowing to take the precautions. So I’m trying to talk to the
sheriff next to me who was marine division. Who was too busy to talk to
me because there was a dead body floating in the water somewhere in his
scenario. And I’m like who cares? Which is what I was trying to say. And
we had a really hard time getting each other’s attention, and everybody
wanted something from somebody else, but everybody had their blinders
on. And I’m sitting there going, “Please don’t waste your time on him,
he’s already dead. Get him later. We have a bigger problem. Everywhere
people go, they’re going to get exposed to something.” And it was hard
for us as a group to put aside who is important and who wasn’t because
the scenarios where we weren’t important at all, we just sat there and
went, “Oh, is there a donut I can eat here, is there anything I can do?”
As this example illustrates, exercises, especially inter-organizational exercises, can be
frustrating, but they can be chances to learn from other agencies and anticipate future
responses in real emergencies. The public health official described what happened
after the exercise was over:
But that night, I remember everyone turning up to watch an NBA bas-
ketball game or something. . . . And the sheriff patted me on the back and
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said, “Why do you get so wound up in there about this and that. The first
responders.” I said, “You don’t understand. . . you’re essential personnel,
if we can’t get you to pay attention. You guys need to wear masks. If we
can’t protect you, who is going to protect the rest of the people?” See
we think about you, you’re thinking about the other person, and we’re
trying to get your attention. So we had this really good conversation, and
I had to explain to him that you see my cooperative agreement in my work
plan, that’s 40 pages long and I’m one person and all these requirements
for risk communication and this and that.’ . . . I felt from that day on, I
had started this progress and a working relationship with him and then
the other ones, and he would advocate for me.
Exercises and plans are not enough to develop trust and confidence in the abilities
of others, especially new people in the community, however. The Canadian EMS
director of Lambton County pointed out that,
I mean, you get a little bit of that, as I said, with training and with
meetings and so on, but I’ve seen people and worked with people that
are amazing when you give them an exercise or tabletop or an exercise
to do, but when something really bad happens, they lose the ability to
concentrate and focus on that. And I think as time goes and you do
a few more, you get better that, but assuming it’s your first one, it’s a
very stressful event, and that’s when you really see how they’re going to
function, no matter how many exercises or training they had. It really
hits the ground and they’re going to be running for it.
Planning and exercising, which are important components of NIMS and generally
seen by policymaker principals as a way of ensuring they get the outcomes they
seek, do not necessarily have the function of developing trust. Respondents described
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planning meetings and exercises as a potential opportunity to make connections and
get to know new people, but the structure of exercises does not ensure this.
5.5 Lessons Learned on Trust
The qualitative data presented from these interviews complements the quantita-
tive data presented in Chapter IV and advances my core argument on the development
of interpersonal trust out of certain types of repeated interactions. The individuals in-
terviewed for this dissertation came from a wide variety of backgrounds, with widely
varying experiences, experience, and levels of professional stature. However, they
shared similar themes of trust development and maintenance, and its effect on the
effectiveness of the professional community.
First, most interviewees described the “institution” of having credentials as being
just a first pass. As with day-to-day relationships, just having a title is not enough
to make others trust or even like you. As a deputy undersheriff at a county-level law
enforcement agency explained,
I mean if you came to me and said “Hi I’m the chief of this fire department
and here’s who I am,” I’ve never met you before. You’ve got the creden-
tials you are who you’re supposed to be I have kind of a basic trusting
sense until you prove me wrong kind of a thing.
This is quite different from the DHS official’s definition of trust described in the
introduction to this chapter, although it is more in line with the expectations of
NIMS that people will cooperate based on a known set of established roles. If, as
most respondents stated, interpersonal trust truly matters for carrying out effective
planning and response for large-scale critical disasters, then NIMS serves to only
create the most fragile threads between individuals.
Second, although they are important components of NIMS, usually tied directly
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to grant funding, exercises and planning are not the most important institutions for
building trust. While they could potentially be an opportunity for others to build
trust by demonstrating their capabilities, most respondents discounted the role of
exercises, even live exercises, for this purpose. Only actual critical emergency events
were described as significant for building trust (or the lack thereof) by witnessing
others perform well, or buckle under pressure.
Third, while information sharing happens through formal channels, it also happens
spontaneously and through informal channels. The informal sharing of information is
perceived as being especially important to developing trust, especially if it would be
impossible to come by any other way. One example is the pipeline manager sharing
private and possibly proprietary information about the pipelines with the small-town
fire chief in whose community the pipes operated. Having a shared background in
firefighting was a sufficient condition for the developing of the trust relationship that
allowed this to happen.
Fourth, for respondents in Canada specifically, the lack of federal and provin-
cial financial support creates a sense of vulnerability that drives the development of
trusting relationships with local private owners of critical infrastructure and their
counterparts in the U.S. with greater resources. In Sarnia, a tremendous amount
of responsibility falls square on the city fire department and police department, and
in most cases, they must trade off security priorities with other priorities in the city
budget without supplementary resources. This effort has paid off, as one Sarnia police
inspector described:
And we have another cooperative thing that we’ve always done is our St.
Clair County Sheriff patrol is very, very willing and able and helpful for
scuba diving for the police department here. We don’t have a dive team.
. . . they come over all the time. Now technically, can they have their guns
with them? No. Do they? They’re out in the river. I suppose. There’s a
143
floatable boundary somewhere, right? But we very much appreciate their
help.
As this statement indicates, they are also somewhat more willing to bend the rules.
The need to share materiel and other resources, and the trust-based relationships
that have developed, keep these professionals more focused on outcomes or potential
outcomes than bureaucratic obstacles.
Finally, most respondents emphasized that their interpersonal trust relationships
were especially important, if not absolutely critical to them in the case of some
future large-scale emergency, supporting the propositions of “politics from below”
advanced by Brower and Abolafia (1997) in Chapter II. In this community specifically,
everyone is concerned about the dangerous petrochemical facilities in Canada which
are just miles from both cities. This ongoing danger has also brought people together,
in ways that might not occur if there was not a shared mutual threat. If there
were ever to be a major incident at the border, many respondents indicated that
their immediate calls would be to each other, both offering and receiving necessary
assistance. Interviewees indicated that in such circumstances, interpersonal trust
could potentially act a substitute for institutional requirements, laws and procedures.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion and Policy Implications
As Joyal (2012, p. 1) notes, “. . . there have been many positive strides with re-
spect to information sharing and interagency collaboration; however, interpersonal
relationships and trust lie at the core of true change.” Professionals who work in the
homeland security context at an international border must operate on a day-to-day
basis with limited resources and outsized threats. Simply having the opportunity
to meet others in exercised or meetings, as mandated by formal institutions such
as NIMS is a necessary but not sufficient conditions for the development of trusting
relationships. Easily identifiable, formally sanctioned mechanisms cannot replace the
role of interpersonal relationships and trust that functions at the heart of local home-
land security. At the end of the day, well-trained professionals must assess threats
and respond to the daily challenges of protecting a vulnerable locality under constant
threat. The quantitative and qualitative data I collected reinforces my argument that
repeated interactions are important to the formation of trust relationships as individ-
uals have the opportunity to prove their competence and reliability under pressure
and share important and relevant information.
My research indicates that the connections of a social network can undergird ex-
isting relationships in a way that leverages the strengths of multiple actors, with
many levels of experience in different fields. The survey data indicates that survey
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respondents had high levels of cooperation that crossed disciplinary boundaries. In
emergency settings, where individuals are acting in their capacity as first responders,
firefighters are often the first people that individuals seek out. Both firefighters and
law enforcement officers help people get their job done, regardless of their own profes-
sion. On the other hand, emergency managers are the most frequently named when
individuals are looking for advice. Taken together, these findings indicate especially
important roles for these professions, emphasizing the need for them to reach out
to others. In this community at least, individuals report having contacts with and
positive assessments of others who are outside of their own professional field. Most
professionals are able to build bridges of interpersonal trust with others and not be
stuck in silos that hinder performance.
The interviews explained, for these respondents, the sources of interpersonal trust
and its consequences for communication and information sharing. They build inter-
personal trust by sharing information, demonstrating competence, and recognizing
and respecting and expertise of others. With a shared regional history going back
decades, this has helped produce formal and informal agreements that facilitate plan-
ning and emergency response by sharing expertise and materiel. This is especially
notable due to the numerous legal and bureaucratic challenges that are present at
the international border. The interviews demonstrate how developing interpersonal
trust increases the resources available to handle shared security concerns at a critical
international location.
In terms of scholarly contribution, the survey as an instrument provides a new
tool that can be used to better understand social networks, especially networks of
individuals who may not wish to share information online. Although web-based
surveys can potentially reach many more respondents, individuals in certain fields
may not wish to enter information into an online system for reasons of privacy or
concerns about data security and the potential for data leakage. Individuals working
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in other sensitive settings, such as journalists or those living in domestically oppressive
countries, may be more responsive to such a survey instrument, particularly if it could
be administered in-person and alter names could be anonymized.
The survey also provides a novel dataset on homeland security networks. While
other research on such networks rely on case studies (Fedorowicz, Gogan and Williams,
2007), public records content analysis (Kapucu and Demiroz, 2011), and Twitter
(Butts, Petrescu-Prahova and Cross, 2007), the data I collected, with multiple co-
variates and alter assessments, provides potentially much richer network information
to analysts interested in this topic.
This dissertation contributes to the interpersonal literature on trust in two ways.
First, it explores the issues of trust in a novel setting – and international security
community. The multi-organizational collaborative problems of homeland security
are challenging everywhere, but even more so at the international border. Due to
the heightened sense of security, this is a difficult setting in which to collect data or
even conduct interviews, especially for academic researchers with no connections to
homeland security. The respondents’ comments on trust, its development and contri-
bution to professional effectiveness complement existing work in this area, providing
a different perspective on how interpersonal trust functions in an empirical setting
that is not frequently studied.
Second, as noted in Chapter II, the theoretical work from political science sug-
gested that institutions with monitoring and enforcement rules are preconditions for
the development of trust. At least in an inter-organizational setting, this may not
necessarily be true. At the international border, there is no such mechanism in place.
As the Sarnia fire chief indicated,1 the two cities maintained a mutual aid agreement
despite legal objections from RCMP, representing the federal government of Canada.
In this situation, interpersonal trust, based on shared professional norms and length
1Page 120
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of experience, actually functions to override the will of policymaker principals, at least
those at higher levels of government who maintain laws to prevent such agreements
from being executed. These findings also help better understand political science
theories about inter-bureaucratic cooperation and competition, providing support for
the “Politics from Below” theories of Brower and Abolafia (1997) by adding new types
of evidence beyond their original ethnographic study.
6.1 Potential Criticisms and Next Steps
There are a number of potential criticisms of this research. I will highlight two of
the main issues, and how future research can address them.
6.1.1 Generalizability
Due to funding and time limitations, it was not possible to carry out this work
over a larger area or with more respondents. The cost of mailing each survey, along
with pre-notification postcards, and post-survey follow-up letters was very high. In
addition to the fixed costs of printing, the per-unit cost of postage, particularly for
Canadian respondents to return pre-paid surveys to the United, was very expensive.
However, the basic design of the survey, and particularly the survey instrument
itself, lends itself to replication in other areas. This survey could be replicated first at
other northern border regional communities, such as the Buffalo-Niagara region, or
the Seattle-Vancouver Pacific Northwest region, as well as smaller communities. Such
replication would be an important next step to validate the results of this research,
and test to see if, at the minimum, the same types of agencies report any relationships
at all.
From a public policy perspective, this type of replication can help emergency
managers identify gaps in relationships or informal communication that they can
then take steps to rectify, through informal meetings or other forms of outreach. In
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any replication, however, it is important to recognize the role of a local champion.
Even for more experienced and prestigious researchers, respondents do not necessarily
see the value of sharing information, particularly about their social networks which
they consider sensitive. The importance of establishing interpersonal trust with re-
spondents, and having that trust validated by someone who is neutral but well-known
in the community, such as an emergency manager, cannot be overstated. Therefore,
conducting future replications of the survey can help address some of the concerns
about generalizability, at least among other U.S.-Canada border regions.
6.1.2 Geographic Limitations
Some may argue that the issues facing homeland security actors at the U.S.-
Canada border do not apply to other border regions. In the U.S. alone, the southern
border with Mexico is far more dangerous, with literally hundreds of murders occur-
ring there each year. CBP agents, for example, who work at the southern border,
work under far more intense threats from extremely violent drug gangs. Furthermore,
the Mexican government is a far less reliable ally than the Canadian government, and
the economic disparity between U.S. citizens and Mexicans living just a few hundred
feet away from each other at the southern border is much larger than between U.S.
citizens and Canadians at the northern border. The northern border, some argue, is
simply more peaceful and less threatened, making any understanding of relationships
there irrelevant to the conditions of the southern border, or even anywhere else. Fi-
nally, some may argue that the southern border is much more important to public
policy than the northern border. The immigration crisis and the fear of terrorists
crossing the large stretches of unfortified southern border and major concerns to law-
makers and the general public, who rarely give the supposedly safe northern border
a second thought.
Despite the clear public policy importance, there were and continue to be serious
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problems with conducting this kind of research at the southern border. First, it is
a very dangerous region. This research as designed seeks to understand cooperative
relationships that occur across borders – how local actors from two different countries
learn to cooperate through the development of mutual interpersonal trust. This would
require conducting the research with the cooperation of Mexican officials at multiple
levels.
While the language barrier is easily overcome, at least for this researcher and
certainly for others, the development of the researcher-subject relationship may be
more difficult. Mexican officials are frequently threatened or even killed by the violent
criminal gangs in the region. Some may even be complicit with the activities of
such gangs, whether voluntarily or not. Asking sensitive questions about the social
networks of Mexican officials could potentially put them and/or the researcher in
serious or even mortal danger. This alone should make this type of research at the
southern border prohibitive, at the minimum due to IRB policies to protect human
subjects but more importantly due to research ethics. Furthermore, subjects may
not be willing to be forthcoming with this information. While this was certainly a
possibility in the Port Huron-Sarnia region where this research was conducted, it was
possible to verify at least the existence of most of the individuals named in the survey.
At this point, it is not advisable to replicate this research at the southern border,
even if the results would be particularly beneficial to public policy.
6.2 Policy Recommendations
As a public policy dissertation, this work is focused less on theory and more on
how insights from political science, scholarly public policy research, and the empirical
findings of social network research can help individuals better do their work. As part
of the agreement to carry out this research, I wrote a public policy report in accessible
language with concrete action steps for emergency managers based on the findings
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from this study. I conclude with a review of the recommendations from this report. It
is particularly important to understand the dynamics of networks when working with
multiple agencies across levels of responsibility and jurisdiction. In social network
studies in numerous settings, the following concepts have been identified as critical:
The Strength of Weak Ties
This research underlines the importance of interactions that give professionals the
opportunity to get to know other in formal and informal non-emergency settings.
While this is not a sufficient condition for the development of trusting relationships,
it is necessary. Early research by Granovetter (1973) found that more information
of various types flowed through channels where the relationship was “infrequent and
distant” Kilduff and Tsai (2003, p. 33) than very close. Sociologists studying this
phenomenon suggest it is because people have to invest less time and energy in ac-
quaintanceships, freeing up more time to “give a little and get a little” information
from more people, allowing them to share information between more groups than
otherwise possible. It is important, therefore, to facilitate the opportunity for people
to meet on an occasional basis.
Policy Recommendations
• Ask “regulars” to bring along a new person from their agency to multi-organizational
meetings from time to time.
• Ensure that there is at least one new person from the organization who is
participating in a meeting or exercise for this first time.
Network Density – Missing Links
The homeland security and public safety professional network of St. Clair County
and Lambton County is somewhat sparse. This is not surprising, since most indi-
viduals are part of organizations that have a separate mission from their emergency
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management responsibilities. What this low density means, however, is that there is
the potential for many more interpersonal connections than are currently in place.
The current measurable size of the network is 276 individuals, who have among them
259 person-to-person relationships.
Put another way, there are a potential for 34,723 different permutations of person-
to-person relationships. That leaves 34,464 connections that have not been realized.
These “missing links” can be bridged by something as simple as an “infrequent and
distant” acquaintance in order to facilitate greater information sharing within the
network.
Recall from Chapter IV, Figure 4.19 showed how many “isolates” are in the net-
work. These are not people who did not respond to the survey, but rather those who
were not named as contacts. There is an opportunity to include them more directly
in the network.
Policy Recommendations
• At multi-organizational meetings, make sure that individuals from different
agencies have the opportunity to meet others from a different sector.
• Ensure that at least one individual from the medical sector is included in every
exercise, even if a medical component is not required.
Centrality – Referrals within the network
There are multiple types of centrality – a measure of “popularity” in the network.
The simplest type of centrality indicates how often someone is named as a contact by
others.
Recall from Chapter IV, Table 4.5, that twelve people were named as a contact
by at least 10 other people – these are the most central individuals in the network.
One individual was named as a contact by 42 different people – this emergency man-
agement official is, not surprisingly, the most central person in the regional network.
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The other most frequently named professionals came from fire (5), emergency man-
agement (3), law enforcement (3), and medical (1). All of the most frequently cited
individuals came from the county or local level.
Kilduff and Tsai (2003, p. 32) caution that, “Organizations with highly centralized
informal networks may tend to be more mechanistic in their functioning, whereas
organizations with multiple centers may be more organic.” Since the beginning of
this research project, there have already been a number of retirements of important
people in the network, with more to come in the next few years. When information
is overly centralized in a network, the removal of certain components (i.e. retirement
of certain individuals) can have a destabilizing effect on other, unanticipated, parts
of the network.
Policy Recommendations
• Facilitate formal (meeting / exercise) and informal opportunities for people to
demonstrate capabilities or share ideas who are some years from retirement.
• Develop a meeting or exercise specifically for such individuals.
Boundary Spanners
People naturally tend to stick with their own group, be it by profession, local
area, or for some other reason. This is made visually clear through the network maps
presented here. This is also why Boundary Spanners – those who have connections
in several fields other than their own – are some of the most important people in
the network. These individuals are not necessarily the most well-connected, with
the largest number of connections. Instead, Boundary Spanners have connections in
multiple sectors.
Network research has shown that they tend to be more professionally successful
than those who stick with others similar to them (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003). But
Boundary Spanners are also important to the community as a whole. Even if they
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only have a few connections across professional fields and sectors, Boundary Spanners
serve a critical role in disseminating information on an informal basis.
These individuals – regardless of level or function – should be encouraged as much
as possible to make ties outside their agency and outside their field. Kilduff and Tsai
(2003, p. 58) warn, however, that: “. . . the role of broker in social networks may be
advisable only for actors who have legitimacy in the social context. Actors who are
considered to be outsiders, or who are from non-traditional groups, may be punished
for attempting to span across structural holes.” Therefore, this role is best filled by
a current member of the community.
Policy Recommendation
• Identify Boundary Spanners, particularly those at different stages in their ca-
reers, and take steps to include them regularly in formal and informal multi-
agency meetings.
Targeted Outreach
87 people were not named at all by any survey respondent, although they were
in the first wave of contacts provided by St. Clair County Emergency Management
and Lambton County Emergency Management. The reasons for their exclusion are
not clear – this group had an average time in the profession of 22 years, and an
average time in their specific job of almost 13 years. They are not, therefore, new
to the community. 19 people each in law enforcement and fire were not named by
anyone, along with 11 in emergency management, 10 in medical, 5 in dispatch, 12
in administration, 6 in critical infrastructure, 3 in non-profit and 1 unknown. These
individuals have an average of 15 employees working for them, making it especially
important to engage them. This is an area where putting network concepts into
practice can help strengthen the resilience of the regional community.
Professionals in the St. Clair County / Lambton County region have clearly
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worked hard to overcome institutional barriers to cooperation and shared security
outcomes. Recognizing the role that social networks play in facilitating this cooper-
ation is an important step forward. When key individuals retire in the future, they
will take with them not only important institutional knowledge, but their close (and
distant) social networks. Recognizing this, a long-term strategy should include con-
crete and measurable steps to facilitate connections between individuals from many
sectors and levels. This does not necessarily require a substantial investment of time,
but it does require ongoing attention. With its established coordinating role, the SCC
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management is in the best position to
include this dimension in future planning.
U.S. Federal Partners
I was only able to conduct one interview with a U.S. federal representative, from
DHS. Nonetheless, a number of U.S. federal employees chose to respond to the survey,
and their input in included in this analysis. Most interviewees had positive things to
say about CBP agents, specifically their cooperation in helping first responders on
both sides get credentials and cross the border quickly in case of an emergency. How-
ever, in St. Clair County, several respondents expressed frustration with the Border
Patrol service, indicating that they were less cooperative on local issues than they
wished. Nonetheless, Border Patrol Agents were named as part of the social network
by several respondents to the survey. This indicates the potential for bridges to be
built with Border Patrol through Boundary Spanners (see above.) The potential ex-
ists to increase cooperation and trust with representatives of this agency by engaging
them on an informal basis.
Policy Recommendation




Homeland security is a vexing policy problem that ultimately falls on the backs of
local actors for the first and last line of defense. Despite spending billions of dollars,
the federal governments of the U.S. and Canada are not always able or willing to
fully empower or even help these locals accomplish their critical missions. Legal and
bureaucratic obstacles coming from the top can even make the already difficult jobs
of local actors working with limited resources even more challenging. At least in the
Port Huron-Sarnia community, professionals have turned to each other for support
and assistance. Interpersonal trust is the crucial basis of this relationship. Through
this study, policymakers seeking to leverage the power of local communities can begin








Interview with Fire Chief/Community
Emergency Management Coordinator
Our Fire Chief/Community Emergency Management Coordinator would like 
to meet with you. He would be your primary contact. I am including his 
Administrative Assistant in this email so she can schedule a time for you to 
meet with him. He may also refer you to a few other people once you have a 
had a chance to speak with him. 
1. Main Questions
2. Follow up questions
3. Probes
4. Ask easy questions, show empathy
Introduce yourself and your topic
Dissertation is on interpersonal trust between members of different agencies in
different jurisdictions who are cooperating for a common security mission.
I am looking specifically at interpersonal networks and how professionals from
different types of organizations cooperate and use these relationships to solve
local security problems despite obstacles like the international border.
Main question
• Interpersonal trust between organizations as a means to cooperation
• Focus is on interpersonal trust between individuals (the network compo-
nent)
• Looking for instances of when interpersonal trust helps to overcome spe-
cific institutional barriers
• idea: trust is a (strategic?) subsitite with institutions in terms of getting
things done
• Design main question based on goal of eliciting information that will an-
swer this question
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• Listen for responses that answer the main question and design follow-up
questions to answer pieces of the main question
Interview Questions - Fire Chief/Community Emergency 
Management Coordinator
1. Tell me about your roles as Fire Chief/Community Emergency 
Manage-ment Coordinator. What do you do?
2. What do you think is different about your department’s roles and respon-
sibilities, as compared to other security entities (agencies, organizations)
you know in the US or Canada?
3. How do you define the role of Emergency management in the Canadian
context?
4. Could you describe your relationships to other agencies who work on home-
land security or public safety in this community? (I am especially inter-
ested in how you work with people in other types of organizations, such
as fire, health, etc. in a cross-border setting)
5. How long have you known the people you work with on homeland security
or public safety issues?
6. What do you do (to develop trust) when a new person joins the border
security community?
7. Tell me about a specific event where you worked with other members of
the homeland security or public safety community? (Walk me through it)
8. How do you communicate with your contacts when there is not a specific
mandate? Who would be the first few people you call in such a situation?
9. Do you use the American NIMS system? Is it adhered to? When is it not
adhered to?)
10. At the end, if you are willing, I would appreciate it if you could provide a
few references of other people I could get in touch with for an interview.
(What I really want to know is about interpersonal networks of trust. So,
if I were to show you a list, who should be on it, who should not.
11. I will also explain the survey I am planning for the winter and ask what




Occupation Number of Total Number in Respondents in
(Level/Sector) Interviews Survey Network Survey Network
Law Enforcement 3 33 17
(Local)
Law Enforcement 1 30 10
(County)
Law Enforcement 1 15 3
(State/Provincial)
Law Enforcement 1 10 3
(Federal)
Law Enforcement 0 2 0
(Private)
Fire 4 75 25
(Local)
Fire NA NA NA
(County)
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Occupation Number of Total Number in Respondents in
(Level/Sector) Interviews Survey Network Survey Network
Fire NA NA NA
(State/Provincial)
Fire NA NA NA
(Federal)
Fire NA NA NA
(Federal)






















Medical 0 0 0
162
Occupation Number of Total Number in Respondents in
(Level/Sector) Interviews Survey Network Survey Network
(Local)
Medical 2 12 4
(County)
Medical 1 3 0
(State/Provincial)
Medical 0 0 0
(Federal)
Medical 1 12 4
(Private)
Dispatch 0 1 7
(Local)
Dispatch 0 7 5
(County)
Dispatch NA NA NA
(State/Provincial)
Dispatch NA NA NA
(Federal)
Dispatch 0 1 0
(Private)
Administration 0 18 0
(Local)
Administration 0 9 2
(County)
Administration 0 0 0
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Occupation Number of Total Number in Respondents in
(Level/Sector) Interviews Survey Network Survey Network
(State/Provincial)
Administration 0 0 0
(Federal)
Critical Infrastructure 0 0 0
(Local)
Critical Infrastructure 0 0 0
(County)
Critical Infrastructure 0 4 0
(State/Provincial)
Critical Infrastructure 0 6 3
(Federal)
Critical Infrastructure 3 7 3
(Private)
Education 0 0 0
(Local)
Education 0 3 1
(County)
Education 0 0 0
(State/Provincial)
Education 0 0 0
(Federal)
Education 0 0 0
(Private)
Nonprofit 0 1 0
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Occupation Number of Total Number in Respondents in
(Level/Sector) Interviews Survey Network Survey Network
(Local)
Nonprofit 0 3 1
(County)
Nonprofit 0 0 0
(State/Provincial)
Nonprofit 0 0 0
(Federal)
Nonprofit 1 2 1
(Private)
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Dear Colleague, 
In the next few days, you will receive a 
survey from Cali Mortenson Ellis of the 
University of Michigan. My office has 
hired Cali to conduct an Organizational 
Network Analysis of homeland security 
and public safety officials in St. Clair 
and Lambton Counties.  
I selected you to receive this survey 
because you are an important part of 
our professional community. Please 
take a few minutes to fill out and return 
the survey when it arrives. 
Beyond the benefit to our office, Cali 
will utilize this research to fulfill her 
PhD requirements and has my full 
cooperation and support. Please feel 
free to contact me if you have any 
questions about Cali or her research.  
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Consent to Participate in a Research Study
DISSERTATION RESEARCH:
TRUST AND COMMUNICATION IN CROSS-BORDER COUNTERTERRORISM NETWORKS
Principal Investigator: Cali Mortenson Ellis, PhD Candidate, University of Michigan
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Allan Stam, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Phil Potter, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, University of 
Michigan
Invitation to participate in a research study
Cali Mortenson Ellis invites you to participate in a research study about the social networks of 
homeland security and public safety professionals at the US/Canada border. The purpose is to 
understand the social networks of professionals from different fields and countries. The study 
is being conducted to fulfill the requirements for a PhD in Public Policy and Political Science. 
You have been selected because you have been identified as a professional member of the 
homeland security and public safety community in St. Clair and Lambton Counties. The study 
is funded by the St. Clair County Office of Emergency Management.
Description of subject involvement
If you agree to be part of the research study, you will be asked to complete an anonymous 
survey. This survey is anticipated to take between 10 and 15 minutes to complete.
Benefits
Although you may not directly benefit from being in this study, others may benefit because the 
survey will provide valuable information to the St. Clair County Office of Emergency 
Management about the connections between members of the community.
Risks and discomforts
There are no risks associated with this study because the data collection is completely 
anonymous and the topic is not sensitive. Your name is not on the survey or any related 
instruments.
Confidentiality
I plan to publish the results of this study, but will not include any information that would identify 
you.  There are some reasons why people other than the researchers may need to see 
information you provided as part of the study.  This includes organizations responsible for 
making sure the research is done safely and properly, including the University of Michigan, 
government offices or the study sponsor, St. Clair County Office of Emergency 
Management. Only anonymized data, without any personally identifying information, will be 
released to researchers or any party.
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To keep your information safe, I will take the following steps:
 Your name will not be attached to any data, but a study number will be used instead.
 The data will be kept on a password-protected computer using special software that
scrambles the information so that no one can read it.
Storage and future use of data
The paper survey you fill out will be stored in a locked storage facility at the University of 
Michigan. After the data from the survey has been entered into a database, the original will be 
destroyed. The only file linking names and code numbers will be kept on a flash drive in this 
locked storage facility. When all surveys have been collected and code numbers assigned, the 
key file linking names and codes will be destroyed. The latest that all surveys and key files are 
destroyed will be June 1, 2013. Only data containing code numbers will be made available to 
other researchers for academic purposes.
Voluntary nature of the study
Participating in this study is completely voluntary.  Even if you decide to participate now, you 
may change your mind and stop at any time.  If you decide to withdraw early, your 
information will not be retained or used in any way.
Contact information
If you have questions about this research you may contact:
Cali Mortenson Ellis, cmortens@umich.edu, (310) 683-2149
Dr. Allan Stam, stam@umich.edu, (734) 763-2599
Dr. Phil Potter, pbkp@umich.edu, (734) 615-6905
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or wish to obtain information, 
ask questions or discuss any concerns about this study with someone other than the 
researcher(s), please contact the University of Michigan Health Sciences and Behavioral 
Sciences Institutional Review Board, 540 E Liberty St., Ste 202, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2210, 
(734) 936-0933 or toll free, (866) 936-0933, irbhsbs@umich.edu.
Consent
By returning this survey you are agreeing to be in the study.  Please keep this consent form for 
your records.  Be sure that questions you have about the study have been answered and that 
you understand what you are being asked to do.  You may contact the researcher if you think 




My name is Cali Mortenson Ellis and I am a PhD candidate in public policy and political 
science at the University of Michigan. I have been hired by St. Clair County Emergency 
Management to conduct a survey of homeland security and public safety professionals in the 
St. Clair and Lambton County region. I am also conducting this survey for my PhD 
dissertation. 
My research is about how homeland security and public safety professionals like you build 
trust as a community to overcome barriers that come from being in different countries, and 
different agencies with different missions. I am particularly interested in the US-Canada 
border because of its economic and political significance. 
I recently had the chance to meet a number of professionals in the region and learned about 
how some of you work with other agencies to achieve shared security goals of the whole 
community. You are receiving this because we met in person, or you have been identified by 
a colleague as an important member of the St. Clair-Lambton security and public safety 
community. 
The survey is important to me and to St. Clair County Emergency Management because it 
provides to opportunity to gather information from many more people than I could ever 
interview in person. I hope you find the survey interesting to complete – it should only take 
between 10 and 15 minutes of your time. 
Social network studies like this want to find relationships between people and understand 
how these connections affect an entire group. Why does this matter? Because, of course, no 
one works in isolation. Changes in one part of the network – for example, someone moving 
to a new job – have effects in other parts of the network that you might not see right away. 
Everybody knows this, but the survey allows us to step back and quantify these relationships. 
Having this kind of data can help St. Clair County Emergency Management and everyone 
else better understand the strengths of your network, and where there are chances to improve 
opportunities for resilience. 
Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns about the survey or my research. I 
am happy to talk to you on the phone to answer any questions you may have. Please feel free 
to email me any time at cmortens@umich.edu or call me at (310) 683-2149. 
Sincerely, 
 
Cali Mortenson Ellis 
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Dear Colleague,
Recently, I contacted you to let you know about this survey from Cali Mortenson Ellis of 
the University of Michigan -- Ann Arbor. As I mentioned, my office has hired Cali to 
conduct an Organizational Network Analysis of homeland security and public safety 
officials in St. Clair and Lambton Counties. This analysis will help St. Clair County 
Emergency Management better understand how we work together across boundaries and 
organizations.
I recommended that Cali send this survey to you because you are an important part of our 
professional homeland security and public safety community. Therefore, your response is 
very important. Due to the social network nature of the survey, we need everyone’s 
cooperation for the survey to succeed.
I have known Cali since the time she was working for the Governor’s Homeland Security 
Advisor, Mike McDaniel, at the Michigan National Guard. This research will be the focal 
point of Cali’s PhD requirements and has my full cooperation and support. Please feel 
free to contact me if you have any questions or concerns about Cali’s research. You can 
also reach Cali directly at cmortens@umich.edu or (310) 683-2149.
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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
5700 HAVEN HALL
505 S. STATE STREET
ANN ARBOR, MI 48109-1045
734 764-6313   FAX 734 764-3522
www.lsa.umich.edu/polsci
Greetings!
Recently, you received a survey from me asking about your professional network of homeland 
security and public safety officials in St. Clair and Lambton Counties. As I mentioned earlier, I 
have been hired by St. Clair County Emergency Management to conduct an Organizational 
Network Analysis from this survey, which is also part of my PhD dissertation research.
I would really like to get your input, too. Unlike regular surveys, social network surveys really 
need the cooperation of everyone in order to get a true picture of what is going on. As a 
reminder, you were sent this survey because someone identified you as an important member of 
the professional community of public safety and homeland security officials in the St. Clair and 
Lambton county region. I already know that you are in the network, but without your response, I 
won’t know where you fit into the network.
This letter and survey does not have your name anywhere on it, and all the information you 
provide is only linked with an anonymous code. The survey will only take 10-15 minutes to fill 
out and return.
I am happy to answer any questions or concerns you have about the survey and my PhD 
research. Please feel free to email me any time at cmortens@umich.edu or call me at (310) 683-
2149.
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Dear Colleague,
Last month, you received a survey from my office and Cali Mortenson Ellis of the University of 
Michigan -- Ann Arbor. If you have had the chance to fill out and return the survey – thanks! 
Cali and I appreciate the time you took to contribute to this Organizational Network Analysis of 
homeland security and public safety officials in St. Clair and Lambton Counties. 
Unfortunately, we have not received as many responses as we need. Due to the social network 
nature of the survey, we need everyone’s cooperation for the survey to succeed.
As I mentioned in my last letter, this analysis will help St. Clair County Emergency Management 
better understand how we work together across boundaries and organizations. This survey will 
provide results that we can all use to show that we have a demonstrated and robust commitment 
to community preparedness and resilience. Participation in the survey will also show our 
commitment to rigorous academic research on our important work.
As I said before, Cali is conducting this research to fulfill her PhD requirements and has my full 
cooperation and support. If you have any questions or concerns about Cali’s survey, please let 
me know.
Otherwise, please take just a few minutes today to fill out and return the survey. I have taken the 











      name:  <unnamed>
       log:  /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/
dissertation_current/Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/stata_log_file
> s/descriptive_stats.log
  log type:  text
 opened on:  13 Jul 2015, 15:24:41
. 
. set more off
. 
. *** 4.1.0.9 Survey Procedure ***
. *** Out of Network Descriptive Statistics ***
. 
. * Categorical Variable Descriptors *
. 
. insheet using "/Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/
dissertation_current/network_data/data/outside_network.csv"
(7 vars, 189 obs)
. 
. count if in_site == 1
  118
. 
. la val canada canada
. la var canada "Country Affiliation"
. la def canada 0 "American" 1 "Canadian"
. 
. la val occ_code occ_code
. la var occ_code "Occupation"
. la def occ_code 0 "Unknown" 1 "Law Enforcement" 2 "Fire" 3 "Emergency 
Management" 4 "Medical" 5 "Dispatch" 6 "Administr
> ation" 7 "Critical Infrastructure" 8 "Education" 9 "Nonprofit"
. 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































. la var sector_code "Level of Government/Sector"
. la def sector_code 0 "Unknown" 1 "Local" 2 "County" 3 "State/
Province" 4 "Federal" 5 "Private", replace
. 




. graph export /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/
dissertation_current/Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/outsid
> e_network_by_country.pdf, as(pdf) replace
(file /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/dissertation_current/
Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/outside_network
> _by_country.pdf written in PDF format)
. 




. graph export /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/
dissertation_current/Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/outsid
> e_network_by_occupation.pdf, as(pdf) replace
(file /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/dissertation_current/
Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/outside_network
> _by_occupation.pdf written in PDF format)
. 
. hist sector_code if in_site == 1, discrete frequency addlabels 
xla(0/5, notick valuelabel angle(45))
(start=0, width=1)
. 
. graph export /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/
dissertation_current/Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/outsid
> e_network_by_sector.pdf, as(pdf) replace
(file /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/dissertation_current/
Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/outside_network
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































. *** 4.2 Survey Response ***









. by sector_code: tab arrived
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> sector_code = 0
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 2      100.00      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 2      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> sector_code = 1
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 96       66.67       66.67
1 | 48       33.33      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 144      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> sector_code = 2
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 42       61.76       61.76
1 | 26       38.24      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-> sector_code = 3
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 19       86.36       86.36
1 | 3       13.64      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 22      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> sector_code = 4
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 10       62.50       62.50
1 | 6       37.50      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 16      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> sector_code = 5
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 15       65.22       65.22
1 | 8       34.78      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 23      100.00
. by sector_code: tab occ_code
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> sector_code = 0
   occ_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 2      100.00      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-> sector_code = 1
   occ_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 2 1.39 1.39
1 | 33       22.92       24.31
2 | 75       52.08       76.39
3 | 14 9.72       86.11
5 | 1 0.69       86.81
6 | 18       12.50       99.31
9 | 1 0.69      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 144      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> sector_code = 2
   occ_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 30       44.12       44.12
3 | 4 5.88       50.00
4 | 12       17.65       67.65
5 | 7       10.29       77.94
6 | 9       13.24       91.18
8 | 3 4.41       95.59
9 | 3 4.41      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 68      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> sector_code = 3
   occ_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 15       68.18       68.18
4 | 3       13.64       81.82
7 | 4       18.18      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 22      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> sector_code = 4














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 | 10       62.50       62.50
7 | 6       37.50      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 16      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> sector_code = 5
   occ_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 2 8.70 8.70
4 | 12       52.17       60.87
5 | 1 4.35       65.22
7 | 6       26.09       91.30
9 | 2 8.70      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 23      100.00
. 
. sort occ_code
. by occ_code: tab arrived
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 0
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 4      100.00      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 4      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 1
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 57       63.33       63.33
1 | 33       36.67      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-> occ_code = 2
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 50       66.67       66.67
1 | 25       33.33      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 75      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 3
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 11       61.11       61.11
1 | 7       38.89      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 18      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 4
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 19       70.37       70.37
1 | 8       29.63      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 27      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 5
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 4       44.44       44.44
1 | 5       55.56      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 9      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 6














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 | 25       92.59       92.59
1 | 2 7.41      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 27      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 7
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 10       62.50       62.50
1 | 6       37.50      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 16      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 8
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 2       66.67       66.67
1 | 1       33.33      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 3      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 9
    arrived |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
0 | 4       66.67       66.67
1 | 2       33.33      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 6      100.00
. by occ_code: tab sector_code
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 0
sector_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 | 2       50.00      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 4      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 1
sector_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 33       36.67       36.67
2 | 30       33.33       70.00
3 | 15       16.67       86.67
4 | 10       11.11       97.78
5 | 2 2.22      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 90      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 2
sector_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 75      100.00      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 75      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 3
sector_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 14       77.78       77.78
2 | 4       22.22      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 18      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 4
sector_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
2 | 12       44.44       44.44
3 | 3       11.11       55.56














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































      Total | 27      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 5
sector_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 1       11.11       11.11
2 | 7       77.78       88.89
5 | 1       11.11      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 9      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 6
sector_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 18       66.67       66.67
2 | 9       33.33      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 27      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 7
sector_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
3 | 4       25.00       25.00
4 | 6       37.50       62.50
5 | 6       37.50      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 16      100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> occ_code = 8
sector_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
2 | 3      100.00      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-> occ_code = 9
sector_code |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1 | 1       16.67       16.67
2 | 3       50.00       66.67
5 | 2       33.33      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total | 6      100.00
. 
. tab wave arrived
|        arrived
      wave | 0 1 |     Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
1 |       112 69 |       181 
2 | 70 24 | 94 
-----------+----------------------+----------
     Total |       182 93 |       275 
. 
. tab canada arrived
|        arrived
    canada | 0 1 |     Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
0 | 97 70 |       167 
1 | 85 23 |       108 
-----------+----------------------+----------
     Total |       182 93 |       275 
. sort arrived
. by arrived: tab sector_code occ_code
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> arrived = 0
sector_cod | occ_code
e | 1 2 3 4 5      
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 | 16 50 10 0 1      
18 0 0 | 96 
2 | 20 0 1 8 2      
7 0 2 | 42 
3 | 12 0 0 3 0      
0 4 0 | 19 
4 | 7 0 0 0 0      
0 3 0 | 10 
5 | 2 0 0 8 1      




     Total | 57 50 11 19 4      
25 10 2 |       182 
sector_cod |  occ_code
e |         9 |     Total
-----------+-----------+----------
1 | 1 | 96 
2 | 2 | 42 
3 | 0 | 19 
4 | 0 | 10 
5 | 1 | 15 
-----------+-----------+----------
     Total | 4 |       182 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------
-> arrived = 1
sector_cod | occ_code
e | 0 1 2 3 4      




0 | 2 0 0 0 0      
0 0 0 | 2 
1 | 2 17 25 4 0      
0 0 0 | 48 
2 | 0 10 0 3 4      













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 | 0 3 0 0 0      
0 0 0 | 3 
4 | 0 3 0 0 0      
0 0 3 | 6 
5 | 0 0 0 0 4      




     Total | 4 33 25 7 8      
5 2 6 | 93 
sector_cod |       occ_code
e | 8 9 |     Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
0 | 0 0 | 2 
1 | 0 0 | 48 
2 | 1 1 | 26 
3 | 0 0 | 3 
4 | 0 0 | 6 
5 | 0 1 | 8 
-----------+----------------------+----------





. *** Categorical Variable Descriptors ***
. 
. insheet using "/Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/
dissertation_current/network_data/data/attributes.csv"
(17 vars, 276 obs)
. 
. la val canada canada
. la var canada "Country Affiliation"
. la def canada 0 "American" 1 "Canadian"
. 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































. la var occ_code "Occupation"
. la def occ_code 0 "Unknown (n = 4)" 1 "Law Enforcement (n = 33)" 2 
"Fire (n = 25)" 3 "Emergency Management (n = 8)" 4 "
> Medical (n = 8)" 5 "Dispatch (n = 5)" 6 "Administration (n = 2)" 7 
"Critical Infrastructure (n = 5)" 8 "Education (n = 
> 1)" 9 "Nonprofit (n = 2)"
. 
. la val sector_code sector_code
. la var sector_code "Level of Government/Sector"
. la def sector_code 0 "Unknown (n = 2)" 1 "Local (n = 48)" 2 "County 
(n = 26)" 3 "State/Province (n = 3)" 4 "Federal (n 
> = 6)" 5 "Private (n = 8)", replace
. 
. la val wave wave
. la var wave "Wave"
. la def wave 1 "Original Respondents" 2 "Referrals", replace
. 
. 
. *** 4.3.1.1 Generalized Trust ***
. *** Continuous Variable Descriptors ***
. 
. la var pt1 "Most people are basically honest."
. la var pt2 "Most people are trustworthy."
. la var pt3 "Most people are basically good and kind."
. la var pt4 "Most people are trustful of others."
. la var pt5 "I am trustful."
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































. gen trusting_score = (pt1 + pt2 + pt3 + pt4 + pt5 + pt6)/6
(193 missing values generated)
. la var trusting_score "Generalized Trust Score"
. 
. tabplot occ_code sector_code, xla(1/6, valuelabel angle(45) 
labs(small)) 
. graph export /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/
dissertation_current/Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/tabplo
> t_occ_by_sector.pdf, as(pdf) replace
(file /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/dissertation_current/
Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/tabplot_occ_by_
> sector.pdf written in PDF format)
. 
. * Occupation *
. 
. graph box trusting_score, over(occ_code, label(angle(45))) 
ytitle("Generalized Trust Scale (Likert 1-5)")
. 
. graph export /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/
dissertation_current/Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/trusti
> ng_by_occupation.pdf, as(pdf) replace
(file /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/dissertation_current/
Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/trusting_by_occ
> upation.pdf written in PDF format)
. 
. tab occ_code, summarize(trusting_score)
| Summary of Generalized Trust Score
 Occupation |        Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
------------+------------------------------------
  Unknown ( |   3.9583334   1.0573815 4
  Law Enfor |   3.8638889   .47670007 30
  Fire (n = |   3.9365079   .30035251 21
  Emergency |   4.0714285   .31706317 7
  Medical ( |   4.0208333   .20773726 8
  Dispatch  |   3.6666666   .30429032 4
  Critical  |   4.0555555   .25092423 6
  Education |   4.3333335 0 1
  Nonprofit |   4.1666667   .23570237 2
------------+------------------------------------














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































. anova trusting_score occ_code
Number of obs =      83     R-squared     =  
0.0689
Root MSE      = .423975     Adj R-squared = 
-0.0318




Model |  .984125614     8  .123015702       0.68     
0.7039
                         |
occ_code |  .984125614     8  .123015702       0.68     
0.7039
|
Residual |  13.3018511    74  .179754744   
-----------
+----------------------------------------------------
Total |  14.2859767    82  .174219228   
. 
. * Level of Government/Sector *
. 
. graph box trusting_score, over(sector_code, label(angle(45))) 
ytitle("Generalized Trust Scale (Likert 1-5)")
. 
. graph export /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/
dissertation_current/Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/trusti
> ng_by_sector.pdf, as(pdf) replace
(file /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/dissertation_current/
Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/trusting_by_sec
> tor.pdf written in PDF format)
. 
. tab sector_code, summarize(trusting_score)
   Level of |
Government/ | Summary of Generalized Trust Score
     Sector |        Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
------------+------------------------------------
  Unknown ( |   4.6666667   .47140441 2













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  County (n |   3.9761905   .37000643 21
  State/Pro |   3.7777778   .38490023 3
  Federal ( | 4.25   .43140599 6
  Private ( | 4   .21821792 8
------------+------------------------------------
      Total |    3.936747   .41739577 83
. 
. anova trusting_score sector_code
Number of obs =      83     R-squared     =  
0.1543
Root MSE      =  .39611     Adj R-squared =  
0.0994




Model |  2.20442847     5  .440885693       2.81     
0.0220
                         |
sector_code |  2.20442847     5  .440885693       2.81     
0.0220
|
Residual |  12.0815482    77  .156903224   
------------
+----------------------------------------------------
Total |  14.2859767    82  .174219228   
. 
. * Canada *
. 
. graph box trusting_score, over(canada, label(angle(45))) 
ytitle("Generalized Trust Scale (Likert 1-5)")
. 
. graph export /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/
dissertation_current/Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/trusti
> ng_by_country.pdf, as(pdf) replace
(file /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/dissertation_current/
Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/trusting_by_cou
> ntry.pdf written in PDF format)
. 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Two-sample t test with equal variances
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-------




American |      62    3.893817    .0573037      .45121    3.779231    
4.008403












    diff = mean(American) - mean(Canadian)                        t =  
-1.6261
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =   
81
    Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff 
> 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0539 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1078 Pr(T > t) = 
0.9461
. 
. * 4.3.1.2 Professional and Community Tenure *
. 
. sum q1, detail
                             Q1
-------------------------------------------------------------
      Percentiles      Smallest
 1% 5 5
 5% 7 5
10% 8 5       Obs 87
25% 16 6       Sum of Wgt. 87
50% 23 Mean 22.54598














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































90% 35 39       Variance       86.85833
95% 38 42       Skewness      -.0613238
99% 42 42       Kurtosis       2.382258
. sum q2, detail
                             Q2
-------------------------------------------------------------
      Percentiles      Smallest
 1%     .0833333       .0833333
 5%       .33333       .0833333
10% 1.5       .1666667       Obs 87
25% 3 .25       Sum of Wgt. 87
50% 7 Mean 9.217433
Largest       Std. Dev.      8.408262
75% 14 27
90% 20 33       Variance       70.69886
95% 26 35       Skewness       1.533247
99% 42 42       Kurtosis       5.553058
. sum q3, detail
                             Q3
-------------------------------------------------------------
      Percentiles      Smallest
 1% 0 0
 5% 5 0
10% 10       .8333333       Obs 84
25% 22 2       Sum of Wgt. 84
50% 42 Mean 36.56349
Largest       Std. Dev.      17.43051
75% 50.5 60
90% 57 60       Variance       303.8226
95% 59 60       Skewness      -.5358584
99% 62 62       Kurtosis       2.140951
. sum q4, detail
                             Q4
-------------------------------------------------------------
      Percentiles      Smallest
 1% 0 0
 5% 0 0
10% 0 0       Obs 82













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































50% 12.5 Mean 29.76829
Largest       Std. Dev.      46.70033
75% 30 140
90% 80 180       Variance       2180.921
95% 110 200       Skewness       2.888166
99% 265 265       Kurtosis       12.33044
. 
. sort q1
. scatter trusting_score q1 || lfit trusting_score q1
. 
. sort q2
. scatter trusting_score q2 || lfit trusting_score q2, 
ytitle("Generalized Trust Scale (Likert 1-5)") ti("Time in this jo
> b")








. scatter trusting_score q3 || lfit trusting_score q3, 
ytitle("Generalized Trust Scale (Likert 1-5)") ti("Time in Communi
> ty")

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































. graph export /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/
dissertation_current/Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/trusti
> ng_score_q2_q3.pdf, as(pdf) replace
(file /Users/elliscm/Desktop/active_projects/dissertation_current/
Umich_Dissertation_LaTeX_Template/Chap4/trusting_score_
> q2_q3.pdf written in PDF format)
. 
. sort q4
. scatter trusting_score q4 || lfit trusting_score q4
. 
. pwcorr q1 trusting_score, sig st(95) o list
|       q1 trusti~e
-------------+------------------
q1 |   1.0000 
|
|       82
             |
trusting_s~e |   0.0117*  1.0000 
|   0.9169
|       82       82
|
. pwcorr q2 trusting_score, sig st(95) o list
|       q2 trusti~e
-------------+------------------
q2 |   1.0000 
|
|       82
             |
trusting_s~e |   0.0374*  1.0000 
|   0.7388
|       82       82
|
. pwcorr q3 trusting_score, sig st(95) o list
|       q3 trusti~e
-------------+------------------
q3 |   1.0000 
|
|       79
             |













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data Analysis: Additional Tables
209
Table F.1: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN2
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN2
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 2 2 4
Law Enforcement 22 11 33
Fire 17 8 25
Emergency Management 5 2 7
Medical 5 3 8
Dispatch 4 1 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 6 0 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 66 27 93
Table F.2: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN3
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN3
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 3 1 4
Law Enforcement 24 9 33
Fire 16 9 25
Emergency Management 5 2 7
Medical 5 3 8
Dispatch 4 1 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 6 0 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 68 25 93
210
Table F.3: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN4
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN4
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 3 1 4
Law Enforcement 25 8 33
Fire 16 9 25
Emergency Management 4 3 7
Medical 4 4 8
Dispatch 4 1 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 6 0 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 67 26 93
Table F.4: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN5
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN5
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 2 2 4
Law Enforcement 24 9 33
Fire 15 10 25
Emergency Management 3 4 7
Medical 7 1 8
Dispatch 3 2 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 6 0 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 65 28 93
211
Table F.5: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN6
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN6
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 2 2 4
Law Enforcement 25 8 33
Fire 14 11 25
Emergency Management 4 3 7
Medical 7 1 8
Dispatch 3 2 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 6 0 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 66 27 93
Table F.6: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN7
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN7
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 3 1 4
Law Enforcement 23 10 33
Fire 15 10 25
Emergency Management 4 3 7
Medical 6 2 8
Dispatch 3 2 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 6 0 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 65 28 93
212
Table F.7: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN8
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN8
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 4 0 4
Law Enforcement 27 6 33
Fire 22 3 25
Emergency Management 5 2 7
Medical 6 2 8
Dispatch 5 0 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 5 1 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 79 14 93
Table F.8: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN9
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN9
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 2 2 4
Law Enforcement 18 15 33
Fire 5 20 25
Emergency Management 1 6 7
Medical 4 4 8
Dispatch 3 2 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 6 0 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 44 49 93
213
Table F.9: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN10
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN10
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 2 2 4
Law Enforcement 19 14 33
Fire 17 8 25
Emergency Management 5 2 7
Medical 3 5 8
Dispatch 3 2 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 5 1 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 59 34 93
Table F.10: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN11
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN11
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 3 1 4
Law Enforcement 21 12 33
Fire 13 12 25
Emergency Management 4 3 7
Medical 4 4 8
Dispatch 4 1 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 6 0 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 60 33 93
214
Table F.11: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN12
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN12
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 1 3 4
Law Enforcement 20 13 33
Fire 15 10 25
Emergency Management 5 2 7
Medical 2 6 8
Dispatch 3 2 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 5 1 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 56 37 93
Table F.12: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN13
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN13
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 1 3 4
Law Enforcement 21 12 33
Fire 9 16 25
Emergency Management 4 3 7
Medical 2 6 8
Dispatch 3 2 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 6 0 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 51 42 93
215
Table F.13: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN14
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN14
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 2 2 4
Law Enforcement 20 13 33
Fire 14 11 25
Emergency Management 6 1 7
Medical 3 5 8
Dispatch 3 2 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 6 0 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
Total 59 34 93
Table F.14: Ego Occupation by Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN15
Same Occupation Group Ego-Alter: SN15
Ego Occupation Different Same Total
Unknown 2 2 4
Law Enforcement 22 11 33
Fire 16 9 25
Emergency Management 7 0 7
Medical 4 4 8
Dispatch 3 2 5
Administration 2 0 2
Critical Infrastructure 6 0 6
Education 1 0 1
Nonprofit 2 0 2
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